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ACCESS TO NETWORKS: ECONOMIC AND
CONSTITUTIONAL CONNECTIONS
Daniel F. Spulber † & Christopher S. Yoo††
A fundamental transformation is taking place in the basic approach to
regulating network industries. Policy makers are in the process of abandoning their century-old commitment to rate regulation in favor of a new
regulatory approach known as access regulation. Rather than controlling
the price of outputs, the new approach focuses on compelling access to and
mandating the price of inputs. Unfortunately, this shift in regulatory policy
has not been met with an accompanying shift in the manner in which regulatory authorities regulate prices. Specifically, policy makers have continued
to base rates on either historical or replacement cost.
We argue that this fundamental shift in regulatory approach demands
an equally fundamental shift in the approach to setting prices. Economic
theory suggests that regulatory authorities should base access prices on market
prices. In addition, because compelled access to most telecommunications
networks requires that competitors be permitted to place equipment on the
network owner’s property, access requirements constitute physical takings for
which market-based compensation must be paid. Although the unavailability of market-based determinants once justified basing prices on some measure
of cost, the shift in regulatory policy (especially when combined with the emergence of direct, facilities-based competition made possible by technological
convergence) has caused the justifications for refusing to set rates on the basis
of market prices to fall away.
We then use these insights to analyze access pricing with respect to three
emerging regulatory issues: (1) access to unbundled network elements mandated by the Telecommunications Act of 1996, (2) access to utility poles compelled by the 1996 amendments to the Pole Attachments Act, and (3) open
access to digital subscriber line (DSL) and cable modem networks providing
high-speed broadband services.
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Access is becoming a potent conceptual tool for rethinking our worldview as
well as our economic view, making it the single most powerful metaphor of
the coming age.
Jeremy Rifkin1

INTRODUCTION
One of the most striking economic developments of the last decade has been the increasing importance of telecommunications networks. Scientific breakthroughs have allowed the information and
communications sectors to expand to more than eight percent of the
nation’s total economy,2 having grown at roughly twenty percent each
year, a rate more than five times faster than the overall economy.3
Telecommunications companies also played a starring role in a significant number of megamergers that have transformed the business environment4 and also served as a driving force behind the spectacular
rise and equally spectacular fall of the NASDAQ index. The increase
in the importance of the telecommunications sector has been
matched by an increase in its volatility, with substantial overcapacity
and the shakeout of companies interpreted by many as a classic boomand-bust cycle.5 Perhaps most dramatically, the failure of WorldCom
has produced the largest bankruptcy in U.S. history.6 As FCC Chairman Michael Powell noted, these developments have left the telecommunications industry in a state of “utter crisis,” with banks worldwide
contemplating industry write-offs of up to half-a-trillion dollars and
telecom operators and vendors in the United States laying off half-amillion workers in a year and a half.7
The importance and the instability of the telecommunications
sector highlight the importance of understanding how this sector is
regulated. Not only does government policy play a key role in shaping
returns and investment incentives, a growing number of commentators have suggested that regulation has played a decisive role in precipitating much of the turmoil that has wracked the industry of late,
1

JEREMY RIFKIN, THE AGE OF ACCESS 15 (2000).
See U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, ECON. AND STATISTICS ADMIN., DIGITAL ECONOMY 2002,
at 26 (2002), available at http://www.esa.doc.gov/508/esa/pdf/DE2002r1.pdf.
3
See id. at 25, 27 tbl.3.4 (reporting that the information technology sector was responsible for between twenty-five and thirty-two percent of annual GDP growth between
1996 and 2000).
4
Houlihan Lokey Howard & Zukin, Inc., 100 Largest Announcements in History,
MERGERSTAT REV. (Jan. 2000), LEXIS, Mstrev File.
5
See, e.g., Bill Atkinson, No Recovery on Horizon for Telecoms, BALT. SUN, Mar. 28, 2002,
at 1C; Andrew Cassel, What Really Battered WorldCom? End of Telecom Boom, PHILA. INQUIRER,
July 24, 2002, at C1; David Hayes & Suzanne King, Telecom: From Boom to Bust, KAN. CITY
STAR, July 21, 2002, at A1.
6
Yochi J. Dreazen & Ryan Chittvim, Upheaval at Worldcom, WALL ST. J., July 22, 2002,
at A6.
7
Too Many Debts; Too Few Calls, ECONOMIST, July 20, 2002, at 59, 59.
2
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having shaped both the recent wave of mergers8 and the WorldCom
bankruptcy.9 The direct link between regulation and industry performance makes understanding the economic implications of current
regulatory policy all the more imperative.
For more than a century, telecommunications regulation was
marked by a remarkable degree of segmentation and invariability. Because each communications service was available only through a single technology, each medium of communications could be governed
by its own, discrete regulatory system that did not have to take into
account the impact of other technologies. In addition, because policy
makers tended to regard each medium as a natural monopoly, they
subjected telecommunications networks to the now-classic regime of
common-carriage regulation, in which state and federal regulatory authorities imposed nondiscrimination and mandatory service requirements, monitored quality, supervised investments, and restricted
competitive entry. Most importantly, this approach focused on the
rates that telecommunications providers could charge end users for
purchasing outputs. The primary policy issue centered on whether
such rates should be based on historical cost or replacement cost.10
Two emergent forces have begun to destabilize this century-old
regulatory consensus. First, scientific advances are rendering different communications media increasingly interchangeable, allowing intermodal or platform competition. Not only has the emergence of
competition between technological platforms provided consumers
and firms with a dazzling variety of ways to access network services; it
has also begun to put pressure on the historical regulatory distinction
among voice, video, and data communications, in which each type of
service was governed by a separate regulatory regime.11
The second driving force is the fundamental shift in regulatory
approach exemplified by the enactment of the Telecommunications
Act of 1996.12 The 1996 Act was designed to introduce competition
into local telephone service by compelling every incumbent local telephone company to interconnect with its competitors on reasonable
and nondiscriminatory terms and to provide them with unbundled
8
See Jim Chen, The Magnificent Seven: American Telephony’s Deregulatory Shootout, 50
HASTINGS L.J. 1503, 1514–38 (1999).
9
For example, noted telecommunications expert Peter Huber has argued that Washington created WorldCom on the grounds that “[m]uch of the telecom industry’s current
woe can be traced to government accountants who set interconnection tariffs at levels completely divorced from economic reality.” Peter Huber, Washington Created WorldCom, WALL
ST. J., July 1, 2002, at A14.
10
See infra Part I.C.4.b.
11
See Christopher S. Yoo, Vertical Integration and Media Regulation in the New Economy,
19 YALE J. ON REG. 171, 285–90 (2002).
12
Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 47
U.S.C.).
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access to every element of its network.13 Initially hailed as a major
deregulatory change,14 it increasingly appears that, rather than representing a shift towards deregulation, the 1996 Act marked a shift towards a different style of regulation known as “access regulation.”
Rather than regulating the terms under which consumers purchase
outputs, access regulation instead regulates the ability of competitors
to obtain inputs. The 1996 Act is part of a broader shift in regulatory
philosophy that spans at least six network industries.15 As Jeremy
Rifkin aptly acknowledges, we do indeed live in “the Age of Access.”16
These two forces have economic and constitutional implications
that should fundamentally transform the manner in which policy makers approach network industries. Somewhat surprisingly, regulatory
authorities have not adequately accounted for these forces. Instead,
they have reflexively adhered to the cost-based approaches associated
with traditional rate regulation without adequately considering
whether these shifts require an equally fundamental change in regulatory approach. Because of the protracted nature of the legal proceedings regarding the implementation of compelled access, these issues
have not yet been fully addressed by the courts, with the Supreme
Court’s decisions in Verizon Communications, Inc. v. FCC17 and National
Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Gulf Power Co.18 representing only a
few rounds of what will undoubtedly be a protracted series of major
court decisions addressing these issues.
The debates about access to telecommunication networks have
been further obscured by academic writings that have made networks
seem like increasingly complex and exotic phenomena. Many of the
basic concepts about networks remain poorly defined and misunderstood. In addition, networks tend to be characterized by sunk costs as
well as economies of scale and scope that many theorists believe distinguish the economic analysis of networks from other forms of production.19 A burgeoning literature argues that networks are susceptible
to unique types of market failures, so-called network externalities,
which in turn require regulators to intervene in ways not required in
other industries.20
13

See 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(2)–(3) (2000).
See, e.g., Statement by President William J. Clinton Upon Signing S. 652, 32 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. DOC. 218 (Feb. 12, 1996) (praising the Act for “providing a roadmap for deregulation in the future”); Congress Maps a Telecom Future, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 6, 1996, at 14
(calling the overall thrust of the Act “clearly deregulatory and pro-competitive”).
15
See Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Grand Transformation of Regulated
Industries Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1323, 1340–46 (1998).
16
See RIFKIN, supra note 1, at 3.
17
535 U.S. 467 (2002).
18
534 U.S. 327 (2002).
19
See infra notes 107–10 and accompanying text.
20
See infra notes 118–20 and accompanying text.
14
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This Article is designed to place the issues surrounding access
pricing on a sounder economic and legal foundation that takes into
account the full import of the changes in technology and regulatory
theory. Part I demystifies networks as an economic phenomenon by
offering a more precise definition of what constitutes network access.
As we will explain in greater detail later, network access is properly
viewed as third-party use of the transmission services provided
through the network. Economic analysis indicates that efficiency
would best be promoted if access to those network services was based
on market value. Reliance on market-based pricing mechanisms
tends not only to allocate goods to their highest and best use; it also
provides the proper signals to parties who consider investing in network technologies.
Rather than basing access prices on the market value of the network services provided, regulators continue to employ access-pricing
methodologies that focus on the cost of the inputs used to establish
the physical network. For the reasons we further explain in Part I, we
find this approach to be quite problematic. Over time, competition
tends to drive the market prices of outputs and the costs of production together so that ideally the purchase cost of inputs would represent a good approximation of the earning potential—and thus the
market value—of those inputs. In practice, however, both purchase
cost and market value are moving targets. Improvements in production technology, innovations in goods and services, shifts in consumer
demand, entry and exit by producers, and changes in factor prices are
likely to cause the market value of inputs to deviate from their initial
cost. The greater the rate of change of technology and other forces,
the greater this disparity is likely to be. Given the unpredictability of
such changes, the deviations from market value caused by basing access prices on the cost of the inputs used to create the network will
tend to lead to gluts or shortages and will eventually induce entrants
to over- or under-invest in certain types of network capacity. Furthermore, basing access prices on input costs ignores the fact that the
whole is typically greater than the sum of its parts. So long as a firm is
efficient and creative, the value of the services it provides is likely to
exceed the cost of the inputs it uses. Frictions such as transaction
costs and asymmetric information, which are present in practically any
market, are likely to create further discrepancies between market
prices of inputs and factor costs.
The only plausible justification for basing regulated prices on
costs incurred was that the absence of external markets caused by the
lack of technological substitutes made it impossible to base rates on
market prices. By stimulating direct facilities-based competition, the
emergence of platform competition and the shift to access regulation
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have made market-based pricing both feasible and desirable. Part I
closes by refuting arguments advanced by other scholars suggesting
that network industries are somehow prone to unique forms of market failure that justify adhering to cost-based pricing. Economies of
scale and scope, sunk costs, and network economic effects do not generally cause market prices to deviate from levels that promote efficiency and do not change the basic analysis.
Part II describes the constitutional implications of the emergence
of platform competition and the shift to access regulation by evaluating the limits that the Takings Clause places on the regulation of access pricing. Because rate regulation simply restricts the terms and
conditions under which parties may contract for finished goods and
services, it represents the type of adjustment of economic burdens traditionally subject to the more permissive analysis applied to nonpossessory takings.21 Access regulation, in contrast, typically requires
network owners to permit third parties to place equipment on their
property. As a result, access regulation necessarily falls within the Supreme Court’s physical takings jurisprudence, which mandates that
the government reimburse property owners for the market value of
their property without regard to the economic impact of the regulation or whether the regulation in question furthers important public
interests. Therefore, just compensation for compelled access exactly
corresponds to economically efficient prices for compelled access.
Part III applies the analytical framework developed in the preceding Parts to three emerging policy problems: (1) unbundled access to
elements of local telephone networks, an issue that underlay the Supreme Court’s decision in Verizon Communications, Inc. v. FCC; (2) access to networks of utility poles, an issue that formed the basis for the
Court’s decision in National Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Gulf
Power Co.; and (3) open access to high-speed broadband systems, encompassing both cable modem systems and DSL systems, an issue that
represents the focus of two ongoing proceedings before the FCC. We
conclude that the steps taken to implement each of these access regimes violate the economic and constitutional principles that we have
identified. Established principles of economics and constitutional law
instead require that regulators adopt methodologies that base access
rates on market prices.
EFFICIENT PRICING

OF

I
ACCESS

TO

NETWORKS

This Part removes some of the perceived mystery surrounding the
economics of network access. It begins in subpart A by offering a definition of what constitutes a network and access to a network. Subpart
21

See, e.g., Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124–25 (1978).
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B lays out the basic case for basing access rates on market pricing.
Subpart C discusses the various methodologies for determining market prices. Finally, subpart D reviews the various features of networks
that have led some commentators to suggest that reliance on market
prices in network industries might not constitute the best way to promote economic efficiency.
In short, conventional economic principles dictate that access
prices should be based on the market value of the incremental network services provided by the relevant input. Although the absence of
comparable transactions in external markets has historically led regulatory authorities to eschew market-based pricing in favor of costbased pricing, platform competition and the shift to access regulation
have drained this justification of its vitality. The emergence of direct
facilities-based competition from alternative telecommunications networks has created market-based benchmarks that can serve as independent bases for setting rates. Contrary to the suggestion of some
commentators, distinctive economic features of networks such as sunk
costs, economies of scale and scope, and network economic effects, do
not alter this core conclusion.
A. Defining Access to Networks
At its most basic level, a network is a system of nodes connected by
links. The nodes of a traditional telecommunications network are the
company’s switches and customer premises, while the links are the
wires that connect them. In a wireless network, the nodes are the receivers and transmitters, and the links are the radio spectrum. Networks have many different configurations. A star-shaped network is a
simple configuration in which there is a single hub and all lines are
spokes. Hub-and-spoke networks have multiple hubs with high-capacity trunk lines connecting the main hubs and lower-capacity spokes
reaching terminal points. The high-capacity trunk lines aggregate
traffic and offer cost economies in comparison to a network that provides connections between every individual point. Telecommunications networks have high-capacity trunks or backbones and lowercapacity distribution lines such as the local loop to the individual
home or business. Economic life is critically dependent on many
types of privately owned networks: for communications (broadcast television and radio, cable television, telephone, broadband data, utility
poles), for energy (electric power transmission and distribution, natural gas and petroleum pipelines), for transportation (airlines, rail-
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roads, buses, trucks, shipping), and for distribution systems (postal
services, product wholesale services).22
The types of networks on which we are focusing generally are
physical production facilities that encompass factors of production such
as land, capital equipment, and technology.23 Construction of these
facilities requires network owners to invest in substantial fixed assets
that should be viewed in the same way as other types of capital equipment such as manufacturing plants, office buildings, and commercial
structures. Like other long-term assets, the network’s physical production facilities do not vary directly with output in the short term. Moreover, like other capital investments, the configuration of the network’s
physical assets cannot be changed in the short term. Given sufficient
time, however, the network’s capital equipment is variable and can be
adjusted to create different capacity levels. The operation of a network’s facilities often requires variable inputs as well, such as the labor
used to maintain its facilities and to monitor its operations.
In combination, the productive inputs that constitute the network are used to create a stream of services, such as the transmission
and distribution of communications, that are the outputs of the network. Just as natural gas transmission does not consume the physical
pipeline, usage of a telecommunications network does not consume
the network itself, but instead only temporarily precludes the provision of services to some other user. Of course, network use does impose some wear and tear on the network’s physical production
facilities. The measures of depreciation employed under generally accepted accounting principles do not accurately indicate the value of
the services provided by the equipment, however. As a result, the applicable depreciation rules typically do not properly reflect the equipment’s economic life.
Access to a network refers to the use of the network’s services, which
are the outputs of the network.24 Thus, access to a network does not
22
This Article focuses primarily on telecommunications networks. Although we suspect that the economic and constitutional concepts that we discuss may have implications
for other network industries, such as energy and transportation, developing those ideas
would require detailed consideration of the technological and regulatory conditions of
those industries and would exceed the scope of this Article. We therefore reserve any firm
policy conclusions with respect to energy and transportation networks. We believe, however, that the definitions of basic network concepts advanced in this subpart have general
application to all network industries. As a result, we draw on examples from the energy
and transportation industries to help illustrate the definitions that we are advancing.
23
Our focus is on physical facilities in transportation, energy, and communications
networks. We do not consider other uses of the term networks that refer to interconnected
relationships between people, such as with social or business relationships.
24
Although more general definitions of access exist, they seem too broad to provide
guidance for pricing access to networks. See, e.g., BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 13 (7th ed.
1999) (defining access as “[a]n opportunity or ability to enter, approach, pass to and from,
or communicate with”); 1 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 72 (2d ed. 1989) (defining the
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represent simply a physical connection to the network. Rather, access
refers to the opportunity to benefit from the services generated by
network usage. Because the use of network elements by another company potentially reduces the services that the network owner can provide, the correct access price depends on what the company could
have obtained by using those network services itself or by selling network services to some other party. The proper measure of the value
of network access is thus the value of the network services provided,
which in turn is determined by the value of the network’s final output.
B. Making the Economic Case for Market-Based Pricing of
Network Access
1. Market Prices, Regulated Prices, and Efficiency
The consensus economic position is that so long as competition is
sufficiently robust, market prices represent the best reflection of
value. The market price is the outcome of the forces of supply and
demand. The supply side of the market reflects the costs to sellers of
providing a good, the demand side reflects the benefits to buyers from
consuming the good. At market equilibrium, prices are thus determined by the marginal cost to sellers of providing a good and the marginal benefit to buyers of consuming it. Prices are adjusted through
the process of exchange to balance supply and demand and to clear
the market so that prices are further reflections of scarcity—the meeting of consumer wants and supplier capacities.25
Because the services of a network are comparable to the output of
other types of production facilities, they can be allocated by market
processes. Markets refer to the interaction of buyers and sellers,26
noun access as a “way or means of approach,” such as an “entrance, channel, passage, or
doorway,” or the action of “coming to or towards; approaching,” and identifying the verb
access as “[t]o gain access to (data, etc., held in a computer or computer-based system, or
the system itself)”). This Article does not consider the notion of access as an entitlement,
as is the case with access to facilities under the Americans with Disabilities Act, or with
access to education or housing under antidiscrimination statutes.
25
Classical economists, such as Adam Smith and David Ricardo, well understood that
the determination of market equilibrium prices and value results from the interaction of
supply and demand, at least in the short run. The classical economists had various costbased explanations for the determination of the long-run prices of land, labor, and capital.
Beginning in the nineteenth century, the marginalist revolution that led to today’s neoclassical economy extended the supply-and-demand analysis consistently to output and input
markets, both in the short and long run. See W. STANLEY JEVONS, THE THEORY OF POLITICAL
ECONOMY 81–174 (2d ed., London, MacMillan 1879); CARL MENGER, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 114–21 (James Dingwall & Bert F. Hoselitz eds. & trans., Free Press 1950) (1871);
LÉON WALRAS, ELEMENTS OF PURE ECONOMICS 20 (William Jaffé trans., George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1954) (1874); 1 ALFRED MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 554–61 (4th ed.,
London, MacMillan 1898); MARK BLAUG, ECONOMIC THEORY IN RETROSPECT 298–326 (rev.
ed. 1968).
26
On the role of intermediaries in market allocation mechanisms, see DANIEL F.
SPULBER, MARKET MICROSTRUCTURE: INTERMEDIARIES AND THE THEORY OF THE FIRM (1999).

\\server05\productn\C\CRN\88-4\CRN401.txt

896

unknown

Seq: 12

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

6-MAY-03

11:13

[Vol. 88:885

with market prices mediating between what buyers are willing to pay
and what sellers are willing to accept. Market prices are determined
through the activities of suppliers, customers, and intermediaries such
as retailers and wholesalers. In the short run, firms increase prices
when demand exceeds supply and lower prices when supply exceeds
demand. In the long run, suppliers make production decisions by
comparing the prices of goods to their costs and to the prices of alternative goods the supplier might provide. Firms will supply a good at
some price if the cost of each unit provided and the cost at the margin
(the last unit provided) are less than or equal to the market price.
Conversely, consumers make purchasing decisions based on the benefits that they derive from that good and the availability of substitute
goods. Consumers will purchase a good at some price if the benefits
of each unit consumed at the margin (the last unit consumed) equal
or exceed the market price. The price will eventually adjust until the
market clears, at which point supply and demand will be in balance
and the benefits to consumers will equal or exceed the costs to suppliers. The market price equals the marginal benefit of the good and
thus indicates its economic value.
Markets are effective mechanisms for pricing not only physical
products such as automobiles and food, but also services such as transportation or restaurant services. Many types of services are routinely
purchased and sold. For example, video rental stores supply their customers with entertainment services corresponding to viewing a movie
at home. Movie theaters provide similar entertainment services that
require viewing the movie at the theater. Automobile renting and
leasing companies supply customers with transportation services. Economic theory does not distinguish between the market allocation of
physical products and the market allocation of services. Accordingly,
markets can allocate network-generated services just as they do any
other type of physical product or service.
Market prices promote allocative and dynamic efficiency. Efficient
allocation of goods occurs when the purchasers of a particular good
are those who obtain the greatest benefit from consumption and the
suppliers of the good are those who incur the lowest cost of production. By allocating the good or service to the person or firm willing to
pay the most, the price mechanism ensures that goods and services
are placed in the hands of those able to put them to their best use.
The price mechanism further ensures that goods and services are provided by the most efficient suppliers.
Dynamic efficiency is attained when economic actors make efficient investment decisions. Investment decisions are efficient when
the present discounted value of the marginal returns to invest equals
the marginal cost of investment. Market prices provide incentives for
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efficient investment decisions because the market prices of services
created by capital facilities are the best measure of the marginal benefit derived by users of those services. A firm deciding whether to invest in production facilities makes efficient decisions by considering
the market value of the products and services to be created with those
facilities in comparison to the cost of investment. Similarly, a firm
choosing whether to purchase a good or service or to construct its
own production facilities makes efficient decisions by comparing the
market price of purchasing the good or service with the costs of constructing and operating its own facilities. Because market prices allocate productive capacity efficiently, signaling marginal benefits and
marginal cost, they provide an accurate guide for investment
decisions.
Regulated prices based on costs tend not to reflect accurately either the value of a good or service or the economic costs of producing
the good or service. This results from the failure of regulatory authorities to process information about costs and benefits as effectively as
the many buyers and sellers that make up a market.27 Even worse, the
government typically must rely on information provided by the regulated entities, which of course have a vested interest in the outcome.
As a result, it is not uncommon for regulated prices to cause allocative inefficiency. To the extent that the regulated prices deviate
from market prices, they send incorrect signals to both users and suppliers of access. For example, regulation that sets the price of network
access below market rates in effect requires network owners to subsidize competitors. This in turn leads those competitors to adjust the
mix of inputs so that they employ reduced quantities of other inputs
and greater quantities of network access. In addition, because access
is an input used in the production of other goods and services, pricing
it below market rates can cause competitors to make inefficient decisions about which markets to enter. Below-market pricing may mislead competitors into believing that the benefits of serving a particular
market exceed the costs by understating the true economic costs associated with entering that market. The result not only creates allocative inefficiency in the primary market by stimulating excess demand
for network access; it also creates secondary distortions in the markets
for other inputs by increasing or reducing demand for those inputs.
To the extent that the suppliers of access are regulated utilities, customers as well as the utilities will bear the burden.
In addition to impeding allocative efficiency, regulated pricing
can also impede dynamic efficiency.28 Pricing access at below-market
27

See F.A. HAYEK, THE FATAL CONCEIT 85–88 (W.W. Bartley III ed., 1989).
For an earlier discussion of the dynamic efficiency problems posed by access regulation, see Yoo, supra note 11, at 246–47, 268–69.
28

\\server05\productn\C\CRN\88-4\CRN401.txt

898

unknown

Seq: 14

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

6-MAY-03

11:13

[Vol. 88:885

levels discourages existing network owners from investing in additional network capacity. At the same time, it also discourages competing companies from investing in alternative capacity, including
substitute network technologies. This effect underscores the extent to
which access requirements represent a policy anomaly. The central
focus of competition policy is to prevent monopolies from emerging
and to break them up whenever they occur. Access requirements, in
contrast, leave the bottlenecks in place and instead simply require the
monopolist to share its facilities. In addition, by rescuing competing
firms from having to supply the relevant input for themselves, compelled access destroys the incentive to invest in alternative network
technologies and thus deprives providers of emerging substitute technologies of their natural strategic partners. As a result, compelled access can entrench any supposed bottleneck facility by forestalling the
emergence of alternative network technologies. This perverse effect is
particularly problematic in technologically dynamic industries, in
which the prospects of developing new ways either to circumvent or to
compete directly with the alleged bottleneck are the brightest. And
even if a regulatory regime were defensible when imposed, it all too
often endures long after technological change has eroded its
justifications.29
Finally, there is good reason to question the extent to which ratemaking authorities will make the pursuit of economic efficiency their
primary goal. As demonstrated by the burgeoning literature on public choice, governmental institutions are subject to a wide variety of
pressures that can cause them to redirect competition policy towards
noneconomic ends.30 The system of cross subsidies in telephone pricing aptly illustrates how governmentally established pricing can be directed towards political and social goals, and how such pricing is an
imperfect guide to allocating goods and services or making investment decisions.31 A review of a previous attempt by the FCC to pro-

29
See, e.g., STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 286–87 (1982); 2 ALFRED E.
KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION 127 (1971); Richard A. Posner, Natural Monopoly
and Its Regulation, 21 STAN. L. REV. 548, 631–32 (1969).
30
See, e.g., William J. Baumol & Janusz A. Ordover, Use of Antitrust to Subvert Competition, 28 J.L. & ECON. 247, 248–52, 256–59 (1985); Fred S. McChesney, Be True to Your School:
Chicago’s Contradictory Views of Antitrust and Regulation, in THE CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF
ANTITRUST 323, 323–33 (Fred S. McChesney & William F. Shughart II eds., 1995); Sam
Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. & ECON. 211, 211–12 (1976);
Posner, supra note 29, at 618–25; George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic Regulation, 2 BELL
J. ECON. & MGMT. SCI. 3, 3–10 (1971).
31
See, e.g., David L. Kaserman & John W. Mayo, Cross-Subsidies in Telecommunications:
Roadblocks on the Road to More Intelligent Telephone Pricing, 11 YALE J. ON REG. 119, 142–45
(1994).
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mote competition through access requirements provides little basis
for optimism in this regard.32
The end result is similar to any system of rent controls, with demand for the service exceeding supply at the regulated price. Regulated prices do not fully serve their function of rationing user capacity
and stimulating the provision of supplier capacity. In contrast, market
prices send correct signals to companies that seek access as well as to
utilities that provide access. Competing companies will have incentives to make economically correct decisions about the amount of services to obtain from the network access supplier and the extent to
which they should invest in their own network services.
2. The Difference Between Market Prices and Unit Costs
As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, the market price of a
good is the best indication of its value. The market price of a good
can differ from the costs incurred in obtaining the inputs to produce
the good because many forces affect market prices through changes
in demand and supply. New methods of production that increase efficiency can increase supply at any given price. Changes in the relative
prices of inputs, including finance capital, wages, land rents, and the
prices of parts and components have complex effects on supply. The
entry and exit of producers and decisions to expand or contract production capacity also impact supply. The introduction of innovative
products can create shifts in both demand and supply toward these
new products. Changes in consumer tastes and income, as well as
changes in the prices of substitute and alternative goods, can also
change demand at any given price. Accordingly, the market prices of
output are unlikely to correspond to the past costs incurred to produce that output. Even if individual producers try to anticipate output prices in their decisions, market uncertainty will defeat their
efforts, leading to randomness in profit margins.
Even if market prices were to reflect accurately the costs of the
marginal producer, they would depart from the costs of the inframarginal producer. Costs tend to vary across firms because of differences in business methods, management techniques, production
processes, and technological knowledge. Moreover, output value can
depart from input costs because firms combine inputs in different
ways, creating different products and addressing customer needs differently. Firm heterogeneity strongly implies that the unit costs of any
individual firm are likely to differ from the market price. Under the
textbook paradigm of perfect competition with identical firms and
32
See Donna N. Lampert, Cable Television: Does Leased Access Mean Least Access?, 44 FED.
COMM. L.J. 245 (1992) (analyzing the leased access provisions in the Cable Act of 1984).
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static demands, efficient entry guarantees that the market price eventually equals the unit cost of firms. This need not be the case when
unit costs vary across firms.
Because of uncertainty regarding changes in output markets,
there are likely to be deviations between output prices and unit costs.
Some firms will earn economic profits and others will suffer economic
losses. Moreover, firms often change prices in anticipation of developments because they respond to buyers’ and sellers’ expectations of
future market conditions.33
Even though competitive forces tend to move market prices toward cost through the exit or improvement of inefficient producers,
the past costs of producing a good are likely to differ substantially
from current and future costs. Costs fluctuate due to changes in input
prices and technology. Market prices correspond more to current
and forward-looking demand and supply conditions than to past costs.
Traditional cost-of-service regulation at best adjusts prices to reflect
past costs,34 thereby permitting regulated rates to depart substantially
from market prices. The fundamental reason for this departure is
that the economic cost of inputs used to produce some output is not
the same as the market price or economic value of an output produced with those inputs. Thus, market prices are necessarily better
than regulated rates based on the costs of production.
C. Determining Market Price
1. Pricing Based on External Market Transactions
Arguing that regulatory authorities should base network access
rates on market prices leaves open the question of how to determine
the prevailing market price. Market transactions constitute the most
(if not the only) reliable indicator of individual preferences.35 Thus,
regulators should develop market benchmarks if they choose not to
defer to market mechanisms for allocation.
Under standard valuation techniques, the most reliable indicator
of market price tends to be the comparable sales approach, in which the
price charged for the hypothetical transaction in question is determined by prices charged in actual market transactions involving simi33
“The question of fact is thus whether entrepreneurs as a class receive on the average more or less than the normal competitive rate of return on the productive services of
person or property which they furnish to the business. The question does not admit to any
definitive answer on inductive grounds.” FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT
364 (1921).
34
See infra Part I.C.4.a.
35
See, e.g., Paul A. Samuelson, Consumption Theory in Terms of Revealed Preference, 15
ECONOMICA 243, 243–44 (1948).
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lar goods.36 Two types of market transactions can serve as external
benchmarks for comparable sales. The easiest case occurs when a network owner sells into an external market the same type of access mandated by the government. In that situation, market value
determination is simple because comparable sales can serve as a reliable proxy for the services provided.
In addition, market value may be inferred from the price charged
for access to a substitute transmission technology providing similar
services. Although the historical balkanization of communications has
long made such determinations impossible, platform competition has
made resort to this type of external benchmark increasingly feasible.
Admittedly, transactions involving substitute technologies can be
more difficult to apply as benchmarks than transactions using the
same type of network. Differences in network configuration can complicate direct comparisons between alternative technologies. For example, although cable television and digital broadcast satellite (DBS)
systems have emerged as direct competitors, the wire-based distribution of cable operators is necessarily restricted to a limited geographic
area, whereas the footprint of DBS providers is inherently national in
scope.37 In addition, different network technologies provide different
performance and reliability levels. As a result, prices must be adjusted
to reflect differences in the type of network before any comparisons
can be drawn. However complicated such adjustments can be, they
are by no means so intractable as to render transactions occurring on
alternative networks useless as external benchmarks for inferring market prices.
The other principal market-based valuation method is the income
capitalization approach. When commercial property is involved, regulators can use a discounted cash-flow analysis to determine the present
value of the income that the input is projected to earn.38 Because the
earnings are based on the prices charged in the output markets, it is
possible to apply this method even if the input being priced is not sold
in any external markets. In addition, because the income capitalization approach is based on data derived from actual market transac36
See, e.g., Michael DeBow, Unjust Compensation: The Continuing Need for Reform, 46 S.C.
L. REV. 579, 581–82 (1995); Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Compensation for Takings: How Much Is
Just?, 42 CATH. U. L. REV. 721, 727–28 (1993).
37
DBS’s inherently national scope makes it uniquely well suited to take advantage of
the economies inherent in national distribution of video programming. See Christopher S.
Yoo, The Rise and Demise of the Technology-Specific Approach to the First Amendment, 91 GEO. L.J.
(forthcoming 2003) [hereinafter Yoo, Rise and Demise]; Christopher S. Yoo, Rethinking the
Commitment to Free, Local Television: A Public Goods Analysis 37–38 (Vanderbilt Law and Economics Research Paper No. 02-09; Vanderbilt Public Law & Legal Theory Research Paper
No. 02-09, 2002), at http://ssrn.com/abstract_id=333702 [hereinafter Yoo, Rethinking Free,
Local Television].
38
See, e.g., DeBow, supra note 36, at 581–82.
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tions, it is still generally regarded as a reasonably reliable means for
determining market value.
2. The Second-Best Solution in the Absence of External Markets
If a market benchmark is not available, then an estimate based on
the economic costs of providing the service may be necessary. Such
an estimate should approximate the market value of all the inputs
used to create and operate the network, with the understanding that
the market price of network access may be greater or less than that
estimate. Over time, the market price of access should reflect the economic cost of all of the inputs used to provide network services. In
the short run, however, market prices may deviate from economic
cost. If network access is scarce, the market price of access would
likely be greater than the replacement cost of the network. Conversely, with a glut of network capacity or obsolescence of network
technology, the market price of access would likely be less than the
replacement cost of the network. For example, a glut in fiber optic
capacity would likely reduce the price of access to below the cost of
the network. Accordingly, it is important to distinguish the market
value of a good from the economic costs of providing it. However, the
economic cost of providing that good, properly estimated, provides a
second-best alternative.
The economic cost of producing a product or service equals the
total opportunity costs of all the inputs used to produce that product
or service. An input’s opportunity cost refers to the value of the best
opportunity necessarily foregone, that is, the return from the best alternative employment of that input. The economic cost of producing
network services in telecommunications includes the opportunity
costs of such inputs as capital, land and land rights, wires, utility poles,
towers and fixtures, switches, control systems, construction costs, operation and maintenance expenses, and management costs. The user
costs of capital associated with owning plants and equipment is equal to
the foregone return from the best alternative investment of expenditures made for the plant and equipment.
For most productive inputs, the most accurate measure of opportunity cost is their market value, which is simply the current market
price of the input less the avoidable direct costs associated with providing it. The best estimate is based on the opportunity cost of the
input. For example, if a company owns a plot of land that it could
rent to another company for $500, the opportunity cost of using the
land is $500.
Replacement cost, which refers to the cost of purchasing an input at
current market prices, in turn provides a reasonable approximation of
market value. Replacement costs are forward-looking costs of con-
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structing the network and include all costs that the utility would incur
to rebuild its system, including capital, land, labor services, and management.39 Accordingly, the market value of the inputs used to create
a network includes the replacement costs of facilities and equipment,
as well as the user cost of capital evaluated using the market cost of
capital, land and land rights evaluated using current market rents,
and current operation and maintenance expenses. A good proxy for
replacement cost is the recent purchase cost of the input. Of course
recent purchase cost is not a perfect measure, as the market price may
have changed since the most recent purchase. Nonetheless, in the
absence of indicia that more directly measure market value, replacement cost estimates based on comparable transactions provide a workable measure of market value.
It is now generally accepted that replacement cost is superior to
historical cost as a measure of market value, because, as noted by thenProfessor Stephen Breyer, “[a] competitive marketplace values assets,
not at their historical price, but at their replacement value—the present
cost of obtaining the identical service that the old asset provides.”40
Historical costs suffer from several well-recognized infirmities. For example, the market value of an input may have increased or decreased
since its purchase. In addition, historical costs will typically be based
on the book values of plant and equipment (also known as “embedded costs”). The depreciation schedules allowed under the applicable
accounting rules and tax laws often fail to constitute proper economic
measures of depreciation. Replacement cost, in contrast, more accurately reflects changes in value. It is true that replacement cost is not
without its own complications41 and that short-term changes can temporarily cause it to rise above or fall below equilibrium levels. Nonetheless, replacement cost provides a reasonably reliable measure of
the direct costs of providing network services.
The costs of supplying network access also include transaction
costs. The network operator must devote management and employee
39
Scholars and policy makers disagree as to whether the replacement cost determination should be based on the network as it is currently configured or on a hypothetical
network employing the most efficient technology and configuration available. Compare
Verizon Communications Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 501–23 (2002) (holding that basing
rates on hypothetical networks represented a reasonable construction of the applicable
statute), and Missouri ex rel. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of Mo., 262
U.S. 276, 312 (1923) (Brandeis, J., concurring in the judgment) (advancing economic arguments in favor of hypothetical networks), with J. GREGORY SIDAK & DANIEL F. SPULBER,
DEREGULATORY TAKINGS AND THE REGULATORY CONTRACT 419–25 (1997) (arguing in favor
of basing on the replacement cost of existing networks). Resolution of this debate, while
undoubtedly important in implementing any access regime, falls outside the scope of this
Article, which focuses primarily on the importance of ensuring that any access prices set by
regulatory authorities include some measure of the market demand for access.
40
BREYER, supra note 29, at 38.
41
See infra notes 64–67 and accompanying text.
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resources to handling the provision of network services, including arranging network connections, monitoring usage, and billing for network use. In the face of mandated access, the owner of the network
must determine the existing demands for capacity and provide additional capacity to meet regulatory requirements. For example, in the
case of pole attachments, the FCC initially required that a utility take
“all reasonable steps” to expand the capacity of its poles, ducts, conduits, and even rights-of-way upon request by telecommunications carriers and cable operators.42 Moreover, the FCC still requires that
electric utilities verify the amount of space that they would like to reserve for themselves.43 This provision of pole attachment services may
also require that utility owners accommodate those telecommunications or cable TV companies seeking access that is more convenient or
less expensive than producing their own system of poles.44 Transaction costs significantly affect prices and decisions in competitive markets. They may appear intangible to regulators and thus may be
difficult for those subject to access requirements to recover.
3. The Efficient Component Pricing Rule
As emphasized thus far, pricing access to a network refers to the
prices attached to the services generated by the entire network. An
alternative regulatory approach to network access grants users the services of particular inputs to the network rather than the output of services from the network as a whole. This regulatory scheme originated
with railroad trackage rights, whereby the Interstate Commerce Commission gave third-party operators access rights to another railroad’s
track.45 The scheme continues in the Telecommunications Act of
1996, which mandates a very different type of network access based on
the use of the services of individual components of the network rather
than the services of the network itself.46 Thus, this approach focuses
on the services of network inputs rather than the outputs. For example, with regards to network components such as the local loop,
switches, or other facilities (called “network elements”), the 1996 Act
42
Implementation of Local Competition Provisions in Telecommunications Act of
1996, First Report and Order, 11 F.C.C.R. 15499, 16075–76 ¶¶ 1161–1163 (1996) (“Local
Competition Order”), rev’d in relevant part sub nom. S. Co. v. FCC, 293 F.3d 1338, 1346–47
(11th Cir. 2002).
43
Id. at 16078 ¶ 1169. Telephone and video companies that own poles are not allowed to reserve space. Id. at 16079 ¶ 1170. Unlike the previous provision, this provision
was sustained on judicial review. See S. Co., 293 F.3d at 1347–49.
44
Local Competition Order, 11 F.C.C.R. at 16076–77 ¶ 1164 (“We will not require telecommunications providers or cable operators seeking access to exhaust any possibility of
leasing capacity from other providers . . . before requesting [the pole owner] to expand
[its] capacity.”).
45
See 49 U.S.C. § 11102(a) (2000).
46
See 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(3) (2000).
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requires that incumbent local exchange carriers (LECs) provide “nondiscriminatory access . . . on an unbundled basis at any technically
feasible point.”47 Such an access requirement is analogous to requiring that a manufacturer provide another company with the use of a
piece of capital equipment, such as a machine tool. Incumbent LECs
also have the duty to provide “physical collocation of equipment necessary for interconnection or access to unbundled network elements
at the premises of the local exchange carrier.”48 Collocation corresponds to a manufacturer allowing another company to locate its
equipment in the manufacturer’s factory.
Regulating access to inputs raises some of the same issues as regulating access to the services provided by the network as a whole. The
best way to price access to inputs is to consider the market price of
similar access. If a market benchmark for access is not available, it is
necessary to resort to cost-based estimates of providing access to the
input.
It is misleading to assume, as does the FCC, that the cost to the
network of providing the use of an input is confined to the direct cost
of that input.49 The input is part of a network, and accordingly, another company’s use of a network component necessarily has an impact on the output of services using the network. The network
element’s capacity to provide network services is correspondingly diminished, thus reducing the output of services by the network itself.
To take a simple example, a set of tires for an automobile may cost
only $400, but allowing another motorist to use the tires precludes the
owner from using the automobile. The foregone value of the entire
automobile might then be $20,000. In the same way, the cost of allowing competing telecommunications companies access to unbundled network elements depends not only on the direct cost of
providing that element, but also on the indirect cost of removing the
services of that element from the incumbent telephone company’s
network. Accordingly, the cost of providing access to unbundled network elements should be measured in terms of the reduction in overall network services that results from another company’s use of a
network element for another purpose.

47

Id.
Id. § 251(c)(6).
49
As will be discussed in greater detail later in this Article, the FCC issued regulations
requiring that prices for the unbundled access to network elements be based on each
element’s Total Element Long Run Incremental Cost (TELRIC). See infra notes 409–15
and accompanying text. This cost notion corresponds with the direct cost that a manufacturer would incur in providing another company with the usage of a piece of capital equipment in the manufacturer’s factory. It does not include any factors designed to capture
opportunity costs.
48
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The proper cost valuation of making an input available is the direct cost of the input plus the reduction in the value of the output.
Thus, prices set at economic cost of an input must represent the sum
of the direct incremental cost of providing the input and the opportunity costs associated with providing the input to a competitor. The
analytical methodology for setting input access prices at these levels is
known as the Efficient Component Pricing Rule (ECPR),50 which
would set access prices according to the following formula:
access price = incumbent’s per-unit incremental cost of providing access + the
incumbent’s opportunity cost of providing the unbundled input.

Because another company’s use of network elements potentially
reduces the services that the network can provide, the correct price of
those network elements depends on what the company could have
obtained by selling network services. Thus, the market price of network services—the outputs of the network—should be used as the basis
for determining the value of access to the services of network component—the inputs of the network. In the absence of market prices for
network output, the opportunity cost calculation can be based on the
regulated rates for the incumbent firm’s output.
We acknowledge that allocating the retail markup among multiple products using ECPR (or any other access pricing method) poses
conceptual and administrative problems. For example, if a competitor were to lease two or more network elements from an incumbent
LEC, it would be improper to include the entire retail markup in the
opportunity cost component for both elements, as this would in effect
allow the incumbent LEC to recover twice for the same markup. The
retail markup could be divided among the various elements, but doing so would require some method (probably based in cost accounting) for apportioning the markup to particular elements. While this
problem is seen most clearly when the same competitor leases both
elements, the identical problem would arise if two different competitors were to lease the same elements or even two different elements in
the same chain of production. Although the allocation of foregone
retail margin to particular components is inevitably arbitrary, such
problems are endemic to any system of establishing prices for inputs.
Apportioning the foregone retail margin should not prove any more
50
The ECPR concept originally appeared in Robert D. Willig, The Theory of Network
Access Pricing, in ISSUES IN PUBLIC UTILITY REGULATION 109 (Harry M. Trebing ed., 1979);
William J. Baumol, Some Subtle Pricing Issues in Railroad Regulation, 10 INT’L J. TRANSPORT
ECON. 341 (1983); and William J. Baumol & J. Gregory Sidak, The Pricing of Inputs Sold to
Competitors, 11 YALE J. ON REG. 171, 178–89 (1994) (suggesting that local exchange carriers
be allowed to sell to their competitors necessary inputs at a price that reflects all costs,
including opportunity costs). For further discussion, see SIDAK & SPULBER, supra note 39,
at 283–392. For a model of competition with ECPR pricing, see Daniel F. Spulber & J.
Gregory Sidak, Network Access Pricing and Deregulation, 6 INDUS. & CORP. CHANGE 757 (1997).
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intractable than the apportionment of common costs that must occur
under any regulatory scheme that relies on compelled access.51 In any
event, the pricing of the element should at least cover its direct incremental cost to avoid cross subsidization.
The market-determined Efficient Component Pricing Rule (MECPR) adjusts the calculation of opportunity costs by using a benchmark market price (if one exists), rather than regulated rates, for the
incumbent firm’s output. It is again likely that regulated rates for network services will not correspond to the market price of competing
alternatives. Thus, the M-ECPR provides a method of adjusting access
prices to reflect market prices of network services, thus promoting efficient allocation of network services as well as dynamic efficiency of
investment decisions.52
Any regulatory method that bases access prices solely on production costs without taking market demand into account will likely lead
to allocative and dynamic inefficiency. The cost of providing access is
not simply production cost, but also includes the value to the owner of
the best opportunity foregone. Thus, access prices must include an
opportunity cost component, preferably based on market prices, to
reflect market demand for access. Including opportunity costs in access reflects the most fundamental economic principles.
4. Traditional, Cost-Based Approaches to Setting Rates in Regulated
Industries
Conventional economic theory suggests that access rates in network industries promote economic efficiency only if they are based on
market prices. If market-based pricing is unavailable, then the appropriate second-best solution is to base rates on the economic costs of
providing access, a concept that embraces both direct incremental
costs and opportunity costs. The classic rate-making approach taken
by regulatory authorities, however, focuses solely on direct incremental costs and excludes opportunity costs. Even regulatory authorities
who are willing in principle to regard opportunity costs in their ratemaking calculus in practice eliminate opportunity costs by positing
that they are zero. The following discussion analyzes the flaws in both
of these approaches.
51
See Implementation of Local Competition Provisions in Telecommunications Act of
1996, First Report and Order, 11 F.C.C.R. 15499, 15852–53 ¶ 696 (1996) (“Local Competition Order”) (proposing two “reasonable” approaches to allocating common costs: use of a
fixed allocator and allocation of “only a relatively small share of common costs to certain
critical network elements . . . that are most difficult for entrants to replicate promptly”),
rev’d in relevant part sub nom. S. Co. v. FCC, 293 F.3d 1338, 1346–47 (11th Cir. 2002).
52
See SIDAK & SPULBER, supra note 39, at 307–33.
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a. Direct Cost
The overwhelming majority of regulatory authorities have established rates solely on the basis of direct costs.53 The dominant initial
position was the “fair value” principle associated with the landmark
decision in Smyth v. Ames,54 which required that rates be based on the
replacement cost of the assets used to provide the service.55 The
Court based its preference for replacement costs on the recognition
that if the regulated entity constituted a natural monopoly, by definition no external transactions would exist that could serve as the basis
for market-based pricing.56 At the same time, parties who obtained
service under a regulated rate always had the option of constructing a
substitute facility. This meant that in the long run, replacement cost
would tend to reflect market demand. Although in some circumstances technological and functional obsolescence could cause replacement cost to be a misleading reflection of market value, in the
absence of data based on actual transactions it remained a useful
proxy.57
The primary alternative to the replacement cost approach associated with Smyth v. Ames was the historical cost methodology associated
with Justice Brandeis’s separate opinion in Missouri ex rel. Southwestern
Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Service Commission.58 Although Justice Brandeis recognized that analyzing the comparable sales approach would
represent the most accurate methodology for determining the utility’s
value for rate-making purposes, he concluded that such prices were
impossible to determine, “since utilities, unlike merchandise or land,
are not commonly bought and sold in the market.”59 Brandeis further
noted that calculating value by capitalizing the utility’s earnings necessarily embroiled regulatory authorities in a “vicious circle.”60 As the
Court later noted, “The heart of the matter is that rates cannot be
made to depend upon ‘fair value’ when the value of the going enterprise depends on earnings under whatever rates may be antici53

See infra notes 54–76 and accompanying text.
169 U.S. 466 (1898), overruled by Fed. Power Comm’n v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co.,
315 U.S. 575 (1942).
55
On its face, Smyth v. Ames appeared to offer a laundry list of considerations to guide
the rate-making determination. See id. at 546–57. If placed in context, however, it is clear
that Smyth and its progeny firmly endorsed the replacement-cost approach to rate regulation. See Stephen A. Siegel, Understanding the Lochner Era: Lessons from the Controversy over
Railroad and Utility Rate Regulation, 70 VA. L. REV. 187, 227–28 (1984).
56
See Smyth, 169 U.S. at 544–47.
57
See Siegel, supra note 55, at 221–22, 228–29, 231; supra notes 39–40 and accompanying text.
58
262 U.S. 276, 292–94 (1923) (Brandeis, J., concurring in the judgment).
59
Id. at 292 (Brandeis, J., concurring in the judgment).
60
Id. (Brandeis, J., concurring in the judgment).
54
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pated.”61 As a result, fair value becomes “the end product of the
process of rate-making not the starting point.”62
In the absence of some market-determined basis for setting rates,
Brandeis believed that rates necessarily must be based on some measure of cost.63 He recognized that replacement cost might well represent the best evidence of present value, as it constitutes a better
reflection of technological improvements.64 In the end, however,
pragmatic considerations led Brandeis to advocate relying on historical costs. Determining replacement cost, he concluded, is an inherently speculative endeavor.65 Basing value on replacement cost,
moreover, exposes both consumers and investors to the risks associated with fluctuations in market prices.66 By comparison, relying on
historic cost results in fewer subjective determinations of value.67
Brandeis’s argument quickly became one of the focal points in
the debate over rate-setting methodologies.68 The Supreme Court has
frequently invoked it to explain why various regulatory authorities
have decided not to use market-based pricing when setting rates.69
Eventually, however, the controversy between historical and replacement cost ended in a somewhat inconclusive draw. Rather than
resolving this dispute on its substantive merits, the Supreme Court ultimately invoked notions of administrative deference and judicial restraint to reject the belief that rates must be set in accordance with any
particular approach. Thus, the Court resolved to uphold any rate determination, regardless of methodology, so long as it fell within a
61

Fed. Power Comm’n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 601 (1944).
Id.; accord Verizon Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 482–84 (2002); Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299, 309 n.5 (1989); Fed. Power Comm’n v. Natural
Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575, 603 (1942) (Black, J., concurring); St. Louis & O’Fallon Ry.
Co. v. United States, 279 U.S. 461, 504 & n.22, 505 (1929) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Jim
Chen, The Second Coming of Smyth v. Ames, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1535, 1556 (1999); Siegel, supra
note 55, at 246–47.
63
See Southwestern Bell, 262 U.S. at 299–300.
64
See id.
65
See id. at 292–302; see also BREYER, supra note 29, at 38–39 (noting that “to determine the replacement cost of plant or equipment is too complex a task for an administrative process”).
66
See Southwestern Bell, 262 U.S. at 302–08. To the extent that Brandeis’s opinion
evinces a strong desire to insulate both consumers and investors from the dislocation
caused by market fluctuations, it exhibits some strikingly anti-economic tendencies. His
position is perhaps explained by the desire to promote classical-style democracy that permeates his jurisprudence. See L.S. Zacharias, Repaving the Brandeis Way: The Decline of Developmental Property, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 596, 634–38 (1988). A more cynical observer might
suggest that his interest in protecting investors from market fluctuations followed more
from his substantial holdings in commercial paper issued by utilities. See id. at 637–38.
67
See Southwestern Bell, 262 U.S. at 308–10.
68
See Siegel, supra note 55, at 240 n.227.
69
See Verizon Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 483 (2002); Duquesne
Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299, 308 & n.5, 309 (1989); Fed. Power Comm’n v. Natural
Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575, 603 (1992) (Black, J., concurring).
62
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fairly broad zone of reasonableness.70 These principles allowed the
Court to sustain a wide variety of rate-making methodologies based on
increasingly complicated versions of historical or replacement cost.71
Eventually, formal rate-making gave way to the imposition of price
caps, in which the maximum rates that utilities could charge in any
particular year did not depend on costs, but rather on the rates set the
previous year, reduced by a fixed percentage to reflect increases in
productivity.72 The rates charged for the initial year in the typical
price-cap scheme, however, were based on historical cost.73 Therefore, although the utility could adjust prices below the cap, price-cap
methodologies did not cure the basic flaw of failing to reflect demand
considerations.
The unifying thread to these approaches was their commitment
to basing rates on direct cost (whether historical or replacement cost)
and their refusal to take opportunity cost or market-based influence
into account.74 Fortified by this background, regulators charged with
implementing access regimes have tended to follow the traditional
patterns and have based access rates solely on either historical or replacement cost.75 As the foregoing discussion reveals, however, regulatory approaches that base rates solely on direct costs suffer from a
fundamental conceptual flaw. Because they fail to reflect the earning
potential of the regulated input, approaches based on direct cost,
70
As the Court noted in Hope Natural Gas, “[I]t is the result reached not the method
employed which is controlling. It is not theory but the impact of the rate order which
counts. . . . The fact that the method employed to reach that result may contain infirmities
is not then important.” Fed. Power Comm’n v. Hope Natural Gas, 320 U.S. 591, 602
(1944) (citations omitted); accord Duquesne, 488 U.S. at 314–16; Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315
U.S. at 586. See generally Siegel, supra note 55, at 254–59 (describing a standard whereby
“[l]egislative decisions should stand . . . unless ‘so outrageous as to shock the common
sense of justice’”) (quoting Gerard C. Henderson, Railway Valuation and the Courts, 33
HARV. L. REV. 902, 1056 (1920)). It should be noted that using reasonableness to evaluate
the sufficiency of compensation is itself somewhat circular. See Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1034 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment).
71
See, e.g., Verizon Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 496–518, 523–25
(2002) (upholding replacement cost methodology as a matter of statutory construction,
but declining to address the overall reasonableness of rates on ripeness grounds); Duquesne, 488 U.S. at 310–12 (upholding rates based on modified historical-cost methodology); Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 761, 768–74 (1968) (upholding rates
based on composite cost data from an entire area rather than prevailing field prices); Hope
Natural Gas, 320 U.S. at 596–98, 603–05 (upholding rates based on historical cost).
72
See, e.g., Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Dominant Carriers, Report and
Order and Second Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 4 F.C.C.R. 2873 (1989).
73
Verizon, 535 U.S. at 486 (citing United States Tel. Ass’n v. FCC, 188 F.3d 521, 524
(D.C. Cir. 1999) and Alfred E. Kahn et al., The Telecommunications Act at Three Years: An
Economic Evaluation of Its Implementation by the Federal Communications Commission, 11 INFO.
ECON. & POL’Y 319, 330–32 (1999)).
74
Verizon, 535 U.S. at 484 (citing ALFRED E. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF REGULATION
40–41 (1988)).
75
See, e.g., infra notes 397–403, 496–99 and accompanying text.
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whether historical or replacement, are incompatible with a century of
economic insight.76
The only conceivable justification for failing to base rates on market prices is that the absence of comparable transactions rendered
such an attempt inherently circular. Indeed, as the foregoing discussion reveals, Justice Brandeis and the regulatory authorities and courts
that followed his lead relied on this reasoning to justify their advocacy
of cost-based approaches.77 What modern regulatory authorities have
failed to recognize is the manner in which the emergence of platform
competition and the shift from rate regulation to access regulation
have now made it possible to base rates on market benchmarks. The
possibility of input substitution allows external markets for inputs to
exist even in the absence of external markets for final goods. In addition, the raison d’être of access regulation is to foster competition in
final goods markets. Any success in doing so will only serve to further
undercut the justification for refusing to base rates on market transactions. The shift from output to input regulation has also undermined
the previously proffered reasons for rejecting the income capitalization approach. When regulation focuses on the rate charged for an
input rather than for a final good, the regulated price becomes only
one of many factors that determines the good’s overall earning potential. As long as the input remains only one component of the overall
good, the income capitalization approach is not tautological. The degree of circularity will be limited to the percentage of the total cost of
the final good represented by the regulated input.
Equally important is the manner in which technological change
has allowed competition among different network platforms to develop. The availability of substitute networks employing alternative
means of transmission has in turn created external markets that now
make it possible for regulatory authorities to base rates on prices
charged in actual market transactions. In addition, the advent of facilities-based competition in turn can lead to deregulation of the rates
charged for the final good, which will eliminate the circularity inherent in the income capitalization approach.
In short, two fundamental changes are transforming the basic approach to regulating network industries: the development of platform
competition and the shift to access regulation. These changes undercut the rationale underlying rate-making authorities’ decisions both to
76
See Herbert Hovenkamp, The Marginalist Revolution in Legal Thought, 46 VAND. L.
REV. 305, 325 (1993) (citing marginalism’s impact on the debate over the use of historical
cost); Siegel, supra note 55, at 251–52 (noting that although some jurists used neoclassical
economics to attack the replacement cost methodology associated with Smyth v. Ames, the
critique ultimately proved too much by also undermining attempts to base rates on historical cost).
77
See supra notes 58–62 and accompanying text.
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base rates on some measure of direct costs and to exclude from their
calculus components designed to reflect earning potential. Together,
the development of platform competition and the shift to access regulation have rendered continued adherence to that approach untenable and mandate, as a matter of economic policy, that regulatory
authorities begin to base access rates on market prices.
b. Excess Capacity and Zero Opportunity Costs
Courts that have recognized the importance of ensuring that access rates contain some measure of opportunity cost have begun to
employ a different gambit to justify basing access rates solely on direct
incremental costs—by positing that opportunity costs were zero. In
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,78 for example, the State
of New York replaced a privately negotiated system, in which cable
companies who wished to lay cable television wires across a given
apartment building would pay the building owner a standard rate of
five percent of the revenue realized from that building, with a regulatory regime that accorded building owners a grand total of one dollar
in compensation.79 In a decision that was ultimately overturned by
the U.S. Supreme Court, the New York Court of Appeals ruled that
this nominal compensation represented a fair return to the building
owner, given that the equipment in question occupied “an area of the
building for which she does not claim to have any other use.”80 According to the court, then, the opportunity cost of occupying property
not currently employed for other purposes was, in effect, zero. The
concurring opinion sounded a similar note when it offered that “if the
installation of a cable substantially interfere[d] with the owner’s present or future use of the building, we must presume that the [State]
would award reasonable compensation for the taking pursuant to its
regulations.”81
The point is made even more dramatically in the Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Alabama Power Co. v. FCC,82 sustaining the compensation regime established under the Pole Attachments Act. In that case,
the court acknowledged the importance of according the owners of
networks of utility poles the fair market value of access to their poles,
which included the pole owner’s opportunity costs.83 The court none78
458 U.S. 419 (1982). The U.S. Supreme Court’s Loretto opinion is analyzed in detail infra Part II.A.2.
79
See 458 U.S. at 423–25.
80
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 423 N.E.2d 320, 333 (N.Y. 1981),
rev’d, 458 U.S. 419, 421 (1982).
81
Id. at 336 (Gabrielli, J., concurring).
82
See 311 F.3d 1357, 1367–71 (11th Cir. 2002). The Pole Attachments Act and the
Alabama Power decision are discussed in greater detail infra Part III.B.1.
83
See Ala. Power, 311 F.3d at 1368–69.

\\server05\productn\C\CRN\88-4\CRN401.txt

2003]

unknown

Seq: 29

ACCESS TO NETWORKS

6-MAY-03

11:13

913

theless sustained a regime that based rates solely on direct incremental costs on the ground that one person’s use of the network does not
necessarily preclude another person’s use.84 Thus, so long as excess
network capacity exists, the grant of a right of access does not foreclose any opportunities to sell space to other interested firms. The
court concluded, then, that the opportunity costs of allowing another
party to access the network was zero. Therefore, the court held that
access rates need not include compensation for opportunity costs unless 1) the network was at full capacity, and 2) other parties sought
access, or the network owner had a higher-valued use for that
capacity.85
These opinions ignore certain aspects of networks’ infrastructure
investments that make excess capacity inevitable. Capacity in network
industries is notoriously “lumpy” in that it can only be efficiently added in large, discrete quantities. In addition, if the needs of network
users are to be met, such capacity must necessarily be added before it
is actually needed, a problem that is particularly acute for carriers of
last resort who are obligated to provide service to anyone who requests
it.86 The tendency towards excess capacity is exacerbated further by
the manner in which excess capacity can enhance network reliability
and provide insurance against unforeseeable variability in demand.87
These qualities make excess capacity a feature that is endemic to all
networks. In addition, these courts have fallen into the same trap as
computer system managers that have allowed additional users free use
of what, at the time, appeared to be excess capacity. That is, this approach overlooks the fact that use of what appears to be excess capacity imposes real costs by hastening the need for additional capacity.
The fact that the use of the facility does not consume the facility is of
no consequence. As we have pointed out earlier,88 this is a quality
that is inherent in all physical networks and, to some extent, in capital
assets generally.
Finally, even assuming for the sake of argument that the costs
associated with allowing access to a building were zero, it does not
necessarily follow that nominal compensation is sufficient to make the
building owner whole. Economic analysis indicates that the price
charged by the building owner would be determined in part by the
amount that other potential users of the same resources might be will84

See id. at 1370.
See id. at 1369–71.
86
See SIDAK & SPULBER, supra note 39, at 119–27; William J. Baumol & J. Gregory
Sidak, The Pig in the Python: Is Lumpy Capacity Investment Used and Useful?, 23 ENERGY L.J. 383,
385–86 (2002).
87
See SIDAK & SPULBER, supra note 39, at 126–27; Baumol & Sidak, supra note 86, at
386–89.
88
See supra Part I.A.
85
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ing to pay. The price would also be determined by the value of that
access to the person purchasing it.89 In other words, the assumption
that networks with excess capacity face zero opportunity costs ignores
the fact that market value is determined in part by demand-side considerations that are independent of any supply-side, cost-oriented considerations. The mere fact that access to the facility has value to the
party seeking access gives the facility’s owner both the incentive and
the ability to insist on receiving more than nominal compensation.
The facts of Loretto provide an apt illustration of these basic concepts. The value of the right to attach a cable wire to an apartment
building is not determined by the costs of constructing a half-inch
strip across the roof and down the face of an apartment building, as a
rate-making approach based on historical or replacement cost might
suggest. In addition, the fact that attaching a cable television wire to a
building does not consume the building does not mean that the right
to attach has no real value absent proof that the building owner had
some other use for the same space. Our analysis indicates instead that
the value of the right to attach the cable wire to an apartment building is determined by the value of the services that are provided
through those wires. Indeed, it is no surprise that the pricing arrangement negotiated among the parties—before the state began regulating such access—was based on a percentage of the value of the
services provided by the cable company.90
D. Demystifying Network Economics
Fundamental economic principles thus indicate that efficiency
would best be promoted if network access prices were based on the
market value of the relevant inputs. If direct, market-based indicia are
not available, regulatory authorities should use a methodology such as
ECPR that includes the direct costs as well as the opportunity costs of
providing the input. That said, some markets contain features that
can cause them to fail to produce outcomes that promote efficiency.
In particular, barriers to entry by new competitors may constitute a
cause of market failure, particularly if the incumbent is a monopolist.
The existence of barriers to entry can provide a monopoly incumbent
with the market power to distort prices away from efficient levels.
Some commentators have suggested that network industries possess
89
To use a concrete example, the fact that a summer home may be unoccupied during the winter would arguably justify regarding the home as having excess capacity. It does
not follow, however, that the government would be justified in forcing the owner to rent
the home to another person who wished to occupy it during the winter for only a nominal
fee. The rent that normally would be charged would depend upon the number of other
possible renters as well as the amount that the owner could obtain by refusing to contract
at a particular price.
90
See supra notes 78–81 and accompanying text.
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features, such as sunk costs, economies of scale and scope, and network economic effects, that may deter entry in ways that can cause
market outcomes to deviate from efficient levels.91
The analysis that follows refutes those arguments. As a preliminary matter, the standard discussions of entry barriers assume that
they are an exogenous feature of technology.92 In fact, companies
choose their technology, by carrying out research and development
and by choosing production methods and product features. Because
many aspects of technology are endogenous, it is thus likely that competitors will find their way around technological impediments to entry.93 Moreover, most of these features, which are not unique to
network industries, are easily taken into account by traditional price
mechanisms. Because these network features do not serve to deter
entry, potential competition by new entrants will discipline established
firms and is likely to lead to competitive pricing and innovation. Even
if entry barriers exist, multiple incumbents could compete with each
other, leading to competitive prices.
1. Economies of Scale and Scope
Economies of scale and scope exist in networks, but they do not
prevent markets from allocating the services that networks provide.
Economies of scale exist for a single-product firm if unit costs decline as
a function of output.94 For a multiple-product firm, economies of
scale mean that total production costs exceed the total of each output
multiplied by its marginal cost. Economies of scope exist if a company
achieves cost economies by producing goods in combination rather
than separately.
Networks certainly exhibit economies of scale. Large-scale networks can employ advanced high-capacity switches. Moreover, a firm
building and operating a large network benefits from economies of
scale because it can spread the overhead costs associated with construction and maintenance over a larger set of activities. Economies
of scale may also be present because of volume-surface relationships,
so that the volume of a conduit can be expanded with a less-thanproportional increase in the surface. Moreover, the unit costs of capacity in a transmission line decline because the necessary cost of constructing the conduit remains fixed regardless of the number of
transmission wires placed inside the conduit. Therefore, telecom
91

See infra notes 96, 107–10, 115–26 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY 67 (1968).
93
See Daniel F. Spulber, Competition Policy in Telecommunications, in 1 HANDBOOK OF
TELECOMMUNICATIONS ECONOMICS 477, 495–97 (Martin E. Cave et al. eds., 2002).
94
Much of the discussion in this section draws upon Spulber, supra note 93, and
Daniel F. Spulber, Deregulating Telecommunications, 12 YALE J. ON REG. 25 (1995) [hereinafter Spulber, Deregulating].
92
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companies find that the incremental cost of installing additional fiber
capacity during initial installation is less than the actual unit cost of
installing fiber capacity.
Because networks can use common facilities to provide multiple
services, networks also contain economies of scope. For example, the
same switch can provide multiple services such as call waiting and call
forwarding. A network’s economies of scope can also derive from its
structure. For example, if a network’s products are viewed as connections between pairs of network users, rather than operating a point-topoint network, then traffic can be aggregated in trunk lines with
points reached by distribution or feeder lines. By realizing economies
of scale in the trunk lines, the firm achieves economies of scope in the
production of multiple connections.
Economies of scale and scope exist in practically any industry.
For example, in the automobile industry, the unit cost of producing
an automobile is lower the more automobiles a manufacturer produces. Producing only a few cars requires making them practically by
hand. Producing many cars allows a manufacturer to develop a large
plant that benefits from automation as well as specialization and division of labor, as recognized by Adam Smith.95 Economies of scope
also explain why an automobile manufacturer can save costs by producing many types of cars—the company shares the common costs of
manufacturing, engineering, and management across multiple product lines.
Contrary to the suggestions of some scholars,96 the presence of
cost economies in manufacturing does not prevent markets from allocating goods and services that are produced with economies of scale.
Multiple producers can have economies of scale and scope and compete with each other in supplying goods and services. For example,
automobile manufacturers compete with each other to sell cars unhindered by the presence of cost economies in manufacturing. There
is no a priori reason that markets for telecommunications services
should differ in any way. Multiple networks can operate with economies of scale and scope and still compete to supply services to customers. Market prices thus continue to be an accurate measure of value.

95

See ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 3–16 (Edwin Cannan ed., 1937) (1776).
For the classic argument that economies of scale constitute barriers to entry, see
JOE S. BAIN, BARRIERS TO NEW COMPETITION 53–113 (1956). For an application of this
argument to local telephony, see Glenn A. Woroch, Local Network Competition, in HANDBOOK
OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS ECONOMICS, supra note 93, at 641, 693, 708 (arguing that “the
strong scale and scope economies inherent in production of network services, and the
huge sunk investments that are necessary for facilities-based supply” are barriers to entry
into local exchange telecommunications, but noting that technological change can also
help entrants).
96
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Sufficient scale relative to the size of the market results in a natural monopoly.97 A given industry is said to exhibit natural monopoly
characteristics if the cost function derived from the underlying technology is “subadditive,” that is, if a single firm can supply the entire
market at lower cost than could two or more firms.98 If the technology of local telephone service were to exhibit natural monopoly characteristics, then a single firm could construct and operate that
network at a lower cost than could two or more firms. Multiproduct
cost functions are said to exhibit natural monopoly characteristics if
and only if the cost function derived from the underlying technology
is subadditive across products. That is, cost functions exhibit natural
monopoly characteristics when the costs incurred by a single firm producing the entire set of products are less than the costs that would
result if the same production were divided between two firms.
Whether existing telecommunications network technology falls within
this definition is a matter of controversy.99

97
Economies of scale can result from many different technological factors, such as
specialization of function and division of labor permitted by increased output. Fixed costs,
which do not vary with output fluctuations, are a source of economies of scale that is particularly significant in the telecommunications industry and other industries that require networks, such as railroads, oil and natural gas distributors, and electricity and water service
providers. See SIDAK & SPULBER, supra note 39, at 22. For a network system, fixed costs are
the “costs of facilities such as transmission lines, which are not sensitive to the level of
transmission on the lines.” Id. Economies of scale at a given output level are not necessary
for natural monopoly. A natural monopoly can exist at an output level at which the cost
function exhibits decreasing returns to scale. For further discussion, see DANIEL F.
SPULBER, REGULATION AND MARKETS 117–18 (1989).
98
The concept of natural monopoly is generally credited to John Stuart Mill, who
emphasized the problem of wasteful duplication of transmission facilities that can occur
with utility services. See JOHN STUART MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 107 (George
Routledge & Sons 1900) (1848).
99
For statistical studies showing that telecommunications network costs are not
subadditive, see David S. Evans & James J. Heckman, A Test for Subadditivity of the Cost Function with an Application to the Bell System, 74 AM. ECON. REV. 615, 620 (1984) (showing that
AT&T’s costs were not subadditive); Richard T. Shin & John S. Ying, Unnatural Monopolies
in Local Telephone, 23 RAND J. ECON. 171, 181 (1992) (finding that the local exchange carriers costs were not subadditive prior to the AT&T antitrust divestiture). Estimating telecommunications network costs can be problematic for regulated companies because data are
obtained from regulatory accounting information. Also, the data are often presented at an
aggregate level that is not suited to the evaluation of cost functions. Paul L. Joskow &
Roger G. Noll, The Bell Doctrine: Applications in Telecommunications, Electricity, and Other Network Industries, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1249, 1260–61 (1999). The estimation of cost functions
using standard econometric techniques is difficult at best, because an established legacy
system built up over decades is not likely to be optimized. Engineering cost models that
make assumptions about system configurations need not describe the costs of existing systems. Moreover, the notion of comparing the costs of two identical systems serving the
same geographic area is likely to be counterfactual. For a review of the literature analyzing
whether costs in the cable television industry are subadditive, see Thomas W. Hazlett, Duopolistic Competition in Cable Television: Implications for Public Policy, 7 YALE J. ON REG. 65, 71–75
(1990).
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The existence of a natural monopoly does not necessarily preclude competitive entry, however. For example, even if a particular
telecommunications technology were to exhibit natural monopoly
characteristics, providers could still achieve efficient retail prices if
they were required to compete through periodic auctions for the right
to serve the market.100 Moreover, proponents of “contestability” theory have demonstrated that so long as entry and exit are easy, the
potential for new entry can drive prices towards competitive levels
even if the technology makes it most efficient for a single firm to serve
the entire market.101 Thus, even if the incumbent firm prices at cost,
there will still be situations in which it cannot set a price that sustains
its position against entry.
Moreover, natural monopoly technology need not impede competition, because the technology of entrants can differ from that of
incumbents. The standard textbook definition of natural monopoly,
which underlies most public policy discussions, presumes that incumbents and entrants have the same cost function and the same underlying technology.102 Under this theory, there is not enough room in
the market for more than one firm, and an entrant could add little to
productive capacity.103 It is unrealistic, however, to assume that the
incumbent and the entrant will employ the same technology.104
Given the rapid pace of technological change in telecommunications,
an entrant can operate a network with a different configuration than
the incumbent’s. For example, an incumbent might operate a traditional telecommunications network with twisted copper wire—a century-old technology—while an entrant might offer wireless service.
Other transmission technologies including coaxial cable television systems, fiber-optic cable, various land-based wireless systems, and satellite-based systems, have different cost and performance properties.
Transmission networks’ various functions, including telephony, mobile communications, data transmission, and video, suggest that differ100
See Harold Demsetz, Why Regulate Utilities?, 11 J.L. & ECON. 55, 56–57 (1968) (arguing that, with enough bidders and absent collusion, periodic auctioning of monopoly
franchises can yield competitive pricing); Richard A. Posner, The Appropriate Scope of Regulation in the Cable Television Industry, 3 BELL J. ECON. 98, 110–13 (1972) (applying Demsetz’s
analysis to the cable television market and critiquing the emerging pattern of regulation);
Mark A. Zupan, The Efficacy of Franchise Bidding Schemes in the Case of Cable Television: Some
Systemic Evidence, 32 J.L. & ECON. 401 (1989). But see Oliver E. Williamson, Franchise Building for Natural Monopolies—In General and with Respect to CATV, 7 BELL J. ECON. 73, 90–91
(1976) (challenging Posner’s proposal).
101
See, e.g., WILLIAM J. BAUMOL ET AL., CONTESTABLE MARKETS AND THE THEORY OF INDUSTRY STRUCTURE 6–7 (1982).
102
See, e.g., id. at 17 (defining natural monopoly as an industry in which all of the firms
have the same cost function).
103
See id. at 4–8.
104
See Spulber, Deregulating, supra note 94, at 34–41.
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ent transmission technologies are suited to different uses.105 As a
result, entrants that offer specialized networks targeted to particular
applications are likely to utilize different technologies than the incumbent. Moreover, the entrant can target specialized market segments
without duplicating the incumbent’s system.106 Competition from Internet telephony, cable telephony, and wireless provides alternatives
to the traditional telephone system. Thus, competitive markets for
network services can form, and market prices continue to be an accurate measure of value.
2. Sunk Costs
The substantial sunk costs in establishing telecommunications
networks, particularly the traditional wireline network, do not prevent
markets from allocating network services or prevent market prices
from representing an accurate measure of value. Sunk costs are present in most industries, to an extent, and are generally accepted as
reasonable business risks with few implications on the performance of
market transactions. For example, expenditures for research, development, and marketing are generally regarded as sunk investments.
Moreover, most forms of manufacturing entail sunk costs in the form
of capital equipment, whether used for manufacturing automobiles or
extracting crude oil. These costs in no way prevent market allocation
of the end products. In other words, the method of manufacture does
not alter the ability of market transactions to allocate a good or service. The telecommunications industry works similarly, although it requires nonrecoverable expenditures in plant and equipment—namely
wires and switches.
Commentators and judges often argue that sunk costs prevent
competition in telecommunications services and hence cause market
failure.107 In particular, sunk costs are an entry barrier if entrants
need to make irreversible investments in capacity while incumbents
have already incurred these costs.108 These commentators and judges
105

See id. at 47–49.
See Spulber, supra note 93, at 477; Spulber, Deregulating, supra note 94, at 47–49.
107
On the view that sunk costs constitute a barrier to entry, see BAUMOL ET AL., supra
note 101, at 291–92; William J. Baumol & Robert D. Willig, Fixed Cost, Sunk Cost, Entry
Barriers and Sustainability of Monopoly, 96 Q.J. ECON. 405, 418–19 (1981); see also Victor P.
Goldberg, Regulation and Administered Contracts, 7 BELL J. ECON. 426, 432–36 (1976) (arguing that sunk costs justify regulatory intervention). For the argument that sunk costs create
a barrier to entry in the telecommunications industry, see United States v. W. Elec. Co., 673
F. Supp. 525, 538 (D.D.C. 1987), aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 900 F.2d 283 (D.C. Cir. 1990);
Jerry A. Hausman, Competition in Long-Distance and Telecommunications Equipment Markets:
Effects of the MFJ, 16 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 365, 367 (1995). But see David L.
Kaserman & John W. Mayo, Competition in the Long-Distance Market, in HANDBOOK OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS ECONOMICS, supra note 93, at 509, 520–21 (criticizing Hausman’s
conclusions).
108
See, e.g., Verizon Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 546–47 (2002).
106
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argue that the incumbent need only price goods or services to recover
operating expenses and incremental capital expenditures, because it
has already overcome the irreversible investment costs of entry.109 An
entrant, in contrast, must anticipate earnings exceeding operating
costs, incremental investment, and the irreversible costs of establishing its facilities before deciding to enter.110 Richard Posner points
out, however, that nonrecurring costs of entry are “irrelevant if there
are small firms in the market that can grow to be large firms.”111
Moreover, “there is grave doubt whether there are important nonrecurring costs of entry—barriers to entry in the true sense.”112 Posner further notes that the capital required for entry is not a barrier
because this cost should be comparable to that of firms already in the
market.113
Potential entrants into an industry have many ways to reduce the
risks associated with nonrecoverable expenditures, including contracting with customers before making irreversible investments and
entering into joint ventures or mergers with incumbents.114 Furthermore, in competitive markets, duplication of investment often occurs.
The entry of excess or insufficient capacity can take place as a consequence of uncertainty regarding costs, technology, or market demand. Temporary overcapacity is part of the competitive process and
certainly does not indicate the presence of market failure. Indeed,
periods of excess capacity, often observed in a variety of industries,
demonstrate that sunk costs are unlikely to deter vigorous competition. The same reasoning applies to the telecommunications industry—in the absence of regulatory intervention that favors or penalizes
incumbents.
Technological change further mutes the impact of sunk costs on
entrants. Entrants commit capital resources in those markets or market segments in which they expect to earn competitive returns on
their investments. The sunk costs involved in establishing a telecommunications system, given currently available technologies, are no different from irreversible investments in any other competitive market.
Concern over sunk costs in telecommunications may be due to the
substantial level of investment needed to establish a traditional telecommunications network, in particular due to the ubiquity of the reg109
See, e.g., Baumol & Willig, supra note 107, at 418–19. According to George Stigler,
barriers to entry are long-run costs that are imposed on entrants but not on incumbents.
STIGLER, supra note 92, at 67.
110
See Baumol & Willig, supra note 107, at 418–19.
111
RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 92 (1976).
112
Id.
113
See id.
114
The following discussion is based on SPULBER, supra note 97, at 610–24, and
Spulber, Deregulating, supra note 94, at 46–49.
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ulated Bell System monopoly. This is a quantitative difference but
hardly a qualitative one; entrants can invest smaller amounts to create
networks targeted at particular customers and specific services.
As in natural monopoly analysis, the argument that sunk costs are
a barrier to entry also depends in part on the similarity of the incumbent’s and entrant’s technology. Yet, an entrant need not duplicate
the incumbent’s network. An entrant with lower operating costs
could be assured of recovering at least the difference between the incumbent’s operating costs and the entrant’s own operating costs,
which could well be sufficient to recover the costs of entry. This scenario is likely because technological change in telecommunications,
such as the application of microprocessors in switching, potentially
lowers the costs of operating networks. By differentiating its offerings
through branding, customer service, and location, an entrant gains
incremental revenues to cover the costs of entry. New technologies
offer enhanced performance, such as the mobility of wireless services
and the increased bandwidth of coaxial and fiber-optic systems, thus
allowing competition with established networks.
Technological change has even altered the need to sink costs into
a telecommunications network. For example, wireless technologies
avoid customer-specific, irreversible investment for the “last mile” to
the customer’s location, because wireless transmission towers can be
relocated. Thus, even if substantial sunk costs are required to
reproduce the incumbent’s wireline network, a wireless alternative
may be an effective competitor without the same sunk costs. Accordingly, sunk costs in telecommunications need not impede the market
allocation of telecommunications services.
3. Interconnection and Network Economic Effects
Although network compatibility and interconnection confer clear
benefits, these benefits do not prevent markets from allocating network services so that market prices continue to be an accurate measure of value. Network interconnection is necessary for a call placed
by a customer served by one network to reach a customer served by
another network. Because the number of connections enhances the
value of a network, interconnection is in the interest of network
operators.
Network industries typically require an extensive set of interconnections. Local networks have access to most, if not all, long distance
and international networks. Wireless services connect to both local
and long distance networks. Customers can access the Internet
through local telecommunications networks, wireless systems, digital
subscriber lines (DSL), and broadband cable. The Internet—itself a
network of networks—represents a vast number of interconnections.
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The terms of such interconnections are established through market
agreements and through regulated charges. Given this set of interconnection agreements, access to the services of a network implicitly
entails access to the connections offered by the network. Customers
may obtain some of these connections as part of the network service,
or they may pay for individual connections, just as retail telecommunications customers purchase local and long-distance services separately.
Accordingly, network interconnectivity enhances the ability of competitive firms to provide network services, and does not conflict with
market pricing of these services.
At the same time, a growing number of scholars have raised the
concern that network owners may be able to use interconnection (or,
more accurately, the refusal to interconnect) as an anticompetitive
weapon.115 These concerns center on the fact that many networks determine their value by the number of people connected to them. The
classic example is the telephone system,116 because the more people
with whom one can communicate through a particular network, the
more valuable that network becomes. Therefore, the value of network
access depends not only on the access price charged, but also on the
number of users with access to the network. Economic literature refers to this characteristic as a network economic effect.117
Some economists consider network economic effects to be a kind
of externality.118 Proponents of this view suggest that network users’
inability to capture all of the benefits generated by their usage repre115
See, e.g., Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 424, 436 (1985). For an argument that network externalities
may justify regulation against monopolies in telecommunications, see WILLIAM H. MELODY,
BUILDING THE REGULATORY FOUNDATIONS FOR GROWTH IN NETWORK ECONOMIES 6 (World
Dialogue on Regulation for Network Economies, Discussion Paper No. 0201, 2002), at
http://regulateonline.org/pdf/wdr0201.pdf.
116
As one group of commentators has noted:
Telecommunications is a network industry with the characteristics of a club.
Both the cost of, and the value of, club membership depend on the number of subscribers. Access to the network is the telecommunications
equivalent of club membership. A new member of the club provides benefits to existing members who can now call an additional subscriber. This
means the private value of membership will differ from the social value.
The existence of such “network externalities” gives rise to a prima facie case
for subsidisation of new membership.
ROBERT ALBON ET AL., TELECOMMUNICATIONS ECONOMICS AND POLICY ISSUES 53 (Govt. of
Australia, Productivity Commission Staff Information Paper, 1997), at http://
www.pc.gov.au/ic/research/information/teleeco/teleeco.pdf. The report continues:
“However, the consensus in the literature is that the network externality is no longer an
important issue for basic telecommunications services.” Id.
117
See generally Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects, 86 CAL. L. REV. 479 (1998) (reviewing the economic literature).
118
See, e.g., Katz & Shapiro, supra note 115, at 424; Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro,
Systems Competition and Network Effects, J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 1994, at 93, 96–100 [hereinafter Katz & Shapiro, Systems Competition].
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sents a positive externality that will cause overall network utilization to
drop below efficient levels.119 These theorists also suggest that network externalities can turn network access into a competitive weapon.
By refusing to interconnect with other networks, network owners can
force users to choose one network to the exclusion of others. Forcing
users to commit to one network naturally leads users to flock to the
largest network, thus creating or reinforcing a monopoly position.120
The classic example of this phenomenon is the development of
the Bell System. During the latter part of the nineteenth century, the
Bell Telephone Company was able to use its initial telephone patents
to establish a near monopoly over local telephone service.121 The expiration of those initial patents in the 1890s allowed competition to
emerge that caused the Bell System’s market share to be cut in half.
The Bell System attempted to reassert its dominance by refusing to
interconnect with these upstarts. This effort ultimately failed, because
the independent companies that comprised the other half of the industry were able to forestall any negative network economic effects by
allying with one another to form a network similar in size to the Bell
network. The Bell System changed course and instead refused to allow independent phone companies access to certain patents that were
essential to providing improved long distance service. Once it
reemerged as the dominant player, Bell was able to use its refusal to
interconnect to forestall the emergence of meaningful
competition.122
In addition, some scholars argue that network effects can adversely affect technological adoption and product selection decisions.
In this view, network externalities can cause a different market failure,
known as technology lock-in, in which markets adhere to previous
technology commitments notwithstanding the arrival of new, more efficient network technologies.123 If users cannot capture all of the benefits created by their adoption of new technology, they may refrain
from making a technological change, even when doing so would increase total welfare. The most commonly cited example of this phe119

See Katz & Shapiro, Systems Competition, supra note 118, at 100.
See id. at 110–11.
121
See Roger G. Noll & Bruce M. Owen, The Anticompetitive Uses of Regulation: United
States v. AT&T, in THE ANTITRUST REVOLUTION 290, 291 (John E. Kowka, Jr. & Lawrence J.
White eds., 1989).
122
See id. at 291–92.
123
See, e.g., Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner, Installed Base and Compatibility: Innovation,
Product Preannouncements, and Predation, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 940, 941–43 (1986); Katz &
Shapiro, Systems Competition, supra note 118, at 108; see also THOMAS C. SCHELLING,
MICROMOTIVES AND MACROBEHAVIOR 92–96 (1978) (identifying the effects of what he calls
critical mass on many types of economic and social behavior); H. Leibenstein, Bandwagon,
Snob, and Veblen Effects in the Theory of Consumer’s Demand, 64 Q.J. ECON. 183, 190–99 (1950)
(describing the effects of perception of other consumers’ desires in consumers’ behavior).
120
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nomenon is the persistence of the conventional typewriter and
keyboard layout (called QWERTY, after the arrangement of letters in
the upper left-hand corner), despite the emergence of the supposedly
more efficient Dvorak keyboard layout.124 Another example is the
emergence of VHS as the standard format for videocassettes, despite
the supposed technical superiority of the Beta format.125 These considerations have led some to argue that compelled access is necessary
to ensure that the early leaders in any network technology, as well as
the owners of large networks, do not use their position to stifle technological innovation.126 They also lead some commentators to ask
whether basing access rates on market prices would in fact promote
efficiency.
These arguments suggest that network industries may be uniquely
susceptible to market failures that may prevent the price mechanism
from playing its usual role in generating efficient outcomes. If network externalities prevent markets from functioning efficiently, then
it might follow that the market equilibrium price of network access
somehow is distorted as well.127
Although formal models developed by proponents of the network
externality view have demonstrated that such market failures are possible, we believe that claims of widespread market failure are exaggerated. A critical review of the economic literature reveals that network
externality theories are subject to several conceptual limitations. Theoretical models simply demonstrate that a particular type of market
failure is possible. Determining whether such a market failure is likely
depends upon a close empirical evaluation of whether the preconditions underlying any particular theory actually exist. To date, network
externality theorists have been unable to establish that any of the classic examples of supposed technology lock-in are either true or can
properly be regarded as cases of market failure. Moreover, widespread innovation, in a variety of industries casts serious doubt on the
lock-in story. Technological change is certainly evident in telecommunications. Indeed, the existence of multiple competing platforms
strongly suggests that technologies in network industries are not
locked in, but rather easily superseded. Finally, proponents of the
network externality view must decide whether the cure is worse than
124
See, e.g., Paul A. David, Clio and the Economics of QWERTY, AM. ECON. REV., May 1985,
at 332; JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 405 n.40 (1988); Farrell &
Saloner, supra note 123, at 941–42.
125
See, e.g., W. Brian Arthur, Positive Feedbacks in the Economy, SCI. AM., Feb. 1990, at 92,
92–93.
126
See Jerry A. Hausman et al., Cable Modems and DSL: Broadband Internet Access for Residential Customers, AM. ECON. REV., May 2001, at 302, 306–07; Mark A. Lemley & Lawrence
Lessig, The End of End-to-End: Preserving the Architecture of the Internet in the Broadband Era, 48
UCLA L. REV. 925, 934–38, 940–42 (2001).
127
See Katz & Shapiro, Systems Competition, supra note 118, at 98–100.
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the disease. In other words, resolution of the regulatory question depends not just on whether a market failure exists, but also on whether
government intervention is likely to do better than private ordering.
a. Network Economics as a Source of Market Failure
As noted above, theories that rely on the supposed presence of
network externalities to justify more intrusive regulation of network
industries suffer from several conceptual shortcomings.128 On closer
inspection, it becomes clear that the argument that network externalities entrench incumbents and existing technologies is too simplistic.
As Joseph Farrell and Garth Saloner point out, a consumer’s adoption
of a new technology is subject to two distinct and countervailing effects. First, the decision to adopt a new technology enhances the
value of the new network for current users as well as future users of
the new network. This effect might cause markets to become locked
into obsolete technologies, a phenomenon that Farrell and Saloner
refer to as “excess inertia.”129
At the same time, however, the adoption of a new technology may
reduce the number of people using the old technology, thereby reducing its value. In effect, adoption of the new technology tends to
strand the installed base in the old technology. Individuals who adopt
a new technology thus do not fully internalize all of the costs created
by their actions. This phenomenon may cause an individual to adopt
a new technology even if the societal costs outweigh the benefits, a
situation known as “excess momentum”130 or “insufficient friction.”131
It is thus theoretically possible that the presence of network economic
effects may prevent network providers from realizing all of the available economies of scale and may accelerate the pace at which consumers adopt new technologies. Whether network externalities would in
fact cause market failure thus depends upon which of these two countervailing effects dominates.132
128

The discussion that follows is based in part on Yoo, supra note 11, at 278–82.
See Farrell & Saloner, supra note 123, at 941.
130
Id. at 942.
131
Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Product Introduction with Network Externalities, 40 J.
INDUS. ECON. 55, 73 (1992).
132
The literature refers to the type of network effects we are discussing as direct network
externalities, which are those generated “through a direct physical effect of the number of
purchasers on the quality of the product.” Katz & Shapiro, supra note 115, at 424. The
leading example is the number of subscribers attached to a telephone network. See id.
With indirect network externalities, in contrast, there is no direct connection. Instead, the
value of a good is determined by the number of other people who purchase the same
good. Commonly cited examples include the selection of a video cassette recorder (VCR)
format and the use of a particular type of software or operating system. See S.J. Liebowitz &
Stephen E. Margolis, Are Network Externalities a New Source of Market Failure?, 17 RES. LAW &
ECON. 1, 3 (1995) [hereinafter Liebowitz & Margolis, Market Failure]; S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Network Externality: An Uncommon Tragedy, J. ECON. PERSP., Spring 1994, at
129
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In addition, the economic literature underscores the importance
of examining in detail the structure of the relevant market before relying on network economic effects to justify regulatory intervention.
The market failures identified by the formal network economic models tend to depend on the assumption that the relevant markets are
either dominated by a single firm or highly concentrated. The clear
implication from these models is that the presence of competition is
likely sufficient to mitigate any such problems. In fact, the Bell System’s failed initial attempt to use network economic effects to forestall
competition133 suggests that the presence of a single competitor of
roughly the same size as the network owner may eliminate such market failures. As we will discuss in considerable detail,134 the markets
described in this Article are not likely concentrated enough to fall
within the ambit of these models.
The economic literature indicates that regulation of network externalities is unnecessary, because private ordering can easily resolve
economic problems that may arise. Any network externalities that
may exist in the examples upon which we are focusing will necessarily
occur within a physical network that can be owned. Thus, although
individual users may not be in a position to capture all of the benefits
created by their demand for network services, the network owner will
almost certainly be in a position to do so.135 With a single network
owner, the problems associated with this type of externality can be
solved in the same manner as externality problems in other contexts—by placing property in the hands of a single owner and protecting it with well-defined property rights.136 Benefits created by
network participation can thus be internalized and allocated through
the interaction between the network owner and network users.137
Relying on unitary ownership of a network to internalize any network externalities that may exist does not necessarily mean that com133, 135 [hereinafter Liebowitz & Margolis, Uncommon Tragedy]; see also Joseph Farrell &
Garth Saloner, Standardization, Compatibility, and Innovation, 16 RAND J. ECON. 70, 70–71
(1985) (contrasting direct network externalities with market-mediated effects). Note that
to the extent that key network elements receive some degree of patent, copyright, or trademark protection, it is conceivable that the use of well-defined property rights may solve
some types of indirect network externalities. See Liebowitz & Margolis, Market Failure, supra,
at 11. Because all of the networks that form the focus of this Article are physical networks,
any network externalities that may exist with respect them are necessarily direct network
externalities.
133
See supra notes 120–22 and accompanying text.
134
See infra Part III.A.2, B.2, C.2.
135
See Liebowitz & Margolis, Market Failure, supra note 132, at 10–14; Liebowitz &
Margolis, Uncommon Tragedy, supra note 132, at 141–44.
136
See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960); Garrett Hardin,
The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968).
137
See Liebowitz & Margolis, Market Failure, supra note 132, at 10–14; Liebowitz & Margolis, Uncommon Tragedy, supra note 132, at 137, 141–44.
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petition cannot emerge. In many cases, a network need not occupy
the entire market in order to realize a sufficient proportion of the
available demand-side economies of scale.138 When this occurs, no
unexploited gains from trade regarding network size remain, and the
equilibrium solution is competition among multiple proprietary networks. The point can be illustrated through the now classic problem
presented by overfishing of a lake. Because individual anglers do not
internalize all of the costs of their actions, they lack sufficient incentives to undertake efficient levels of conservation and investment.139
The solution is to internalize network externalities by vesting property
rights to the entire lake in a single owner.140 Moreover, unitary ownership will not necessarily eliminate competition in the fish market.
Because owners with unitary property rights over a particular lake will
not have control over all lakes, the various owners of different lakes
will continue to compete with one another.141 With networks, the
proper policy question becomes one of defining property rights in a
way that insures that networks achieve sufficient size to realize enough
of the available network economies. This does not necessarily mean
that a single network will emerge, with government involvement required to ensure the network is the “right” one.142
138
See STAN J. LIEBOWITZ & STEPHEN E. MARGOLIS, WINNERS, LOSERS & MICROSOFT
70–71 (1994).
139
See id. at 74–76.
140
See id.
141
See id.
142
See Liebowitz & Margolis, Uncommon Tragedy, supra note 132, at 140–42; see also
Liebowitz & Margolis, Market Failure, supra note 132, at 14–15 (describing how the assumptions embodied in formal models of network externalities in effect assume away this problem by positing inexhaustible economies of scale).
Indirect network externalities pose a somewhat different problem, because the lack of
a direct physical connection among users means that policy makers cannot simply rely on
network ownership to internalize the relevant externalities. To date, scholars have focused
on two facts: (1) indirect network externalities typically arise in markets that involve complementary goods, and (2) proprietary control of a network can provide users with some
assurance that a ready supply of complementary goods will remain available. See Katz &
Shapiro, Systems Competition, supra note 118, at 101–04; James B. Speta, Handicapping the
Race for the Last Mile?: A Critique of Open Access Rules for Broadband Platforms, 17 YALE J. ON
REG. 39, 83 (2000).
Although true to an extent, these facts do not shed light on the more fundamental
analytical deficiencies underlying theories of market failure based on indirect network externalities. Specifically, indirect network externalities primarily affect inframarginal network users. Therefore, although charging higher prices to inframarginal users has
distributional consequences, it has no impact on efficiency, because equilibrium price and
quantity are determined solely by the decisions of the marginal network user. See Liebowitz
& Margolis, Market Failure, supra note 132, at 4–5; Liebowitz & Margolis, Uncommon Tragedy,
supra note 132, at 136–37. Furthermore, it is often difficult to distinguish an indirect network externality from the results of a properly functioning market, because any drop in
prices may represent nothing more than technological change or the fact that the
purchases are occurring in a declining cost industry. If so, the drop in price would simply
reflect movement along the cost curve rather than a deviation from the cost curve caused
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Even assuming that network externalities that tend to cause monopolistic dominance and technology lock-in actually exist, other features of the market and the structure of consumers’ preferences
might mitigate, if not eliminate, these adverse effects. For example,
after networks have captured a sufficient number of subscribers, the
marginal benefit from adding another subscriber is likely to be low,
reducing or eliminating network effects and mitigating any potential
externality.143 The market may also dislodge an existing network
technology as long as the additional value provided by the new technology exceeds the value of the network externalities supporting the
old technology.144 As Professors Kaplan and Ramseyer succinctly put
it, “an entrenched inefficient technology is potentially a twenty-dollar
bill lying on the sidewalk.”145
In addition, network externalities may be substantially mitigated
if user preferences are nonuniform. As Professors Katz and Shapiro
have noted:
Consumer heterogeneity and product differentiation tend to limit
tipping and sustain multiple networks. If the rival systems have distinct features sought by certain consumers, two or more systems may
be able to survive by catering to consumers who care more about
product attributes than network size. Here, market equilibrium
with multiple incompatible products reflects the social value of
variety.146
by an externality. See Liebowitz & Margolis, Market Failure, supra note 132, at 7–9; Liebowitz
& Margolis, Uncommon Tragedy, supra note 132, at 138–39. In such situations, there is no
efficiency loss to be abated. Any remedies imposed in the name of compensating for a
network externality would thus be the cause of, rather than the solution to, market failure.
Even worse, the true source of the decline in cost may lie in one of the input markets
rather than the output market. Positing that the problem is an indirect network externality operating in the output market may thus prompt an incorrect policy response by focusing attention away from the input markets that may be the true locus of whatever market
failure may exist. See Liebowitz & Margolis, Market Failure, supra note 132, at 9–10.
143
See ALBON, supra note 116, at 53; BRIDGER M. MITCHELL & INGO VOGELSANG, TELECOMMUNICATIONS PRICING: THEORY AND PRACTICE 55 (1991); A. de Fontenay & J.T. Marshall
Lee, BC/Alberta Long Distance Calling, in ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 199, 208 (Léon Courville et al. eds. 1983); George Yarrow, Dealing
with Social Obligations in Telecoms, in REGULATING UTILITIES: A TIME FOR CHANGE? 67, 75 (S.
Sayer et al. eds., 1996).
144
See Katz & Shapiro, Systems Competition, supra note 118, at 106 (observing that new,
incompatible standards may emerge despite the presence of network externalities if “consumers . . . care more about product attributes than network size”); S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, The Fable of the Keys, 33 J.L. & ECON. 1, 4 (1990) (noting that the “greater
the gap in performance between two standards . . . the more likely that a move to the
efficient standard will take place”), reprinted in FAMOUS FABLES OF ECONOMICS 90, 92
(Daniel F. Spulber ed., 2002), and in LIEBOWITZ & MARGOLIS, supra note 138, at 19, 21–22.
145
Steven N. Kaplan & J. Mark Ramseyer, Those Japanese Firms with Their Disdain for
Shareholders: Another Fable for the Academy, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 403, 405 (1996).
146
Katz & Shapiro, supra note 115, at 106 (citing Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner,
Standardization and Variety, 20 ECON. LETTERS 71, 71–74 (1986)); S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen
E. Margolis, Should Technology Choice Be a Concern of Antitrust Policy?, 9 HARV. J.L. & TECH.
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The existence of large network users may further mitigate any
problems caused by network economic effects. If a single user controls a significant portion of the network, then that user would be able
to internalize more of the benefits of any technological changes,
which would help minimize any slippage caused by the existence of
the network externality.147 Furthermore, because large users can capture a disproportionate share of the benefits from the adoption of
new technology, they have a significant incentive to make the investments needed to begin the shift towards the new technology.148 Indeed, formal models of such market structures indicate that “the
sponsor of a new technology earns greater profits than its entry contributes to social welfare. In other words, markets with network externalities in which new technologies are proprietary exhibit a bias
towards new technologies.”149 Far from being a bane, the existence of
large network players may be a blessing in disguise.
In addition, significant growth in market size can render network
externalities irrelevant.150 If a market is undergoing substantial
growth, market outcomes are determined by the commitments that
future users will make, not by the decisions of the users who have
already committed to a particular technology.151 In such cases, the
fact that a particular firm may currently dominate a market is of little
consequence. Those who are concerned about lock-in should focus
on the future network, not the existing one.
Finally, it is important to recognize that the adoption of a new
technology carries significant costs. The standardization associated
with established technology can create real benefits by facilitating
compatibility between complementary products. These benefits
would be lost if a new technology were adopted. Changes in technology also impose significant transaction costs, because it can be costly
to produce new technological platforms and adapt existing network
infrastructure to incorporate innovations.152 Accordingly, some delay
283, 292 (1996) (“Where there are differences in preferences regarding alternative standards, coexistence of standards is a likely outcome.”).
147
See Katz & Shapiro, Systems Competition, supra note 118, at 102–03.
148
See Liebowitz & Margolis, Market Failure, supra note 132, at 11, 13. The fear of
delays after committing to a network might make consumers reluctant to join proprietary
networks. Katz and Shapiro describe a number of ways that a network owner can allay such
fears. See Katz & Shapiro, Systems Competition, supra note 118, at 104–05, 107.
149
Katz & Shapiro, supra note 131, at 73.
150
See id. at 67, 73 (concluding that exponential market growth effectively prevents
excess inertia); Liebowitz & Margolis, supra note 146, at 292 (“Entrenched incumbents are
less entrenched when consumers react to new sales . . . .”).
151
See Liebowitz & Margolis, supra note 146, at 312.
152
Timothy F. Bresnahan, New Modes of Competition: Implications for the Future Structure of
the Computer Industry, in COMPETITION, INNOVATION AND THE MICROSOFT MONOPOLY: ANTITRUST IN THE DIGITAL MARKETPLACE 155, 200 (Jeffrey A. Eisenach & Thomas M. Lenard
eds., 1999).
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in the introduction of new products may reflect efficiency, not market
failure. Absent a compelling reason to believe that network externalities are causing efficiency losses that the market cannot properly redress, regulations designed to counteract network economic effects
cannot be justified.
b. The Empirical Support for Network Induced Market Failures
The fact that markets seem capable of resolving most of the supposed market failures identified by network economics literature suggests that any attempt to remedy these supposed problems should be
approached with considerable caution. Indeed, it seems appropriate
to insist on empirical proof that such problems actually exist before
authorizing governmental action to redress them. Proponents of network externality theories have yet to offer any systematic empirical
support for their theories. Instead, most of these theorists have opted
to invoke a handful of well-known anecdotes concerning supposed
technology lock-in.153
This lack of systematic evaluation has allowed proponents of network externality theories to be maddeningly imprecise about what
constitutes lock-in. Even the term—“lock-in”—is ambiguous in that
no technological standard is permanent and that over a long enough
time, all technological standards are subject to change. Whether a
technology has become locked-in is thus largely a function of the period of time deemed relevant for evaluating technological change.
Therefore, the concept of lock-in, as currently employed in the economics literature, obscures any empirical attempt to verify its
existence.
Furthermore, close analysis of the historical record reveals that
none of the key examples that form the empirical basis for the network externality theory can properly be considered market failures.
Specifically, the evidence suggests that the QWERTY keyboard does
not represent an obsolete technology locked into place by network
externalities. On the contrary, it appears that the QWERTY keyboard
first emerged as the winner of a vibrant competition on the merits, in
which various keyboard designs were tested against one another in a
series of typing contests.154 In addition, the evidence demonstrating
the Dvorak keyboard’s superiority is riddled with conflicts of interest,
because Dvorak himself conducted all of the key studies, including
U.S. Navy tests that represent the primary support for these claims.
Modern ergonomic studies suggest that any technical difference between the QWERTY and the Dvorak keyboards is nominal.155
153
154
155

See supra notes 123–25 and accompanying text.
See Liebowitz & Margolis, supra note 144, at 17–21.
See id. at 8–15.

\\server05\productn\C\CRN\88-4\CRN401.txt

2003]

unknown

Seq: 47

6-MAY-03

ACCESS TO NETWORKS

11:13

931

The historical record also belies any suggestion that VHS’s emergence as the prevailing standard for videocassettes represents the perseverance of an obsolete technology. Rather, the evidence suggests
that the competition between Beta and VHS turned on a design tradeoff, with Beta incorporating a smaller cassette in order to enhance
portability and VHS opting for a larger cassette in order to provide for
longer playing and recording times.156 VHS’s victory over Beta thus
seems to have resulted from consumers’ preference for videotapes capable of recording a two-hour movie on a single cassette, rather than
from a market failure that frustrated the efficient outcome. In fact,
any suggestion that VHS’s victory was the result of inefficient lock-in
effects is contradicted by the fact that Beta was deployed first and was
the early leader in VCR technology.157 Thus, the outcome is more
properly regarded as an example of how markets can use differences
in product value and an expanding customer base to displace an existing technology rather than an example of lock-in.
Other anecdotal examples upon which network externality theorists rely have faced similar criticism.158 Moreover, the many circumstances in which new technologies have displaced firmly entrenched
technologies further undercut network externality theory. For example, compact discs have displaced vinyl and cassette recordings, and
the digital video disc (DVD) format is in the process of displacing the
VHS format. In short, the empirical record provides little reason to
believe that networks are so prone to market failure so as to justify
more intrusive regulation than in any other type of industry. If anything, the history of technological change suggests the contrary.
Therefore, regulators should exercise considerable caution in evaluating claims of market failures caused by network economic effects
when those claims are not backed by firm empirical support.
c. The Limits of Regulation as a Solution to Market Failure
Finally, even if the necessary empirical preconditions for networkinduced market failure were present, regulatory intervention would
not necessarily improve matters. As noted earlier, government-imposed solutions often fall short of efficient outcomes, even when they
are implemented to correct a market failure.159 Not only can a regulatory access regime harm allocative efficiency if access prices are set at
inefficient levels, regulation can also harm dynamic efficiency by caus156
See LIEBOWITZ & MARGOLIS, supra note 138, at 122–23, reprinted in FAMOUS FABLES OF
ECONOMICS, supra note 144, at 112–13.
157
See S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Path Dependence, Lock-In, and History, 11
J.L. ECON. & ORG. 205, 219–20 (1995).
158
See LIEBOWITZ & MARGOLIS, supra note 138, at 127–32, reprinted in FAMOUS FABLES OF
ECONOMICS, supra note 144, at 116–21.
159
See supra notes 27–30 and accompanying text.
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ing investment incentives to fall below efficient levels and by creating
de facto entry barriers.160 Thus, regulators confronting a market failure must ask themselves the logically subsidiary question whether government intervention is likely to improve matters or make them
worse.
Consider, for example, the particular regulatory decisions associated with any state-sponsored attempt to solve the problems of technological lock-in. Such intervention would necessarily require the
government to replace clear winners in the technology marketplace
with what it believed to be the superior technology.161 Moreover, in
order to be effective, the government must intervene at an early stage
in the technology’s development, when making such determinations
is most difficult.162 Regulators typically would have to assess technological superiority on the basis of extremely thin information that in
most cases would be provided by parties with a direct interest in the
outcome of the regulatory process.163 In addition, decision makers
would have to insulate themselves from the types of systematic biases
traditionally associated with political decision making.164 Thus, even
supporters of network externality theories caution that government
intervention might well make the problem worse instead of better.165
In short, there is ample reason to be skeptical of claims that network economic effects will cause widespread market failure in network
industries. Not only are such claims problematic as a theoretical matter, but they also appear to be essentially devoid of any empirical support. Thus, there appears to be little justification for the belief that
basing access rates on actual market transactions would lead to inefficient outcomes. On the contrary, basic economic principles indicate
that market-based pricing represents the most appropriate way for
rate-making authorities to ensure that access rates are set at levels that
promote both allocative and dynamic efficiency. Two fundamental
transformations—the emergence of platform competition and the
shift to access regulation—made direct, facilities-based competition
feasible. As a result, the only plausible explanation for failing to implement market-based access rates—that the absence of technological
160
See supra notes 27–30 and accompanying text. Under rate regulation—the traditional governmental response to market failure—regulators explicitly prohibit competitors
from entering the market. Although access regulation does not involve any de jure prohibition of market entry, it can forestall the emergence of facility-based competition to existing
networks by rescuing users from having to invest alternative capacity. See supra notes 28–29
and accompanying text.
161
See Bresnahan, supra note 152, at 200.
162
See id.
163
See id. at 200–01.
164
See id. at 201–03.
165
See id. at 200–03; Katz & Shapiro, Systems Competition, supra note 118, at 112–13.
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substitutes made market-based pricing impossible—has been drained
of its vitality.
II
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON THE PRICING
TO NETWORKS

OF

ACCESS

Just as regulatory authorities have largely failed to recognize the
economic significance of both the emergence of platform competition and the shift from rate regulation to access regulation, they have
failed also to appreciate that these transformations compel a different
constitutional analysis. Because rate regulation simply adjusts the
terms under which parties can contract, it represents the type of nonpossessory regulation traditionally subjected to a rather permissive
standard of review under the Takings Clause.166 This standard requires only that the rate fall within a zone of reasonableness.167 Compelling access to a physical network, in contrast, invariably requires
the network owner to permit third parties to locate equipment on its
property. As such, access regulations are subject to the more restrictive standards associated with the Court’s physical takings jurisprudence.168 Unlike nonpossessory regulations, in which reductions in
the value of property are not necessarily compensable, physical takings necessarily command market-value compensation.169 Principles
of constitutional law thus reinforce the basic economic conclusion
that network access should be priced at market levels.
A. The Distinction Between Physical and Nonpossessory Takings
1. The Emergence of Nonpossessory Takings Doctrine
Initially, the Takings Clause was believed to protect only against
direct government appropriations of private property or invasions that
effectively divested the owner of possession as though the government
formally condemned the property.170 Government actions that
merely reduced property value did not qualify as a taking.171 The
166

See infra notes 242–44, 249 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 239–46 and accompanying text.
168
See infra notes 216–17 and accompanying text.
169
See infra Part II.B.2.a.
170
See, e.g., Meyer v. City of Richmond, 172 U.S. 82, 99 (1898) (holding that the deprivation of street access to plaintiff’s property did not constitute a taking); Transp. Co. v.
Chicago, 99 U.S. 635, 642–43 (1878) (holding that city-built dam did not effect a taking,
even though it damaged plaintiff’s property and temporarily rendered the property worthless). See generally Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg’l Planning Agency, 535
U.S. 302, 325 n.21 (2002) (describing early Takings Clause jurisprudence); Lucas v. S.C.
Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014 (1992) (same).
171
See Transp. Co., 99 U.S. at 642 (noting that “acts done in the proper exercise of
governmental powers, and not directly encroaching upon private property, though their
consequences may impair its use, are universally held not to be a taking”); Legal Tender
167
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Court subsequently recognized two types of takings that can arise without a physical occupation. First, the Court acknowledged that a rate
regulation may effect a taking if the rate is set so low as to be confiscatory.172 Second, the Court recognized that the government may effect
a taking without physical occupation or appropriation if it “goes too
far” in limiting the owner’s use of his or her property.173
a. Confiscatory Rate-Making
Confiscatory rate-making doctrine is rooted in the notion that although regulators may limit the prices that certain industries charge
for their services, “it is not to be inferred that this power of limitation
or regulation is itself without limit. This power to regulate is not a
power to destroy, and limitation is not the equivalent of confiscation.”174 As a result, the Court acknowledged that the Constitution
forbids rates that are set so low as to be confiscatory.175 Although earlier Court opinions were unclear as to whether confiscatory rate-making doctrine was based on takings or due process principles,176
subsequent decisions clarified that the doctrine stems from the Takings Clause.177
The methodology on which a particular rate is based does not
determine whether it is confiscatory.178 Instead, determining whether
Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 551 (1871) (holding that the Takings Clause “has never been
supposed to have any bearing upon, or to inhibit laws that indirectly work harm and loss to
individuals” even if the government action “render[s] valuable property almost valueless”).
172
See, e.g., Covington & Lexington Tpk. Rd. Co. v. Sandford, 164 U.S. 578, 597 (1896)
(holding that, in determining the existence of a taking, a court must consider “whether the
rates prescribed . . . are . . . so unjust as to destroy the value of [the] property [and thus]
practically deprived the owner of property”).
173
Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
174
R.R. Comm’n Cases, 116 U.S. 307, 331 (1886).
175
See, e.g., Covington & Lexington Tpk. Rd. Co., 164 U.S. at 597; see also Stone v. Wisconsin, 94 U.S. 181, 184 (1876) (Field, J., dissenting) (stating that excessively low rates can
result in “practical confiscation”); Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 142 (1876) (Field, J., dissenting) (“If the legislature of a State . . . can determine, against the consent of the owner,
the . . . prices which the owner shall receive for [his private property’s] uses, it can deprive
him of the property as completely as by a special act for its confiscation or destruction).
176
See, e.g., R.R. Comm’n Cases, 116 U.S. at 331 (concluding that confiscatory rate making violated either the Takings Clause or the Due Process Clause, without clarifying which
one applied). Interestingly, the Court at times suggested that the prohibition of confiscatory rate making arose under the Equal Protection Clause. See Covington & Lexington Tpk.
Rd. Co., 164 U.S. at 592; St. Louis & S.F. Ry. v. Gill, 156 U.S. 649, 658, 663 (1895); Reagan v.
Farmers’ Loan & Trust Co., 154 U.S. 362, 399 (1894); Chi., Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry. v.
Minnesota ex rel. R.R. & Warehouse Comm’n, 134 U.S. 418, 458 (1890).
177
See JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE CHIEF JUSTICESHIP OF MELVILLE W. FULLER, 1888–1910, at
104 (1995).
178
As the Court recently indicated, “an otherwise reasonable rate is not subject to
constitutional attack by questioning the theoretical consistency of the method that produced it. ‘It is not theory, but the impact of the rate order which counts.’” Duquesne
Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299, 314 (1989) (quoting Fed. Power Comm’n v. Hope
Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 602 (1944)).
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a particular rate falls within the zone of reasonableness involves a “balancing of the investor and the consumer interests.”179 Rates are constitutional so long as they provide a return on equity that is sufficient
to cover operating expenses, allow for returns that are “commensurate with returns on investments in other enterprises having corresponding risks,” and are “sufficient to assure confidence in the
financial integrity of the enterprise, so as to maintain its credit and to
attract capital.”180 In so holding, the Court made clear that the mere
fact that a particular rate reduced the value of the utility’s property is
not by itself sufficient to render a rate confiscatory. As the Court acknowledged, “Rate-making is indeed but one species of price-fixing.
The fixing of prices, like other applications of the police power, may
reduce the value of the property which is being regulated. But the
fact that the value is reduced does not mean that the regulation is
invalid.”181
Some Justices have emphasized that the Court’s confiscatory ratemaking jurisprudence occupied a sphere that was distinct and separate from its physical takings jurisprudence. For example, Justice
Brandeis recognized that the Court’s decisions regarding the determination of value in condemnation cases played no part in determining
value for rate-making purposes.182 Justice Black offered a similar observation in Federal Power Commission v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co., stating
that “[i]n condemnation cases, the ‘value of property, generally speaking, is determined by its productiveness—the profits which its use
brings to the owner.’”183 In addition, “when property is taken under
the power of eminent domain the owner is ‘entitled to the full money
equivalent of the property taken, and thereby to be put in as good
position pecuniarily as it would have occupied if its property had not
been taken.’”184 Those principles, Black pointed out, “have no place
in rate regulation.”185 All rate regulation necessarily reduces the value
179

Hope Natural Gas, 320 U.S. at 603; see supra note 70 and accompanying text.
Hope Natural Gas, 320 U.S. at 603 (holding that rates are constitutional so long as
they “enable the company to operate successfully, to maintain its financial integrity, to
attract capital, and to compensate its investors for the risks assumed”); accord Duquesne
Light, 488 U.S. at 312 (holding that rates are valid if they do not “jeopardize the financial
integrity of the compan[y], either by leaving [it] insufficient operating capital or by impeding [its] ability to raise future capital” and if they are adequate “to compensate current
equity holders for the risk associated with their investments”).
181
Hope Natural Gas, 320 U.S. at 601 (citation omitted); accord Fed. Power Comm’n v.
Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575, 603 (1942) (Black, J., concurring).
182
See Missouri ex rel. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 262 U.S. 276,
310–11 (1923) (Brandeis, J., concurring in the judgment).
183
315 U.S. at 603 (Black, J., concurring) (quoting Monongahela Navigation Co. v.
United States, 148 U.S. 312, 328 (1893)).
184
Id. (Black, J., concurring) (quoting United States v. New River Collieries Co., 262
U.S. 341, 343 (1923)).
185
Id. (Black, J., concurring).
180
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of the regulated property, but this fact does not “stay the hand of the
legislature or its administrative agency in making rate reductions.”186
b. Regulatory Takings
Regulatory takings are the second type of nonpossessory taking
recognized by the Supreme Court. As Justice Holmes acknowledged
in his seminal opinion in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon,187 regulatory
takings necessarily involve a difficult balance of interests. On the one
hand, the government must have wide latitude in regulating the use of
property, even if such regulation reduced the property’s value.188 Indeed, “[g]overnment hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property could not be diminished without paying for every
such change in the general law.”189 On the other hand, the government’s ability to impose limits on the use of property “must have its
limits” if the constitutional protection of property is to be meaningful.190 Without some restriction on the government’s ability to qualify
the manner in which owners can use their property, “the natural tendency of human nature [would be] to extend the qualification more
and more until at last private property disappears.”191 Thus, “[t]he
general rule at least is, that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.”192 Although the Supreme Court’s regulatory takings
jurisprudence originally emerged in the context of land-use restrictions, the Court has since applied the analysis to any government-imposed nonpossessory restriction on property.193
In the landmark decision in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,194 the Court squarely held what it had frequently noted in dicta in
186

Id. (Black, J., concurring).
260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922). Although Pennsylvania Coal is generally regarded as the
seminal opinion on regulatory takings, see, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S.
1003, 1014 (1992), it was not without its historical antecedents. See, e.g., Hadacheck v.
Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 410–11 (1915); Commonwealth v. Perry, 28 N.E. 1126, 1127 (Mass.
1891) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
188
260 U.S. at 413.
189
Id.
190
Id.
191
Id. at 415.
192
Id. For more recent restatements of this rationale, see Tahoe-Sierra Preservation
Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302, 325 n.21 (2002), and Lucas,
505 U.S. at 1014.
193
See E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 522–37 (1998) (plurality opinion) (retiree
benefits); Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 172 (1998) (interest on attorney
trust accounts); Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust, 508
U.S. 602, 641–45 (1993) (pension plans); Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587, 603–09 (1987)
(welfare payments); Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1004–19 (1984) (pesticide
formulas); United States v. Sec. Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70, 78 (1982) (liens on real property); Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 64–68 (1979) (eagle feathers).
194
505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
187
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other cases:195 a nonpossessory regulation may constitute a per se taking if it deprives the owner of “all economically beneficial or productive use of land.”196 When a restriction reaches this level, it can no
longer be considered a regulation that “simply adjust[s] the benefits
and burdens of economic life,” but instead is more properly regarded
as “the equivalent of a physical appropriation.”197
A more difficult issue arises when a restriction that falls short of
eliminating all economically beneficial use nonetheless constitutes a
regulatory taking. Holmes did not elaborate on the proper way to
balance the interests of property owners and the government, although he did note that “this is a question of degree.”198 The Court
did not offer much additional guidance until 1978, when it issued its
opinion in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York.199 In
Penn Central, the Court recognized that, although determining
whether a particular governmental action constitutes a taking is an
“essentially ad hoc, factual inquir[y],” it is possible to identify three
factors with particular significance.200 Specifically, the Court focused
on (1) “the economic impact of the regulation” on the property
owner, (2) “the extent to which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations,” and (3) “the character of the
governmental action.”201 The Court immediately thereafter emphasized that “[a] ‘taking’ may more readily be found when the interference with property can be characterized as a physical invasion by
government than when interference arises from some public program
adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the
common good.”202
What is perhaps most striking about Penn Central is the suggestion
that physical and regulatory takings might be governed by the same
analysis. The Court’s observation that a taking may “more readily” be
found when the regulation effects a physical invasion arguably implies
that a physical invasion of property is not by itself a taking. Instead, it
is simply one consideration that can be overcome by countervailing
considerations. The Court seemed to confirm this conclusion in
PruneYard Shopping Center v. Robins,203 in which the Court upheld a
California decision requiring that the owner of a shopping center per195
See Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987); Hodel v. Va. Surface
Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 295–96 (1981); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447
U.S. 255, 260 (1980).
196
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015.
197
Id. at 1017 (internal quotation marks omitted).
198
Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922).
199
438 U.S. 104 (1978).
200
Id. at 124.
201
Id.
202
Id. (citation omitted).
203
447 U.S. 74 (1980).
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mit a group of high school students to engage in political speech on
his premises. In holding that this requirement did not violate the
Takings Clause, the Court stated that the students’ physical invasion
of the shopping center “cannot be viewed as determinative.”204 Many
noted scholars have downplayed the importance of this language and
argued that PruneYard can be explained largely on First Amendment
grounds.205 Nevertheless, a number of lower courts following
PruneYard held that the Penn Central factors govern takings that effect
physical invasions as well as nonpossessory restrictions on the use of
property.206
The Supreme Court soon removed any remaining doubts about
the issue. In the first of two leading cases on the proper takings analysis applied to compelled access to communications networks, the
Court in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.207 firmly distinguished between its physical and regulatory takings jurisprudence.
2. Loretto and the Distinction Between Physical and Regulatory
Takings
The issue in Loretto concerned cable operators’ ability to string
coaxial cables on New York apartment buildings for the provision of
cable television services.208 Such cables served two distinct purposes.
First, they allowed cable operators to provide service to each building’s tenants. Second, even if no tenant in a particular building subscribed to cable, the cable operator often needed to string a
“crossover” line in order to service customers in adjacent buildings.209
In 1970, the previous owner of the plaintiff’s building allowed the local cable operator to install a thirty-five-foot crossover line that was less
than one-half inch in diameter and which ran eighteen inches above
the building’s roof. The operator also attached directional taps, measuring four inches per side, on the front and rear of the roof and two
silver boxes, measuring 18 by 12 by 6 inches, along the roof cables.
When the building’s tenants subscribed to the service, the cable operator installed another cable running down the front of the building to
the first floor.210
204

Id. at 84.
See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 9.5, at 600 (2d ed.
1988); cf. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 450–51 (1982)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting) (suggesting that Loretto rejected the takings rationale of
PruneYard).
206
See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 423 N.E.2d 320, 331–34
(N.Y. 1981), rev’d, 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
207
458 U.S. 419 (1982).
208
Id. at 422.
209
Id.
210
Id. at 422, 438 n.16.
205
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The cable operator originally compensated building owners for
such access by paying them a standard rate of five percent of the gross
revenues realized from the particular property owned.211 In 1973,
however, the State of New York enacted a statute requiring that landlords permit cable operators to install equipment on their property
and providing that a state agency would set the rate of compensation.212 The agency eventually set the compensation at a one-time
rate of one dollar.213 The plaintiff, owner of a Manhattan apartment
building, challenged the statute on the ground that it violated the
Takings Clause.214 The New York Court of Appeals, consistent with
the suggestion of the language in Penn Central and PruneYard quoted
above, held that a government-authorized physical occupation is not
necessarily a taking.215
The Supreme Court responded with a ringing reaffirmation of
the distinction between physical and regulatory takings. In particular,
the Court rejected the conclusion that the takings determination
should in all cases be governed by the ad hoc standards announced in
Penn Central.216 Instead, the Court held that any regulation that authorizes a permanent physical occupation of property constitutes a
per se taking. This proposition held regardless of whether the government itself occupied the property or simply empowered a third party
to do so.217
The Court based its decision on three considerations. First, the
Court looked to precedent, finding that that “when the ‘character of
the governmental action’ is a permanent physical occupation of property, our cases uniformly have found a taking to the extent of the occupation, without regard to whether the action achieves an important
public benefit or has only minimal economic impact on the
owner.”218 Indeed, the Court indicated that it was the “historical” and
“traditional” rule to treat a permanent physical occupation as a per se

211

Id. at 423.
Id.
213
Id. at 423–24.
214
See id. at 423–24.
215
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 423 N.E.2d 320, 330–32 (N.Y.
1981), rev’d, 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
216
See Loretto, 458 U.S. at 432.
217
See id. at 432 n.9 (“A permanent physical occupation authorized by state law is a
taking without regard to whether the State, or instead a party authorized by the State, is the
occupant.”).
218
Id. at 434–35 (quoting Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104,
124 (1978) (citation omitted); see also id. at 427 (“When faced with a constitutional challenge to a permanent physical occupation of real property, this Court has invariably found
a taking.”); id. at 427–34 (reviewing precedent).
212

\\server05\productn\C\CRN\88-4\CRN401.txt

940

unknown

Seq: 56

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

6-MAY-03

11:13

[Vol. 88:885

taking.219 In so holding, the Court explicitly limited or rejected language in Penn Central and PruneYard that suggested otherwise.220
Second, the Court drew support for its conclusion from the general policies underlying the existence of property rights. Permanent
appropriation of property is “perhaps the most serious form of invasion of an owner’s property interests.”221 In so reasoning, the Court
invoked the familiar metaphor of property as a bundle of rights encompassing three separate strands—the rights to possess, use, and dispose of the property.222 Unlike regulatory takings, which affect only
the property-use strand, physical invasions “chop[ ] through the bundle, taking a slice of every strand.”223 Specifically, physical occupations necessarily foreclose owners from either possessing or using the
occupied portion of property.224 Although the owner retains the theoretical right to dispose of the occupied space, the presence of equipment attached to that space essentially “empt[ies] the right of any
value.”225 In addition, the Court concluded that these deprivations
are particularly severe when the government authorizes a stranger to
invade and occupy the owner’s property.226 As a result, the Court concluded that a permanent physical occupation “is qualitatively more severe than a regulation of the use of property, even a regulation that
imposes affirmative duties on the owner, since the owner may have no
control over the timing, extent, or nature of the invasion.”227
219

Id. at 435–36, 441.
See id. at 432, 441. The Court reasoned that nothing in Penn Central “repudiate[s]
the rule that a permanent physical occupation is a government action of such a unique
character that it is a taking without regard to other factors that a court might ordinarily
examine.” Id. at 432. The Court emphasized that the “permanence and absolute exclusivity” of the physical occupation at issue in Loretto “distinguish[ed] it from [the] temporary
limitations on the right to exclude” at issue in PruneYard. Id. at 435 n.12. The Court also
distinguished PruneYard on the grounds that the invasion in that case was “temporary and
limited in nature” and that “the owner had not exhibited an interest in excluding all persons from his property.” Id. at 434. Moreover, in PruneYard, “the owner had already
opened his property to the general public, and . . . permanent access was not required.”
Nolan v. Ca. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 832 n.1 (1987). For a recent analysis of
PruneYard, see Richard A. Epstein, Takings, Exclusivity and Speech: The Legacy of PruneYard v.
Robins, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 21, 33–50 (1997).
221
Loretto, 458 U.S. at 435; see id. at 441 (concluding that a permanent physical occupation is “qualitatively more intrusive than perhaps any other category of property
regulation”).
222
See id. at 435.
223
Id.
224
See id. at 436. The Court emphasized that physical invasions also deny an owner the
power to exclude others from his property, a power which “has traditionally been considered one of the most treasured strands in an owner’s bundle of property rights.” Id. at 435.
225
Id. at 436.
226
Id. The Court classified such a regulation as “literally add[ing] insult to injury”
because it violates “an owner’s expectation that he will be relatively undisturbed at least in
the possession of his property.” Id.
227
Id.
220
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Finally, the Court invoked practical considerations. Treating permanent physical occupations as per se takings “avoids otherwise difficult line-drawing problems.”228 Unlike the ad hoc quality of the Penn
Central balancing test, determining the presence of a permanent physical occupation under Loretto poses fewer problems of proof. For example, “[t]he placement of a fixed structure on land or real property
is an obvious fact that will rarely be subject to dispute.”229 As a result,
when the government action is in the form of a permanent physical
occupation, that factor by itself becomes “determinative.”230 Although the size and economic impact of the occupation are relevant
in ascertaining the amount of compensation,231 those considerations
play no role in determining whether a taking has occurred.232
The Court was careful to emphasize that its holding was not at
odds with the “substantial authority” upholding the state power to restrict an owner’s use of his property.233 Citing Penn Central, the Court
observed that “[s]o long as these regulations do not require the
[property owner] to suffer the physical occupation of a portion of his
building by a third party, they will be analyzed under the multifactor
inquiry generally applicable to nonpossessory governmental
activity.”234
Loretto thus established two principles that play a central role in
our analysis. First, the opinion articulated a strong rationale for subjecting physical takings to the highest degree of protection under the
Takings Clause. If a regulation requires a property owner to allow
third parties to install permanent equipment on his property, it constitutes a per se taking, regardless of the size of the physical invasion or
the public purposes that the regulation advances.235 Second, Loretto
228

Id.
Id. at 437; see also Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 628 (2001) (noting that
in those cases in which a physical taking is involved, “the fact and extent of the taking are
known.”).
230
Loretto, 458 U.S. at 426.
231
See id. at 437.
232
See id. at 434–35, 436–38. Addressing the cable company’s argument regarding the
small size of the equipment it installed, Justice Marshall quipped, “whether the installation
is a taking does not depend on whether the volume of space it occupies is bigger than a
breadbox.” Id. at 438 n.16.
233
See id. at 440, 441 (“[O]ur holding today in no way alters the analysis governing the
State’s power to require landlords to comply with building codes and to provide utility
connections, mailboxes, smoke detectors, fire extinguishers, and the like in the common
area of a building.”).
234
Id. at 440 (citing Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978)).
The reference to Penn Central indicates that the Court was referring to traditional regulatory takings doctrine.
235
It bears emphasizing that this Article advances a far narrower argument than the
one advanced in SIDAK & SPULBER, supra note 39, at 229–32, which claimed that Loretto
required compensation for any deviation from investment-backed expectations resulting
from a change in regulatory systems and that a third party’s introduction of a data stream
229
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reasserted the sharp distinction between the Court’s physical and regulatory takings jurisprudence. When a physical taking is involved, regulatory takings precedent does not apply.
3. Florida Power and the Distinction Between Physical Takings and
Confiscatory Rate-Making
The Supreme Court advanced similar themes in FCC v. Florida
Power Corp.,236 the other leading case involving a takings challenge to
regulation compelling access to a communications network. As noted
in Loretto, the distribution of cable television depended on the operator’s ability to establish a web of coaxial cables connecting individual
households.237 Although in urban areas this could be accomplished
by compelling building owners to allow cable operators to string cable
across their properties,238 in suburban and rural areas, the network of
utility poles owned by telephone and electric companies was the only
feasible means of establishing the necessary infrastructure.239 Congress was concerned, however, that utility companies were exploiting
their monopoly position by overcharging cable operators for the right
to attach coaxial cables to existing utility poles. As a result, in 1978
Congress enacted the Pole Attachments Act240 authorizing the FCC to
regulate the terms and conditions of pole attachment agreements in
any state that did not already impose such regulation.241
Nothing in the original version of the Pole Attachments Act gave
“cable companies any right to occupy space on utility poles, or prohibit[ed] utility companies from refusing to enter into attachment
agreements with cable operators.”242 Instead, the Act simply regulated the rents charged by those parties who voluntarily chose to enter
into such agreements. As a result the Court held that the Act did not
constitute the type of permanent physical occupation that Loretto held
to be a per se taking because it lacked the necessary “element of required acquiescence.”243 The Court found Loretto dispositive, concluding that, “‘[s]o long as these regulations do not require the
constituted a physical occupation. Instead, this Article limits itself to what is indisputably
Loretto’s core holding—that regulations authorizing the permanent placement of equipment on another person’s property constitute a physical taking. See supra note 217 and
accompanying text. Thus, even those who question the former interpretation of Loretto are
unlikely to find this Article’s interpretation controversial.
236
480 U.S. 245 (1987).
237
See supra notes 208–09 and accompanying text.
238
Supra notes 208–09 and accompanying text.
239
See Fla. Power, 480 U.S. at 247.
240
Pub. L. No. 95-234, 92 Stat. 33 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 224 (2000)).
241
See Fla. Power, 480 U.S. at 247–48. Cable companies did not utilize the underground rights of way owned by natural gas companies because “in most instances underground installation of the necessary cables is impossible or impracticable.” Id. at 247.
242
Id. at 251.
243
Id. at 252.
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landlord to suffer the physical occupation of a portion of his building
by a third party, they will be analyzed under the multifactor inquiry
generally applicable to nonpossessory governmental activity.’”244
Having held that the Pole Attachments Act fell outside Loretto’s
per se rule governing physical takings, the Court evaluated whether
the Act nonetheless represented a nonpossessory taking. Rather than
applying the Penn Central factors, as its quotation of Loretto suggested,
Florida Power held that the Takings Clause simply required that the set
rates not be confiscatory.245 The Court concluded that the pole attachment rates established by the statute allowed for sufficient return
on investment to satisfy the requirements of its confiscatory rate-making jurisprudence.246
Florida Power thus reinforced the same key principles underlying
the Court’s decision in Loretto. First, although it did not address the
issue explicitly, the Court implied that had the Pole Attachments Act
compelled utilities to give cable television systems access to their
poles, the Act would have constituted a per se taking under Loretto.247
Second, Florida Power underscored the sharp distinction between the
Court’s physical takings and confiscatory ratemaking precedent.
Echoing the admonitions of Justices Brandeis and Black that physical
takings and confiscatory ratemaking occupy distinct jurisprudential
spheres,248 the Court established that its confiscatory rate-making precedent did not apply to cases involving physical takings.249
4. Implications
a. Towards a Possible Synthesis of Regulatory Takings and
Confiscatory Rate-Making Doctrine
Although courts and scholars typically treat regulatory takings
and confiscatory rate-making as conceptually distinct,250 the Court’s
opinions in Loretto and Florida Power suggest that both lines of precedent may represent a single concept. It is easy to conceptualize a re244
Id. (quoting Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 440
(1982)). The Court further noted:
Appellees contend, in essence, that it is a taking under Loretto for a tenant
invited to lease at a rent of $7.15 to remain at the regulated rent of $1.79.
But it is the invitation, not the rent, that makes the difference. The line
which separates these cases from Loretto is the unambiguous distinction between a commercial lessee and an interloper with a government license.
Id. at 252–53.
245
See id. at 253 (citing Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 770 (1968); St.
Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38, 53 (1936)).
246
See id. at 253–54.
247
See id. at 251–52 n.6.
248
See supra notes 182–86 and accompanying text.
249
See Fla. Power, 480 U.S. at 251–52.
250
See, e.g., SIDAK & SPULBER, supra note 39, at 213.
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striction on the amount that one can charge for access to a piece of
property as either a restriction on the property’s use or as a “public
program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to promote the common good.”251 Moreover, similar concerns appear to
animate both lines of precedent. Each recognizes that almost every
government action necessarily affects the value of private property
and that imposing too stringent a leash on regulatory action conflicts
with the exigencies of modern governance.252 At the same time, both
recognize that excess power to regulate can constitute the power to
destroy.253 In addition, both employ almost identical methodologies
that emphasize the fact-specific nature of the claims254 and that focus
primarily on the restriction’s economic impact on the regulated entity255 and investor expectations.256
Finally, some case law suggests that these two approaches may be
fungible. For example, in Florida Power the Court invoked its regulatory takings jurisprudence when it suggested that unless a regulation
required that utilities permit cable companies to occupy existing poles
permanently, it would be “‘analyzed under the multifactor inquiry
generally applicable to nonpossessory governmental activity.’”257 Immediately following that observation, however, the Court held that in
the absence of such compulsion, the Pole Attachments Act was prop251

See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 (1978).
Compare, e.g., Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 413 (1922) (“Government
hardly could go on if to some extent values incident to property could not be diminished
without paying for every such change in the general law.”), with Fed. Power Comm’n v.
Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 601 (1944) (“The fixing of prices . . . may reduce the
value of the property which is being regulated. But the fact that the value is reduced does
not mean that the regulation is invalid.”).
253
Compare Pa. Coal, 260 U.S. at 415 (noting that, without some limit on the government’s ability to restrict owners’ use of their property, “the natural tendency of human
nature [would be] to extend the qualification more and more until at last private property
disappears”), with R.R. Comm’n Cases, 116 U.S. 307, 331 (1886) (“[I]t is not to be inferred
that this power of limitation or regulation [of rates] is itself without limit. This power to
regulate is not a power to destroy, and limitation is not the equivalent of confiscation.”).
254
Compare Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124 (calling the regulatory takings standard an “essentially ad hoc, factual inquir[y]”), with Hope Natural Gas, 320 U.S. at 602 (observing that
determining whether a rate is confiscatory depends upon a series of fact-intensive inquiries
focusing on the rate’s net effect).
255
Compare Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124 (identifying “[t]he economic impact of the
regulation on the claimant” as a factor in the regulatory takings analysis), with Hope Natural
Gas, 320 U.S. at 603 (recognizing the importance of ensuring that the regulated entity
receives “enough revenue not only for operating expenses but also for the capital costs of
the business”).
256
Compare Penn Cent., 438 U.S. at 124 (identifying “the extent to which the regulation
has interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations” as a factor in the regulatory
takings analysis), with Hope Natural Gas, 320 U.S. at 603 (noting that investors have “a legitimate concern with the financial integrity of the company whose rates are being
regulated”).
257
FCC v. Fla. Power Corp., 480 U.S. 245, 252 (1987) (quoting Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 440 (1982)).
252
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erly analyzed under the Court’s confiscatory rate-making precedent.258 The juxtaposition of these two observations indicates that the
Court may have viewed these two lines of precedent as simply variations on the same theme.
The Court’s reasoning in rent control cases gives rise to a similar
inference. For example, the Court analyzed the rent control ordinance at issue in Pennell v. City of San Jose259 in terms of the Court’s
confiscatory rate-making precedent. In contrast, the Court analyzed
the rent control ordinance in Yee v. City of Escondido260 in terms of its
regulatory takings jurisprudence, stating that the rent control ordinance at issue “merely regulate[s] petitioners’ use of their land by regulating the relationship between landlord and tenant.”261 Indeed, the
Court specifically equated rent ceilings imposed on landlords with
other use restrictions and declared that both types of restrictions were
properly analyzed under classic regulatory takings precedent such as
Pennsylvania Coal and Penn Central’s progeny.262 The parallel between
the two doctrines is further underscored by the Court’s opinion in
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, which described the strand of
regulatory takings doctrine used to invalidate regulations prohibiting
all economically beneficial land use as being directed against “confiscatory” regulations.263
It is thus arguable that the Court’s regulatory takings and confiscatory rate-making jurisprudence amount to slightly different aspects
of a single doctrine. Unfortunately, the Court has never clearly addressed the relationship between these two lines of precedent, and
scholarly analysis has shed little light on the issue.264 In addition, it
would be anachronistic to suggest that the Court had a unified takings
jurisprudence in mind from the outset. The Court’s confiscatory takings jurisprudence long antedates its recognition of regulatory takings
in Pennsylvania Coal, let alone its announcement of ad hoc factors in
Penn Central. In fact, because states primarily regulated rates and the
Takings Clause was not applied to the states until 1897,265 the earliest
258

See id. at 253–54.
485 U.S. 1, 11–13 (1988).
260
503 U.S. 519, 522–23 (1992).
261
Id. at 528; see also Block v. Hirsh, 256 U.S. 135, 155–56 (1921) (Holmes, J.) (analogizing rent control to restrictions on the use of property, such as limits on billboards and
building heights).
262
See Yee, 503 U.S. at 529.
263
505 U.S. 1003, 1029, 1032 n.18 (1992).
264
See John N. Drobak, From Turnpike to Nuclear Power: The Constitutional Limits on Utility
Rate Regulation, 65 B.U. L. REV. 65, 98 (1985) (asserting, without analysis, that the Court’s
regulatory takings and confiscatory rate-making precedents are equivalent); see also Richard
Goldsmith, Utility Rates and “Takings”, 10 ENERGY L.J. 241, 256–62 (1989) (identifying similarities in the Court’s regulatory takings and confiscatory rate-making precedents, but concluding that confiscatory rate-making is based on due process considerations).
265
See Chi., Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226, 241 (1897).
259
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confiscatory rate-making cases arose under the Due Process Clause,
rather than the Takings Clause. The historical dichotomy is further
reinforced by the views of Justice Brewer, perhaps the primary architect of the Court’s early takings jurisprudence. His famous speech at
Yale Law School on the subject clearly evinced his belief that rate regulation and use restrictions represent distinct lines of authority.266
b. The Paradigmatic Importance of the Shift to Access Regulation
Fortunately, we need not resolve the precise relationship between
regulatory takings and confiscatory rate-making in order to press our
argument. Although the cases do not shed much light on whether
regulatory takings and confiscatory rate-making represent distinct
concepts or slightly different aspects of the same doctrine, for our
purposes it is sufficient that the Court has emphasized the importance
of distinguishing both categories from its physical takings jurisprudence.267 If a regulation authorizes a third party to establish a permanent physical invasion, Loretto and Florida Power hold that it constitutes
a per se taking—regardless of any other factors typically invoked in
regulatory takings and confiscatory rate-making cases.
Equally important, the Court has frequently reiterated that its
physical and nonpossessory takings cases occupy separate doctrinal
spheres, and that its decisions involving nonpossessory takings have
no application to physical takings. For example, the Court held in Yee
that a regulatory takings challenge was not fairly included in a physical
takings challenge, because “[c]onsideration of whether a regulatory
taking occurred would not assist in resolving whether a physical taking
occurred as well.”268 In so holding, the Court emphasized that both
questions “exist side by side, neither encompassing the other.”269 The
Court struck a similar note in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island270 when it recognized that physical takings “present[ ] different considerations than
cases alleging a taking based on a burdensome regulation.”271
The Court reaffirmed these principles in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation
Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency.272 The Court held that
whenever a physical taking occurs, the government has a categorical
duty to compensate the owner, regardless of the size of the occupa266
See D.J. Brewer, Protection to Private Property from Public Attack, 55 NEW ENGLANDER &
YALE REV. 97, 101–04 (1891), reprinted in 2 PROPERTY RIGHTS IN AMERICAN HISTORY 41,
45–48 (James W. Ely, Jr. ed., 1997).
267
See supra notes 235–36, 248–49 and accompanying text.
268
Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 537 (1992).
269
Id.
270
533 U.S. 606 (2001).
271
Id. at 628.
272
535 U.S. 302 (2002).
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tion or whether the government only takes part of a larger parcel.273
Echoing its more extended discussion in Loretto, the Court found it
appropriate to treat physical takings categorically because “physical
appropriations are relatively rare, easily identified, and usually represent a greater affront to individual property rights.”274 As a result,
when determining whether a physical taking has occurred, the Court
does not evaluate the magnitude of the economic impact on the property owner or inquire into the substantiality of the governmental interest underlying the regulation; any physical invasion, no matter how
small, is sufficient to trigger the duty to compensate.275 Most importantly for our purposes, the Tahoe-Sierra Court emphasized that these
differences “make[ ] it inappropriate to treat cases involving physical
takings as controlling precedents for the evaluation of a claim that
there has been a regulatory taking, and vice versa.”276 Tahoe-Sierra
thus reaffirmed the core substantive holding of Loretto by reiterating
that permanent physical occupations constitute per se takings without
regard to the economic impact or the public purpose served by the
invasion. Tahoe-Sierra also offered the Court’s plainest statement to
date that its regulatory takings decisions do not constitute precedent
in cases involving physical takings.
B. Physical Takings Jurisprudence Applied to Network Access
Determining whether a takings violation has occurred thus requires resolution of two separate questions. First, has the government
action in question effected a taking? As the foregoing discussion underscores, the resolution of this question varies depending on
whether the regulation at issue is alleged to be a physical taking. Second, has the government provided just compensation for its actions?
1. Determining Whether a Taking Has Occurred
In contrast to the analysis applied to both regulatory takings and
confiscatory rate-making, which attempt to balance the interests of the
public with those of the utility and which carefully examine the regulation’s economic impact, physical takings are governed by a simple
bright-line rule. As the Court held in Loretto and reaffirmed several
times since, government action is a per se taking if it authorizes a permanent physical occupation, such as giving third parties the right to
place telecommunications equipment on another person’s property.277 This fact underscores the constitutional significance of the
273
274
275
276
277

Id. at 320–22.
Id. at 324.
Id. at 322.
Id. at 323 (footnote and internal quotation marks omitted).
See supra Part II.A.2.
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shift from rate regulation to access regulation. If a permanent physical occupation occurs, it does not matter whether the action furthers
an important public interest or achieves an important public benefit.278 Nor does the size or economic impact of the invasion matter.279
Indeed, a permanent physical invasion constitutes a per se taking even
if it increases the value of the property.280 The Court reasoned:
[This] conclusion . . . [is] premised on our longstanding recognition that property is more than economic value; it also consists of
“the group of rights which the so-called owner exercises in his dominion of the physical thing,” such “as the right to possess, use and
dispose of it.” While the [property] at issue here may have no economically realizable value to its owner, possession, control, and disposition are nonetheless valuable rights that inhere in the
property.281

As will be discussed below in greater detail,282 regulations that
compel access to wireline telecommunications networks also generally
require the placement of third-party equipment on the network
owner’s property.283 As a result, the shift from rate regulation to access regulation generates an equally fundamental shift in the constitu278
See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 322; Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015,
1028 (1992); Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 530 (1992); Nollan v. Cal. Coastal
Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 831–32 (1987); Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,
458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982).
279
See Tahoe-Sierra, 535 U.S. at 322; Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015; Nollan, 483 U.S. at 831–32;
Loretto, 458 U.S. at 436–37, 438 n.16.
280
See Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 169–70 (1998); Loretto, 458 U.S. at
437–38 n.15.
281
Phillips, 524 U.S. at 170 (citations omitted) (quoting United States v. Gen. Motors
Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 378 (1945)).
282
See infra notes 460–74, 579–91, 715–29 and accompanying text.
283
A more difficult question arises with regard to regulations that do not require a
network owner to allow others to place equipment on its property, but instead require the
network owner to extend its network onto another’s property so that this party may interconnect with the network. As will be discussed later, courts generally regard such requirements as physical takings, even though they involve no physical invasion of the network
owner’s property. See infra notes 622–28 and accompanying text.
An even more difficult problem emerges with regard to regulations compelling access
to a wireless network. In contrast to wireline communications, which depend on a physical
connection to the network, wireless networks do not necessarily require the network owner
to install third-party equipment on its property. As a result, the D.C. Circuit recently rejected a takings challenge to an FCC order intended to ensure access to different forms of
television service. See Bldg. Owners & Managers Ass’n Int’l v. FCC, 254 F.3d 89, 99 (D.C.
Cir. 2001). The order required property owners to allow residents to install antennas
needed to receive DBS service, broadcast signals, and other forms of television programming. See id. at 91. The court concluded that, because the regulation did not compel a
physical invasion of property by a third party, it did not constitute a per se taking under
Loretto. See id. at 99.
It appears, then, that the constitutional arguments for basing access rates on market
prices is weaker with respect to wireless networks than with respect to wireline networks.
The economic arguments, however, are the same in each case, as the harm effected by the
third party’s occupation of productive capacity is the same. As a result, we would still urge
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tional analysis. Finding that a taking has occurred, however, is only
the first step in the constitutional inquiry.
2. Determining Just Compensation
Once a court determines that a taking has occurred, the constitutionality of the regulation in question depends on whether the government provides just compensation for the property taken. The
Loretto Court did not address the question of compensation, remanding it for consideration by the state courts.284 In addition, most courts
confronted with this issue held that it was not ripe for judicial
consideration.285
a. Market Value as the Preferred Measure of Just Compensation
The Court often has averred that the guiding principle for determining just compensation is that the owner should be put “‘in as good
a position pecuniarily as if his property had not been taken.’”286 As a
result, the Court established that the predominant measure of just
compensation should be “market value.”287 As Justice Frankfurter reasoned in Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States:288
Most things . . . have a general demand which gives them a value
transferable from one owner to another. As opposed to such perthe FCC and state public utility commissions to base access rates on market prices as a
matter of policy.
284
Loretto, 458 U.S. at 441.
285
See, e.g., Verizon Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 524–25 (2002); Gulf
Power Co. v. FCC, 208 F.3d 1263, 1272–73 (11th Cir. 2000), rev’d on other grounds sub nom.
Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Gulf Power Co., 524 U.S. 327, 342 (2002); Gulf Power
Co. v. United States, 187 F.3d 1324, 1338 (11th Cir. 1999); Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, 120 F.3d
753, 818 (8th Cir. 1997), rev’d & remanded in part on other grounds sub nom. AT&T Corp. v.
Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 396 (1999); Ill. Bell Tel. Co. v. FCC, 911 F.2d 776, 780 (D.C.
Cir. 1990).
286
United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 510 (1979) (“Lutheran Synod”)
(quoting Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934)). As Richard Epstein has noted,
“In principle, the ideal solution is to leave the individual owner in a position of indifference between the taking by the government and the retention of the property.” RICHARD
A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 182, (1985).
For the earliest statements of this principle, see Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States,
148 U.S. 312, 326 (1893), and Seaboard Air Line Railway Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 299,
304 (1923).
287
See, e.g., United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24, 29 (1984) (“Duncanville
Landfill”); Kirby Forest Indus. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1, 10 (1984); Lutheran Synod, 441
U.S. at 511; Almota Farmers Elevator & Warehouse Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 470, 474
(1973); United States v. Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U.S. 121, 123 (1950); United
States v. Toronto, Hamilton & Buffalo Nav. Co., 338 U.S. 396, 402 (1949); United States v.
Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 379 (1945); United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 374
(1943); Olson, 292 U.S. at 255; United States v. New River Collieries Co., 262 U.S. 341, 344
(1923). Although the cases at times refer to this standard as “fair market value,” as the
Court noted in Miller, the two formulations essentially amount to the same thing. 317 U.S.
at 374.
288
338 U.S. 1 (1949).
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sonal and variant standards as value to the particular owner whose
property has been taken, this transferable value has an external validity which makes it a fair measure of [just compensation].289

The external validity identified by Justice Frankfurter has both a
theoretical and a practical basis. As a theoretical matter, market value
reflects the seminal economic insights that effectively transformed
value from the intrinsic concept of a good to the result of market
transactions between buyers and sellers. A good’s market value provides observable evidence—a market price—of the benefits to buyers
and the costs to sellers. Market value thus sheds light on property
rights by considering the returns in transferring those rights. In evaluating the value of assets used in production, market value provides
tangible evidence of the property’s earning potential. This shift was
evident in Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States,290 the first case
in which the Court addressed just compensation principles. The
Court determined that the Takings Clause required not only compensation for the tangible property taken—a lock and a dam—but also
for the tolls the facility would have earned by using that property. The
Takings Clause required payment of “a full and perfect equivalent for
the property taken,”291 which, “generally speaking, is determined by
its productiveness,—the profits which its use brings to the owner.”292
“The value, therefore, is not determined by the mere cost of construction, but more by what the completed structure brings in the way of
earnings to its owner.”293 As a result, the income that the lock and the
dam would have earned was considered part of the property’s
value.294 The Court subsequently reaffirmed this principle on numerous occasions.295
Practical considerations provide additional reasons for preferring
exchange-oriented approaches over cost-oriented approaches when
determining just compensation. As the Court observed, the shift to
the market-value standard was driven in part by the “need for a clear,
easily administrable rule governing the measure of ‘just compensation.’”296 The use of external measures of value eliminated many of
the “serious practical difficulties in assessing the worth an individual
289

Id. at 5.
148 U.S. 312.
291
Id. at 326.
292
Id. at 328.
293
Id.
294
See id. at 329.
295
See, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1017 (1992) (“‘For what is the
land but the profits thereof?’” (quoting 1 E. COKE, INSTITUTES, ch. 1, § 1 (1st Am. ed. 1812)
(alterations omitted))); Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 9 (1949) (“The
market value of land as a business site tends to be as high as the reasonably probable
earnings of a business there situated would justify . . . .”).
296
Kirby Forest Indus. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1, 10 n.15 (1984).
290
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places on particular property at a given time.”297 Permitting such subjective considerations to determine what constitutes just compensation “would enhance the risk of error and prejudice.”298
The Court has held that the market-value standard is not constitutionally mandated and thus might not require strict adherence.299
Indeed, the Court has long recognized that market value fails to give
“full and literal force” to the principle of putting property owners in
as good a position as if their property had not been taken.300 In particular, the Court has frequently observed that just compensation does
not necessarily require compensation for the special value that a piece
of property may have for a particular user.301 Furthermore, the Court
does not allow recovery of any transaction costs imposed by the taking.302 As a result, the market-value standard has been criticized for
failing to make whole those whose property is taken.303
The Court has nonetheless concluded that the market-value standard offers an appropriate accommodation for the exigencies of modern governance. In most cases market value “achieves a fair ‘balance
between the public’s need and the claimant’s loss,’”304 thereby mediating “the conflict between the people’s interest in public projects and
the principle of indemnity to the landowner.”305 Although a failure to
consider subjective valuation can impose real costs on those whose
property is taken, this loss is “properly treated as part of the burden of

297
United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 511 (1979) (“Lutheran Synod”);
accord United States ex rel. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Powelson, 319 U.S. 266, 280 (1943).
298
United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24, 36 (1984).
299
See id. at 30–31; Kirby Forest, 467 U.S. at 10 n.14; Lutheran Synod, 441 U.S. at 512;
United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488, 490 (1973); United States v. Toronto, Hamilton &
Buffalo Nav. Co., 338 U.S. 396, 402 (1949); United States v. Cors, 337 U.S. 325, 332 (1949)
(cautioning against making a “fetish” of market value).
300
Lutheran Synod, 441 U.S. at 511. The Court also held that “[a]lthough the market
value standard is a useful and generally sufficient tool for ascertaining the compensation
required to make the owner whole . . . [it] does not necessarily compensate for all values
an owner may derive from his property.” Id.
301
See id. (citing United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 374–75 (1943); Cors, 337 U.S. at
332).
302
See, e.g., United States v. Petty Motor Co., 327 U.S. 372, 377–78 (1946).
303
See, e.g., James Geoffrey Durham, Efficient Just Compensation as a Limit on Eminent
Domain, 69 MINN. L. REV. 1277, 1300 (1985); cf. supra Part I.C.2 (arguing that transaction
costs are real costs that should be taken into account when compensating network owners
for access to their inputs). See generally DeBow, supra note 36, at 579–80 & n.7 (noting the
systematic undercompensation of property, and collecting commentary); D. Michael Risinger, Direct Damages: The Lost Key to Constitutional Just Compensation when Business Premises Are
Condemned, 15 SETON HALL L. REV. 483, 526–40 (1985) (collecting commentary).
304
United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24, 33 (1984) (“Duncanville Landfill”)
(quoting Toronto, Hamilton & Buffalo, 338 U.S. at 402).
305
United States ex rel. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Powelson, 319 U.S. 266, 280 (1943).
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common citizenship.”306 As a result, any exceptions to the marketvalue rule remain very narrow.307
b. Determining Market Value Under the Takings Clause
Market value is the amount that would be paid for the property in
a transaction between a willing buyer and a willing seller.308 Consequently, market value takes into account any aspect of the property
that affects the price that a reasonable buyer is willing to pay.309 For
example, in Boom Co. v. Patterson, the Court held that in determining
the value of condemned land,
the same considerations are to be regarded as in a sale of property
between private parties. The inquiry in such cases must be what is
the property worth in the market, viewed not merely with reference
to the uses to which it is at the time applied, but with reference to
the uses to which it is plainly adapted . . . .310

The Court reiterated these principles in Olson v. United States.311 In
Olson, the Court noted that when determining the price upon which a
willing buyer and a willing seller would settle, “there should be taken
into account all considerations that fairly might be brought forward
and reasonably be given substantial weight in such bargaining.”312
The Court acknowledged the importance of opportunity cost by stating that
[t]he highest and most profitable use for which the property is
adaptable and needed or likely to be needed in the reasonably near
future is to be considered, not necessarily as the measure of value,
but to the full extent that the prospect of demand for such use affects the market value while the property is privately held.313

In addition, “to the extent that probable demand by prospective purchasers or condemnors affects market value, it is to be taken into
account.”314
306

Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 5 (1949).
See DeBow, supra note 36, at 581; Lunney, supra note 36, at 729–31, 759–61; Ann E.
Gergen, Note, Why Fair Market Value Fails as Just Compensation, 14 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. &
POL’Y 181, 195 (1993).
308
See Kirby Forest Indus. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1, 10 (1984); United States v.
564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 511 (1979) (“Lutheran Synod”); United States v. Miller,
317 U.S. 369, 374 (1943).
309
See Almota Farmers Elevator & Warehouse Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 470, 474
(1973); Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 257–58 (1934); Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98
U.S. 403, 407–08 (1878).
310
98 U.S. at 407–08.
311
292 U.S. 246 (1934).
312
Id. at 257; see id. at 255 (“Just compensation includes all elements of value that
inhere in the property . . . .”).
313
Id. at 255.
314
Id. at 256; accord Almota, 409 U.S. at 477–78 (valuing property based on every consideration that would have applied had the property been sold in an open market); id. at
307
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Consistent with the economic principles identified above,315 the
Court has held that an evaluation of comparable sales represents the
most reliable way to determine the amount a willing buyer would have
agreed to pay a willing seller had the property been transferred on the
open market. As the Court observed in Kimball Laundry, “If exchanges
of similar property have been frequent, the inference is strong that
the equivalent arrived at by the haggling of the market would probably have been offered and accepted, and it is thus that the ‘market
price’ becomes so important a standard of reference.”316
Other evaluation methodology may be required when the property being valued is traded so infrequently that, in effect, no market
for it exists.317 In the absence of comparable sales, when valuing commercial property the Court has sanctioned the income capitalization
approach, in which market value is equal to the net present value of
the property’s projected income.318 Although this approach has the
advantage of being based on data derived from actual market transactions, the Court has recognized that it does carry some risks. Estimates of value based on income capitalization are only as reliable as
the data upon which they are based. For example, projections of future income are typically based upon a particular property’s past earnings. Although such data are often reliable indicators of future
earnings, at times they may fail to reflect the full range of technological and economic developments.319
In addition, the Court has suggested that in the absence of better
measures of value, courts can appropriately consider replacement cost
when determining whether the government has provided just compensation.320 As noted earlier, replacement cost is better than historic
cost at reflecting changes in value over time.321 Replacement cost also
479 (Powell, J., concurring) (giving weight to every value that would have applied in a
transaction between a willing buyer and a willing seller).
315
See supra Part I.C.1.
316
Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 6 (1949).
317
See, e.g., United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24, 29 (1984) (“Duncanville
Landfill”) ; Kirby Forest Indus. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1, 10 n.14 (1984); United States v.
564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 512 (1979) (“Lutheran Synod”); United States v. Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U.S. 121, 123 (1950); Kimball Laundry, 338 U.S. at 5; United
States v. Toronto, Hamilton & Buffalo Nav. Co., 338 U.S. 396, 402 (1948); United States v.
Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 374 (1943).
318
See Lutheran Synod, 441 U.S. at 515 (noting that “the uses to which commercial
property is put can often be valued in terms of the capitalized earnings produced”); Kimball Laundry, 338 U.S. at 16 (“One index of going-concern value offered by petitioner is the
record of its past earnings.”). For an application of these principles in the telecommunications context, see Illinois Bell Telephone Co. v. FCC, 988 F.2d 1254, 1262–63 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
319
See, e.g., Toronto, Hamilton & Buffalo, 338 U.S. at 398–403 (finding that development of new ferry routes rendered earnings records of prior years’ routes unreliable indicators of future income).
320
See Kimball Laundry, 338 U.S. at 5–7.
321
See supra notes 39–40 and accompanying text.
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provides a useful price ceiling, because all those who purchase access
can create the input themselves.322 At the same time, the Court’s takings decisions recognize that replacement-cost approaches to valuation suffer from several conceptual limitations. First and foremost,
such approaches do not necessarily reflect exchange value.323 In addition, by failing to incorporate any element that reflects demand, the
replacement-cost approach may fail to account for technological obsolescence and thus may require compensation even “when no one
would think of reproducing the property.”324 Moreover, in order to
compensate for functional obsolescence, courts must analyze the replacement cost of an equally efficient plant by allowing for physical
depreciation. Failing to do so would bestow a windfall on the property owner due to the difference in quality between the replacement
facility and the older facility.325 Factoring in depreciation does, however, add considerable uncertainty to the valuation process.326
The Court reserved its heaviest criticism for historical cost, the
valuation approach upon which authorities have relied most often
when regulating network industries.327 As the Court explained in
United States v. Toronto, Hamilton & Buffalo Navigation Co.,328 historical
cost all too often represents a “false standard of the past” that bears no
necessary relationship with present value.329 As a result, historical cost
is often a backward-looking measure that is unreliable in determining
a current fair market value.330 Moreover, the Court in Olson pointed
out that market value
may be more or less than the owner’s investment. He may have
acquired the property for less than its worth or he may have paid a
speculative and exorbitant price. Its value may have changed substantially while held by him. . . . The public may not by any means
confiscate the benefits, or be required to bear the burden, of the

322

See supra Part I.C.2.
See 4 JULIUS L. SACKMAN, NICHOLS’ THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 12.01[1], at 1235 to -37 (3d ed. 1995).
324
Toronto, Hamilton & Buffalo, 338 U.S. at 403. For example, in Toronto, Hamilton &
Buffalo, the Court determined that replacement cost was misleading because the development of rail lines and larger ferries had rendered ships of the type in question obsolete.
See id. at 399–400.
325
United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24, 34–35 (1984) (“Duncanville
Landfill”).
326
See id.
327
The Court’s criticism of historical-cost methodologies dates back to its earliest takings decisions. See, e.g., Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 328
(1893) (“The value, therefore, is not determined by the mere cost of construction. . . .”).
328
338 U.S. 396 (1949).
329
Id. at 403 (citation omitted).
330
See id.
323
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owner’s bargain. . . . He must be made whole but is not entitled to
more.331

Because of the problems associated with these other methodologies, the Court has consistently indicated that the comparable-sales
approach represents the best evidence of market value.332 Indeed,
the Court has gone so far as to characterize other valuation methods,
including replacement cost, as exceptions to the comparable-sales approach, and to hold them inapplicable whenever there are marketbased transactions in similar properties.333 The Court offered its most
dramatic statement to this effect in United States v. New River Collieries
Co.,334 in which it held that “[w]here private property is taken for public use, and there is a market price prevailing at the time and place of
the taking, that price is just compensation.”335 As a result, because
comparable sales data were available, the Court properly held inadmissible income and replacement cost evidence.336 Only if such data
are unavailable should courts resort to other methods. Furthermore,
if it is necessary to resort to other methods of determining market
value, courts should turn first to the income capitalization approach
and then to the replacement-cost approach before resorting to historical cost valuation.
Justice Brandeis used historical cost in evaluating takings challenges to conventional rate regulation.337 At no point, however, did
either Justice Brandeis or the Court suggest that cost-based methodologies are superior to the comparable-sales approach under the princi331

292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934) (citation omitted); accord 4A NICHOLS’ THE LAW OF EMIDOMAIN, supra note 323, § 15.09[1], at 15-62 (noting that historical cost “is not a
conclusive test, because the money may have been improvidently expended, or by reason
of a change in conditions, parts of the works may have ceased to be of value, or the cost of
labor and materials may have increased or decreased”).
332
See 4 NICHOLS’ THE LAW OF EMINENT DOMAIN, supra note 323, § 12B.04[3], at 12B-23
(calling the comparable-sales approach “the preferred way to compute market value); DeBow, supra note 36, at 582 (stating that “it is widely understood that in practice the Supreme Court shows a strong preference for the comparable sales approach”); Lunney,
supra note 36, at 728 (noting that the Court “has preferred that a party establish market
value through the comparable sales approach”).
333
See United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24, 29 (1984) (“Duncanville Landfill”); United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 512–13 (1979) (“Lutheran
Synod”); Toronto, Hamilton & Buffalo, 338 U.S. at 402. The Court has also suggested in dicta
that the market value standard may be set aside when its application “‘would result in
manifest injustice to owner or public.’” Duncanville Landfill, 469 U.S. at 29 (quoting
United States v. Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U.S. 121, 123 (1950)). The Court has
never provided much guidance as to when this exception might arise, and has rejected
every attempt to invoke it. See id. at 30–36; Lutheran Synod, 441 U.S. at 514–17. The language of these opinions and the Court’s failure to apply this exception strongly suggest
that it is extremely narrow, at best, and possibly even empty.
334
262 U.S. 341 (1923).
335
Id. at 344 (emphasis added).
336
See id.
337
See supra notes 58–70 and accompanying text.
NENT
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ples of economics and fairness embodied in the Takings Clause.
Instead, the Court made clear that it was sanctioning the cost-based
methodologies only because market-based methodologies were unavailable.338 Implicit in this argument is the recognition that the
emergence of market-based benchmarks would require a return to
market-based compensation principles.
The foregoing analysis underscores the constitutional significance of both transformations that we have identified. The fundamental shift from rate regulation to access regulation makes it far
easier for regulatory authorities to incorporate external reference
points that reflect the demand side of the valuation equation. Because conventional rate regulations set prices that utilities can charge
for final outputs, any attempt to base regulated rates on final prices is
hopelessly circular. Access regulation, in contrast, alleviates this problem by allowing market-based competition to determine the prices
utilities charge for final goods. It is true that the access regulation
approach is somewhat circular as well. For example, regulatory authorities still must establish rates to govern the terms under which incumbent firms must provide access to competitors, and the rates they
set will have some influence on the prices charged for final goods.
Network access nonetheless remains only one of several inputs required to produce the final good. Therefore, if network access comprises only a small percentage of total cost, access rates will not be a
significant determinant of final goods prices.
The emergence of direct, facilities-based network competition
also is of considerable constitutional importance. Indeed, the emergence of direct competition undercuts the justifications for imposing
access regulation as a matter of principle. But even setting aside the
question whether access represents good policy, the emergence of
substitute network technologies has profound implications for the implementation of any access regime. By facilitating the emergence of
alternative networks capable of providing market-based indicia of
competitive pricing, converging telecommunications technology is vitiating the justification for setting rates according to cost-based methodologies. Once competition leads to market benchmarks, continued
reliance on cost-based methodologies will be improper, under
precedent.339
c. Partial Takings of Utility Property
The Supreme Court’s takings jurisprudence recognizes that government compensation should generally reflect the earning potential
338
See Missouri ex rel. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 262 U.S. 276,
292–94 (1923) (Brandeis, J., concurring in the judgment).
339
See supra notes 309–38 and accompanying text.
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of the property taken. The government need not compensate for a
property’s going concern value when it takes the entire fee and divests
the current owner of title.340 As the Court explained in Kimball Laundry, “the denial of compensation in such circumstances rests on a very
concrete justification: the going-concern value has not been taken.”341
In such circumstances, “only the physical property has been condemned, leaving the owner free to move his business to a new location.”342 The Court further reasoned that “there is no more reason
for a taker to pay for the business’ going-concern value than there
would be for a purchaser to pay for it who had not secured from his
vendor a covenant to refrain from entering into competition with
him.”343
Nonetheless, the Court identified two circumstances in which
compensation for the going-concern value is appropriate. The first
occurs when the government takes a public utility that possesses natural monopoly characteristics.344 “Since a utility cannot ordinarily be
operated profitably except as a monopoly, investment by the former
owner of the utility in duplicating the condemned faculties could have
no prospect of a profitable return.”345 In such cases, “[t]he owner
retains nothing of the going-concern value that it formerly possessed.”346 Therefore, because taking over a public utility “has the inevitable effect of depriving the owner of the going-concern value of
his business,” it is properly regarded as a taking for which compensation must be paid.347
The second situation arises when the government physically takes
less than the fee interest in the owner’s property.348 For example, the
Court in United States v. General Motors Corp.,349 noted that although
the government need not compensate for a property’s going-concern
value when it takes the full fee interest,350 “[i]t is altogether another
matter when the Government does not take [the owner’s] entire interest, but by the form of its proceeding chops it into bits, of which it
takes only what it wants, however few or minute, and leaves [the
340
See, e.g., Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 11 (1949); United States
v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373, 379 (1945). Going-concern value represents the product of the “contribution to the earning capacity of the business of greater skill in management and more effective solicitation of patronage than are commonly given to [a
particular] combination of land, plant, and equipment.” Kimball Laundry, 338 U.S. at 9.
341
338 U.S. at 11.
342
Id.
343
Id.
344
See id. at 12 (citing City of Omaha v. Omaha Water Co., 218 U.S. 180 (1910)).
345
Id. at 12–13.
346
Id. at 13.
347
Id.
348
See id. at 14–16.
349
323 U.S. 373 (1945).
350
See id. at 379.
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owner] holding the remainder.”351 Because only part of the property
was taken, it was effectively impossible for the property owner simply
to reestablish its business elsewhere. In such a case, the proper measure of compensation is not just the cost of the property taken, but
also the going-concern value of the property as reflected by rental fees
that could be obtained on the open market.352
These situations underscore the constitutional problems that
would result if network access rates were based solely on direct cost
and support rates that reflect the probable demand for network services. To the extent that compelled access to any particular portion of
a network is justified, it must be because that portion bears natural
monopoly characteristics. Because it is infeasible for the network
owner to establish similar facilities elsewhere, the physical occupation
of its facilities requires that the owner be compensated for the goingconcern value of the property taken. In this case, the value of the
property is reflected by the value of the network services provided. In
addition, the partial nature of the physical taking effected by access
requirements provides yet another reason for requiring the government to compensate network owners for lost profits. Access necessarily involves a physical taking that is considerably less than the full fee,
thus interrupting the owner’s use of the property and leaving it inextricably intertwined with others’ use. Because these encumbrances effectively prevent the owner from using the property for other
purposes, compensation for such a taking must reflect the property’s
going-concern value.
3. Implications
It is no doubt tempting for regulatory authorities and courts to
resolve takings challenges to network regulations according to the
same principles applied in conventional rate regulation cases. Those
principles are based on balancing tests that regard constitutionally unproblematic those regulations backed by strong public policy justifications and having minimal economic impact. In addition, adherence
to preexisting approaches allows regulators to continue employing the
cost-based methodologies with which they are familiar. Rate-making
authorities can thus maximize the leverage they have gained from regulatory tools developed in previous rate-making efforts.
Blind application of existing principles, however, ignores the constitutional import of the shift from rate regulation to access regulation. As noted earlier, access regulation typically requires network
owners to permit permanent physical occupations of their prop351
352

Id. at 382.
See Kimball Laundry, 338 U.S. at 7; Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. at 382.
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erty.353 Unlike rate regulation, access regulation effects a physical taking for which the government must pay compensation—without
regard to the magnitude of the invasion, its impact on investmentbacked expectations, or the importance of the policy interests furthered by the regulation. The Court has made clear that the regulatory takings and confiscatory rate-making precedents upon which
regulatory authorities have previously relied in rejecting takings challenges do not apply to cases involving a physical taking.354
The Court’s takings jurisprudence also makes clear that the best
measure of just compensation is market value, which is best determined through actual market transactions.355 Although at one point
the absence of external, market-determined benchmarks may have
justified reliance on cost-based valuation methodologies, the emergence of platform competition and the shift from regulating outputs
to regulating inputs have made it increasingly possible for regulatory
authorities to determine value on the basis of actual market transactions. This shift implies that the theoretical and technological transformation of regulated-industries law commands, in turn, a similar
transformation of the principles used to evaluate takings challenges to
access regulation of network industries. Front-line policy makers—
those in charge of implementing access regulations—have largely ignored these implications.356 Therefore, the obligation to enforce
these principles will fall to the courts as they begin to address the merits of takings challenges to this type of regulation.
III
CURRENT POLICY APPLICATIONS
This Part applies the framework developed above to the three
most salient access-related policy issues of the day: (1) access to local
telephone networks, (2) access to networks of utility poles, and (3)
access to high-speed broadband networks. This analysis shows how
the emergence of platform competition and the shift to access regulation have made basing rates on market prices more feasible than ever
before. Although we expect the level of competition in the relevant
markets—which include local telephony, multichannel video programming distribution, and broadband services—to vary, the competition likely to emerge in each industry should be sufficiently robust to
justify basing rates on market prices. We also demonstrate how access
to each of these networks necessarily requires a permanent physical
353
354
355
356

See
See
See
See

supra Part II.A.2.
supra notes 235, 249, 267–75 and accompanying text.
supra notes 286–89 and accompanying text.
infra Parts III.A.1, III.B.1, III.C.1.
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invasion, which adds a constitutional dimension that reinforces the
economic analysis.
A. Access to Local Telephone Networks
Access to local telephone systems represented the keystone to the
Telecommunications Act of 1996,357 which has been lauded as the
most sweeping reconceptualization of telecommunications policy
since the initial enactment of the Communications Act of 1934.358
This subpart provides an overview of the access requirements imposed
on local telephone networks. It then analyzes the regulatory regime
in light of the economic and constitutional principles developed
above. Both sets of principles compel the conclusion that the current
approach to setting access rates for local telephone networks is flawed
and should be replaced by an approach that better reflects market
pricing.
1. Regulatory Framework
In a typical narrowband network, customers connect to the telephone network through a pair of copper wires known as the local
loop. Local loops terminate at a circuit switch located in the LEC’s
central office, which receives calls in analog format. The circuit
switch then routes the calls either to another local customer whose
loop is also connected to the same switch or to a designated interconnection point, called a “point of presence” (POP), where it can transfer the call to a long-distance carrier. The typical local telephone
network thus performs two distinct functions. First, it allows customers to place local calls to other customers in the same geographic area,
a function known as “local exchange services” (represented in Figure
1 by the connection between Customer Premises A and Customer
Premises B).359 Second, the network connects customers to long distance carriers by providing “exchange access services” (represented in
Figure 1 by the connection between Customer Premises A and the
POP maintained by the long distance carrier).
Policy makers initially regarded the entire telephone network as a
natural monopoly for two reasons. First, the significant fixed costs associated with constructing the initial network of wires, switches, and
other equipment caused costs to decline across all relevant volumes.
357
Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 47
U.S.C.).
358
Pub. L. No. 73-416, 48 Stat. 1064 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. §§ 151–615(b)
(2000).
359
If a local exchange area is particularly large, the LEC may employ more than one
central office switch connected together by high-speed trunk lines to serve a single calling
area.
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Second, because any local telephone network’s value to a particular
user is determined in large part by the number of other users connected to the same network, local telephone systems exhibit network
economic effects.360
Over time, policy makers realized that portions of the telephone
network could be competitive. Usually at the prodding of the courts,
the FCC began to allow and then to encourage competition in various
portions of the overall telephone system, such as the markets for telephone-related equipment361 and long-distance services.362 This initial
movement culminated in the breakup of AT&T,363 which was aimed at
preventing the Bell System from using its local telephone service monopoly to impede competition in the long-distance and equipment
markets.364 This decision, known as the Modified Final Judgment
(MFJ), did not refute the notion that local telephone service is a natural monopoly.365 Therefore, neither the FCC nor the courts attempted to promote competition at the local level.
Over time, dramatic decreases in the cost of switching and transmission technology led policy makers to question whether local telephone service remained a natural monopoly. The initial step in
360

See supra notes 116–17 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Hush-A-Phone Corp. v. United States, 238 F.2d 266, 268 (D.C. Cir. 1956)
(allowing continued use of privacy equipment attached to telephones); Use of the
Carterfone Device in Message Toll Tel. Serv., 13 F.C.C.2d 420, 424 (1968) (striking down a
tariff that effectively rendered a two-way radio phone extension uneconomical).
362
See, e.g., MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. FCC, 561 F.2d 365, 380 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (rejecting the FCC’s refusal to allow MCI to establish a long-distance service to compete with
AT&T); MTS and WATS Market Structure, Report and Third Supplemental Notice of Inquiry and Proposed Rulemaking, 81 F.C.C.2d 177, 202–04 (1980).
363
See United States v. AT&T Co., 552 F. Supp. 131, 222–25 (D.D.C. 1982), aff’d mem.
sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
364
See id. For a complete discussion of the theories underlying the breakup of AT&T,
see Noll & Owen, supra note 121, at 295–326.
365
See Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 11 F.C.C.R. 14171, 14173–74 ¶ 4
(1996).
361
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fostering competition in local telephony was the FCC’s Expanded Interconnection proceeding,366 which attempted to promote competition in
local telephone service by nurturing the development of a new category of carriers known as Competitive Access Providers (CAPs).367
The increasing feasibility of competition in local telephony eventually
culminated with the enactment of the local competition provisions of
the 1996 Act.368
a. The Expanded Interconnection Proceeding
When they first emerged, CAPs focused on offering corporate
customers dedicated connections that allowed high-volume long distance customers to bypass the incumbent LEC’s facilities by transporting calls directly from the customer’s premises to those of the longdistance carrier’s POP.369 CAPs also began to offer partial bypass services that covered either the segment running from the customer’s
location to the incumbent LEC’s central office (a service known as
“special access”) or the segment running from the central office to the
long-distance carrier’s POP (a service known as “switched transport”).
CAP services had many advantages over the services provided by
the incumbent LECs. First, CAP networks tended to employ more
modern technology, such as fiber-optic rings, that allowed the networks to offer a greater range of features and a more attractive price
structure.370 Moreover, unlike with incumbent LECs, the FCC did not
require that CAPs provide uniform services according to published
tariffs. As a result, CAPs were able to respond more quickly to market
demands and to tailor pricing and terms of service to each customer’s
particular needs.371 Lastly, the untariffed nature of CAP services allowed them to avoid the cross subsidies embedded in the FCC’s system of access charges.372
366
See Expanded Interconnection with Local Telephone Co. Facilities, Second Report
and Order and Third Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 8 F.C.C.R. 7374 (1993) (“Switched
Transport Order”); Expanded Interconnection with Local Telephone Co. Facilities, Report
and Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 7 F.C.C.R. 7369 (1992) (“Special Access
Order”).
367
See infra Part III.A.1.a.
368
See infra Part III.A.1.b.
369
For a detailed description of regulations designed to encourage the development
of CAPs, see Alexander C. Larson & Douglas R. Mudd, Collocation and Telecommunications
Policy: A Fostering of Competition on the Merits?, 28 CAL. W. L. REV. 263, 274–84 (1992).
370
Specifically, fiber optics provided dramatic improvements in the amount of available bandwidth. They also decreased service costs in general and made them much less
distance-sensitive. Finally, fiber optics allowed CAPs to take advantage of the efficiencies
made possible by computer processing, such as improved switching and digital compression. Id. at 275; David J. Teece, Telecommunications in Transition: Unbundling Reintegration,
and Competition, 1 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 47, 68 (1994-1995).
371
Larson & Mudd, supra note 369, at 274–75.
372
Teece, supra note 370, at 57.
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CAPs were also important for a far more fundamental reason.
The eventual expansion of CAP networks to cover the entire core business districts of major metropolitan areas made it possible for CAPs
to offer local telephone service in direct competition with the incumbent LECs.373 The FCC recognized that in order for CAPs to compete
with the major LECs,374 they needed to interconnect with the LECs’
networks on the same terms and conditions that the LECs provided
for their own circuits. As a result, the FCC gave CAPs the right to
install in LECs’ central offices any equipment necessary to terminate
calls.375 The FCC believed that this right, dubbed “physical collocation,” was necessary to ensure that the interconnection provided to
the CAPs was comparable to that used by LECs. If the LECs’ central
offices lacked the physical space to accommodate physical collocation,
the LECs could instead provide “virtual collocation” which is the installation and maintenance of equipment on their property that allowed the requesting carrier to interconnect with the LECs’ networks
through a location outside of the LECs’ central offices.376 Price caps
373
See id. at 66, 78 (describing CAP entry into local telephone service in New York,
Chicago, and Grand Rapids).
374
The FCC limited these expanded interconnection requirements to Tier I LECs,
which it defined as LECs with revenues of at least $100 million. See Expanded Interconnection with Local Telephone Co. Facilities, Second Report and Order and Third Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, 8 F.C.C.R. 7374, 7376 ¶ 1 & n.1 (1993) (“Switched Transport Order”);
Expanded Interconnection with Local Telephone Co. Facilities, Report and Order and
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 7 F.C.C.R. 7369, 7372 n.1, 7398 ¶ 57 (1992) (“Special
Access Order”).
375
See Switched Transport Order, 8 F.C.C.R. at 7391–92 ¶ 29; Special Access Order, 7
F.C.C.R. at 7389–90 ¶ 39, 7391 ¶ 42; see also Bell Atl. Tel. Cos. v. FCC, 24 F.3d 1441, 1444
(“[T]he CAP strings its cable to the LEC central office. The LEC must then turn over
space within the central office in which the CAP may install and operate its circuit terminating equipment.”). This requirement applied only to central office equipment needed
to terminate basic transmission facilities. It did not cover equipment, such as enhanced
services or customer premises equipment, unrelated to the competitive provision of transmission services. See Switched Transport Order, 8 F.C.C.R. at 7412–13 ¶ 63; Special Access Order, 7 F.C.C.R. at 7413–14 ¶ 93. This was by no means the only obstacle hindering CAPs
from emerging as direct competitors of LECs. The existing tariffs required customers
purchasing partial bypass services from the CAPs to pay for both the special access and the
switched transport segments, even though they used the CAP to bypass one of the legs.
This forced CAP customers to pay twice for the same service, rendering CAP pricing uneconomical. In order to cure this problem, the FCC ordered Tier I LECs to unbundle
their special access and switched transport tariffs. See Switched Transport Order, 8 F.C.C.R. at
7418 ¶ 75; Special Access Order, 7 F.C.C.R. at 7424–25 ¶ 120.
376
See Switched Transport Order, 8 F.C.C.R. at 7393–94 ¶ 31; Special Access Order, 7
F.C.C.R. at 7390–91 ¶ 41. The FCC also approved virtual collocation if both parties agreed
that it was preferable to physical collocation or if state regulatory authorities determined
either that virtual collocation was preferable or that the LEC should decide which form to
allow. See Switched Transport Order, 8 F.C.C.R. at 7393–95 ¶¶ 31–32; Special Access Order, 7
F.C.C.R. at 7390–91 ¶¶ 40–41. The FCC set specific conditions on LECs’ provision of
virtual collocation in order to minimize technical differences between physical and virtual
collocation. First, the FCC required LECs to permit interconnectors using virtual collocation to designate the type of equipment dedicated to their use, although the intercon-
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governed interconnection rates for both physical and virtual collocation. As in other price-cap regimes, the initial rates were based on
historical cost.377 The FCC also rejected arguments that the physical
collocation requirement violated the Takings Clause on the ground
that physical takings doctrine was not applicable to public utility property, which was governed exclusively by the framework applied to regulatory takings.378 Even assuming that physical collocation did
constitute a taking, the FCC argued in the alternative that the compensation it provided was sufficient to render the requirement constitutional.379 State regulatory authorities issued similar orders in order
to facilitate CAP entry into local telephone service.380
The D.C. Circuit struck down the FCC’s collocation rules in Bell
Atlantic Telephone Cos. v. FCC on the ground that they exceeded the
FCC’s statutory authority.381 The court reasoned that granting CAPs
the right to place equipment in the LECs’ central offices represented
precisely the type of permanent physical occupation that constituted a
per se taking under Loretto.382 As a result, the physical collocation requirement ran afoul of the principle that statutes should not be construed to create “‘an identifiable class of cases in which application of
a statute will necessarily constitute a taking.’”383
The FCC responded to the Bell Atlantic decision by ceasing to
mandate physical collocation and by giving the LECs the option of
providing virtual collocation.384 The FCC continued to maintain that
mandatory physical collocation did not constitute a per se taking, but
argued that the virtual collocation option eliminated any potential
constitutional infirmity.385 Before the courts could address the validnectors bore any additional costs associated with their choice of equipment. In addition,
the FCC required LECs to install, maintain, and repair virtual collocation equipment as
regularly and with the same failure rates that applied to the LEC’s own equipment. Finally,
LECs had to allow interconnectors to monitor and control the equipment remotely. See
Switched Transport Order, 8 F.C.C.R. at 7392 ¶ 30; Special Access Order, 7 F.C.C.R. at 7392–94
¶¶ 44–46.
377
See Switched Transport Order, 8 F.C.C.R. at 7419 ¶ 79; Special Access Order, 7 F.C.C.R. at
7428–29 ¶ 127; Expanded Interconnection with Local Telephone Co. Facilities, Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking and Notice of Inquiry, 6 F.C.C.R. 3259, 3267 ¶¶ 52–53 (1991).
378
See Switched Transport Order, 8 F.C.C.R. at 7445 ¶ 144; Special Access Order, 7 F.C.C.R.
at 7476–83 ¶¶ 230–40.
379
See Switched Transport Order, 8 F.C.C.R. at 7475 ¶ 144; Special Access Order, 7 F.C.C.R.
at 7482–83 ¶ 240.
380
See Special Access Order, 7 F.C.C.R. at 7374–75 ¶ 7 & nn.10–12.
381
24 F.3d 1441, 1446–47 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
382
See id. at 1445–47.
383
Id. at 1445 (quoting United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121,
128 n.5 (1985)).
384
See Expanded Interconnection with Local Telephone Co. Facilities, Memorandum
Opinion and Order, 9 F.C.C.R. 5154, 5163 ¶¶ 22–23 (1994).
385
Id.
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ity of these revised regulations, the entire scheme was rendered moot
by the collocation provisions of the 1996 Act.386
b. The Local Competition Provisions of the 1996 Act
The local competition provisions of the 1996 Act were designed
to “open[ ] all communications services to competition,” including
local telephone service, by eliminating local providers’ bottleneck
control over the elements needed to originate or terminate telephone
calls.387 Rather than regulating the retail prices charged for local telephone service, the 1996 Act focuses on regulating the price at which
new entrants can obtain access to key elements of an incumbent
LEC’s network. As such, it represents a prime example of the shift
from output regulation to input regulation taking place throughout
regulated industries.
Congress envisioned that competition in local telephone markets
might emerge through one of three paths.388 First, a new entrant
might obtain all of the necessary elements from the incumbent LEC
and resell them.389 Second, a new entrant might construct an entirely
new network.390 Because the inability to complete calls to the incumbent LEC’s customers would render a new network relatively unattractive, the Act requires that incumbent LECs allow any requesting
telecommunications carrier to interconnect with their networks “at
any technically feasible point.”391 The Act also requires that the interconnection be equal in quality to that which the incumbent LEC provides to itself or a subsidiary392 and that it be provided according to
“rates, terms, and conditions that are just, reasonable, and
nondiscriminatory.”393
Congress recognized, however, that not every facilities-based entrant could have its entire network in place when it began to offer
local service.394 Therefore, to allow competition to emerge before entrants had fully established their networks, Congress established a
third path for entering local telephone markets by requiring that incumbent LECs provide other carriers with access to all of their network elements on an unbundled basis. The LECs must provide access
386

See Pac. Bell v. FCC, 81 F.3d 1147 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (table decision).
See H.R. REP. NO. 104-204, pt. I, at 48–49, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1, 11–13.
388
See Implementation of Local Competition Provisions of the Telecommunications
Act of 1996, First Report and Order, 11 F.C.C.R. 15499, 15509 ¶ 12 (1996) (“Local Competition Order”); Verizon Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 491–92 (2002).
389
See 47 U.S.C. § 251(b)(1), (c)(4) (2000).
390
Verizon, 535 U.S. at 491.
391
47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(2)(B).
392
Id. § 251(c)(2)(C).
393
Id. § 251(c)(2)(D).
394
S. CONF. REP. NO. 104-230, at 148 (1996).
387
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“at any technically feasible point on rates, terms, and conditions that
are just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory.”395
Typically, to interconnect and have access to unbundled network
elements, the requesting carrier must install some of its equipment on
the incumbent LEC’s property. Thus, mandatory interconnection
presupposes that competitors will establish physical connections to
the incumbent LEC’s network.396 In addition, compelled access to elements of the incumbent LEC’s network presupposes some ability to
combine those elements with the new entrant’s facilities.397 The local
loop, which more than any other network element has natural monopoly characteristics, is the element that a requesting carrier is most
likely to access in this manner. A carrier who requests unbundled access to the local loop must terminate that loop by connecting the loop
to its switching equipment.
As a result, the 1996 Act includes collocation requirements similar to those the FCC adopted in its Expanded Interconnection proceedings.398 Specifically, the Act requires incumbent LECs to permit
“physical collocation of equipment necessary for interconnection or
access to unbundled network elements.”399 When technical considerations or space limitations render physical collocation impractical, incumbent LECs need only provide virtual collocation.400
The 1996 Act requires that prices for interconnection and access
to unbundled network elements be determined through voluntary negotiations between the incumbent LEC and the requesting carrier, at
times aided by a state public utility commission’s mediation.401 If the
parties are unable to reach a voluntary agreement, the Act gives state
public utility commissions the authority to set rates through binding
arbitration, which would be governed by one of two statutory mandates.402 First, the arbitrators shall set rates for interconnection and
access to unbundled network elements that are “based on the cost . . .
395
47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(3). In determining which network elements are subject to the
unbundled access requirement, the statute requires that the FCC consider whether “access
to such network elements as are proprietary in nature is necessary” and whether “the failure
to provide access to such network elements would impair the ability of the telecommunications carrier seeking access to provide the services that it seeks to offer. Id.
§ 251(d)(2)(A)–(B) (emphasis added).
396
See Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, First Report and Order, 11 F.C.C.R. 15499, 15514 ¶ 26 (1996) (“Local
Competition Order”) (defining interconnection as “the physical linking of two networks for
the mutual exchange of traffic”).
397
Id. at 15514–15.
398
See supra notes 375–79 and accompanying text.
399
47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(6).
400
See id.; see also supra notes 376, 384 and accompanying text (describing similar virtual collocation provision with respect to CAPs).
401
47 U.S.C. § 252(a)(1)–(2).
402
See id. § 252(b), (c)(2).

\\server05\productn\C\CRN\88-4\CRN401.txt

2003]

unknown

Seq: 83

ACCESS TO NETWORKS

6-MAY-03

11:13

967

of providing the interconnection or network element,” provided that
cost is “determined without reference to a rate-of-return or other ratebased proceeding.”403 Second, the Act requires that compensation
for traffic originating on the network of one LEC and terminating on
the network of another be governed by the principle of “reciprocal
compensation.”404 This requirement “provide[s] for the mutual and
reciprocal recovery by each carrier of costs associated with the transport and termination on each carrier’s network facilities of calls that
originate on the network facilities of the other carrier.”405 Such costs,
moreover, must be determined “on the basis of a reasonable approximation of the additional costs of terminating such calls.”406
c. Implementation of the 1996 Act
The FCC implemented the local competition provisions of the
1996 Act in a massive order issued just three months after the statute’s
enactment.407 The order dealt encyclically with a wide range of implementation-related issues, including the scope of the unbundling requirements, which gave rise to the Supreme Court’s decision in AT&T
Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Board.408 For our purposes, however, it is suffi403
Id. § 252(d)(1)(A)(i). The statute further requires that rates be “nondiscriminatory,” id. § 252(d)(1)(A)(ii), and that they “may include a reasonable profit,” id.
§ 252(d)(1)(B).
404
See id. § 251(b)(5).
405
Id. § 252(d)(2)(A)(i).
406
Id. § 252(d)(2)(A)(ii). The statute, however, specifically allows carriers to waive
mutual recovery in favor of other arrangements, such as bill-and-keep systems. Id.
§ 252(d)(2)(B)(i).
407
Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the Telecommunications
Act of 1996, First Report and Order, 11 F.C.C.R. 15499 (1996) (“Local Competition Order”).
408
525 U.S. 366 (1999). Initially, the FCC broadly defined the elements subject to
unbundled access without considering the availability of equally cost-effective inputs. See
Local Competition Order, 11 F.C.C.R. . at 15642 ¶ 283, 15643 ¶ 285. The FCC gave a similarly
broad interpretation to the equipment subject to physical collocation. See id. at 15628
¶ 250, 15794 ¶ 579. The Supreme Court struck down the FCC’s interpretation of the
scope of the unbundled access requirements as an improper construction of the statutory
requirements that a network element be “necessary” before it is subject to unbundled access and that withholding access to that element would “impair” the requesting carrier’s
ability to provide such service. See Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. at 387–92. The D.C. Circuit
applied similar reasoning in striking down the FCC’s initial collocation orders. See GTE
Serv. Corp. v. FCC, 205 F.3d 416, 422–24 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (citing Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. at
389–90). On remand, the FCC reinterpreted the “necessary” and “impair” standards in a
way designed to give those terms substance, only to see those provisions struck down once
again. See Implementation of Local Competition Provisions in Telecommunications Act of
1996, Third Report and Order and Fourth Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 15 F.C.C.R.
3696, 3712 ¶ 22 (1999) (“UNE Remand Order”), remanded sub nom. U.S. Telecom Ass’n v.
FCC, 290 F.3d 415, 422–28 (D.C. Cir. 2002), cert. denied, 71 U.S.L.W. 3416 (U.S. Mar. 24,
2003) (No. 02-858). The FCC also revised its rules to limit collocation to equipment designed primarily to provide the requesting carrier either with interconnection that is
“equal in quality” to that provided by the incumbent LEC for its own services, or with
“nondiscriminatory access” to an unbundled network element. Deployment of Wireline
Services Offering Advanced Telecommunications Capability, Fourth Report and Order, 16
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cient to focus on the FCC’s methodology for setting interconnection,
unbundled access, and physical collocation rates.
The FCC has implemented the provisions governing rates for interconnection and access to unbundled network elements using a
methodology known as Total Element Long Run Incremental Cost
(TELRIC). TELRIC bases rates on the element’s “economic costs,”
which the FCC defines as the sum of the incremental costs directly
attributable to the specified element and a reasonable allocation of
common costs.409 TELRIC’s most distinctive feature is that it assesses
both incremental and common costs on a forward-looking basis by
focusing on a network element’s replacement cost, rather than its historical cost.410 The FCC believed that basing rates on forward-looking
incremental cost represents the best way to replicate the conditions of
a competitive market.411 TELRIC further accommodates technological change by requiring that costs be determined “based on the use of
the most efficient . . . technology currently available and the lowest
cost network configuration, given the existing location of the incumbent LEC’s wire centers.”412 Finally, the FCC declined to incorporate
an element reflecting the opportunity cost to a network owner of providing competitors unbundled access to its network elements.413
Although the statutory mandate underlying TELRIC ostensibly
applies only to compensation for interconnection and access to unbundled network elements, the FCC determined that the same pricing rules should govern compensation for physical collocation.414 In
F.C.C.R. 15435, 15452–60 ¶¶ 32–44 (2001) (“Collocation Remand Order”), aff’d sub nom. Verizon Tel. Cos. v. FCC, 292 F.3d 903 (D.C. Cir. 2002). The FCC subsequently adopted a
new construction of “impair” designed to address the concerns raised by the D.C. Circuit.
With respect to business customers, the FCC entered a presumption that local switching
would no longer be subject to UNE access. State regulators would have ninety days to
rebut this presumption in particular cases. With respect to mass market customers, the
FCC gave state regulators nine months to determine whether eliminating access to switching would impair competitors in particular markets. News Release, FCC Adopts New Rules
for Network Unbundling Obligations of Incumbent Local Phone Carriers, available at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-231344A1.pdf (Feb. 20, 2003).
The text of the order has not yet been released.
409
See 47 C.F.R. § 51.505(a) (2001). TELRIC properly refers only to the first of these
two components. For simplicity, however, this Article refers to both parts of the methodology collectively as TELRIC.
410
Local Competition Order, 11 F.C.C.R. at 15857–59 ¶¶ 704–707 (citing 47 U.S.C.
§ 252(d)(1)(A)(i) (2000)). TELRIC avoids the problems caused by the distinction between fixed and variable costs by measuring incremental costs from a “long run” perspective, defined as a period long enough that all of a firm’s costs become variable or
avoidable. See id. at 15845 ¶ 677, 15851 ¶ 692.
411
See id. at 15846–47 ¶ 679.
412
47 C.F.R. § 51.505(b)(1).
413
See Local Competition Order, 11 F.C.C.R. at 15859 ¶ 709.
414
Id. at 15816 ¶ 629. The FCC reasoned that physical collocation is simply a method
of obtaining interconnection and access to unbundled network elements and, as such,
should be priced in the same fashion. See id.
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addition, the FCC determines that TELRIC-based rates provide an appropriate basis for reciprocal compensation.415 TELRIC thus governs
all of the important pricing aspects of the access regime created by the
1996 Act.
In so ruling, the FCC rejected arguments that TELRIC violates
the Takings Clause. Whereas in its Expanded Interconnection proceedings, the FCC argued that takings of public utility property are governed by the Court’s regulatory takings jurisprudence,416 it later ruled
that the guiding principle for determining whether such regulation
violates the Constitution is whether the rates are confiscatory.417 Alternatively, even if physical collocation constitutes a physical taking,
the FCC found that its rate-making methodology satisfies the just-compensation standard. Although the government must pay the fair market value of the property taken, it need not allow recovery of
monopoly rents.418 The FCC reaffirmed this reasoning in its Collocation Order and its Collocation Reconsideration Order.419
The Supreme Court upheld TELRIC as a matter of statutory construction in Verizon Communications, Inc. v. FCC.420 As several lower
415
47 C.F.R. § 51.705(a)(1) (requiring that reciprocal compensation be determined
on the basis of forward-looking economic costs pursuant to the methodology governing
pricing for interconnection and access to unbundled network elements); Local Competition
Order, 11 F.C.C.R. at 16025–26 ¶ 1058 (ruling that a reasonable allocation of common costs
represents an appropriate “additional cost” under the standard for reciprocal compensation). The FCC allowed for two alternatives. First, state public utility commissions could
adopt a proxy range set by the FCC (at 0.2 and 0.4 cents per minute for termination). See
Local Competition Order, 11 F.C.C.R. at 16024 ¶ 1055, 16026–28 ¶¶ 1060–62. The Eighth
Circuit struck down the use of proxy prices in Iowa Util. Bd. v. FCC, 219 F.3d 744, 756–57
(8th Cir. 2000), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Verizon Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 535
U.S. 467 (2002). This portion of the Eighth Circuit’s decision does not appear to have
been challenged before the Supreme Court. Second, state PUCs could instead impose
“bill and keep” arrangements so long as the traffic flowing in each direction is roughly
equal. Local Competition Order, 11 F.C.C.R. at 16024 ¶ 1055, 16054–58 ¶¶ 1111–18. The
FCC recently sought comment on whether it should abandon TELRIC for reciprocal compensation in favor of “bill and keep.” Developing a Unified Intercarrier Compensation
Regime, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 16 F.C.C.R. 9610, 9634–37 ¶¶ 69–77 (2001).
416
See supra notes 378, 384 and accompanying text.
417
See Local Competition Order, 11 F.C.C.R. at 15869–70 ¶ 733 (citing Duquesne Light
Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299, 307 (1989)).
418
Id. at 15872 ¶ 740 (citing Lord Mfg. Co. v. United States, 84 F. Supp. 748, 755–56
(Ct. Cl. 1949)); see also id. at 15811 ¶ 617, 15811 ¶ 818.
419
See Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced Telecommunications Capability and Implementation of the Local Competitions Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Order on Reconsideration and Second Further Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking in CC Docket No. 98–147 and Fifth Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
in CC Docket No. 96-98, 15 F.C.C.R. 17806, 17838–39 ¶ 68 (2000) (“Collocation Reconsideration Order”); Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced Telecommunications Capability, First Report and Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 14 F.C.C.R. 4761,
4778–79 ¶ 31 (1999) (“Collocation Order”).
420
535 U.S. 467 (2002).
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courts had done previously,421 the Court declined to reach the merits
of the underlying takings claim. Instead, it explicitly adopted what its
previous decisions clearly implied—that takings challenges to ratemaking methodologies were generally inappropriate until the methodology in question had been embodied in an actual rate order. Although the Court suggested that a rate-making methodology might
have sweeping implications that would justify addressing its constitutionality on its face, the methodology before the Court did not call for
such an evaluation.422
2. Economic Arguments in Favor of Market-Based Pricing
As Part I demonstrated, the best way to promote economic efficiency when compelling access to an input is to price the input at its
market value. This pricing scheme promotes allocative efficiency by
providing the signals that firms need in order to calibrate the amount
of each input purchased and to ensure that they are employing the
optimal mix of possible inputs.423 Market-based pricing also promotes
dynamic efficiency by signaling to incumbents and new entrants the
need to invest in additional capacity.424 As Justice Breyer noted in his
separate opinion in Iowa Utilities Board:
[A] sharing requirement may diminish the original owner’s incentive to keep up or to improve the property by depriving the owner
of the fruits of value-creating investment, research, or labor. . . .
[One cannot] guarantee that firms will undertake the investment
necessary to produce complex technological innovations knowing
that any competitive advantage deriving from those innovations will
be dissipated by the sharing requirement. The more complex the
facilities, the more central their relation to the firm’s managerial
responsibilities, the more extensive the sharing demanded, the
more likely these costs will become serious. And the more serious
they become, the more likely they will offset any economic or competitive gain that a sharing requirement might otherwise provide.425
421
See Tex. Office of Pub. Util. Counsel v. FCC, 183 F.3d 393, 428–29 (5th Cir. 1999),
cert. granted sub nom. GTE Serv. Corp. v. FCC, 530 U.S. 1213, cert. dismissed, 531 U.S. 975
(2000); Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, 120 F.3d 753, 818 (8th Cir. 1997), rev’d in part on other
grounds sub nom. AT&T v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366 (1999); US W. Communications,
Inc. v. Minn. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 55 F. Supp. 2d 968, 990 (D. Minn. 1999); Southwestern
Bell Tel. Co. v. AT&T Communications of Southwest, Inc., No. A–97-CA-132, 1998 WL
657717, at *12 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 31, 1998).
422
Verizon, 535 U.S. at 522–25.
423
See discussion supra Part I.B.1.
424
See discussion supra Part I.B.1.
425
525 U.S. at 428–29 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citation
omitted); accord Verizon, 535 U.S. at 551–52 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (noting that compelling incumbents to share the cost-reducing benefits of a successful innovation destroys the incumbents’ incentives to innovate in the first place).
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In addition, “compulsory sharing can have significant administrative and social costs inconsistent with the Act’s purposes.”426 If taken
to an extreme, “[r]ules that force firms to share every resource or element of a business would create not competition, but pervasive regulation, for the regulators, not the marketplace, would set the relevant
terms.”427
Thus, the best way to promote economic efficiency is to base access rates on the price the input in question would command on the
open market. Such prices are easy to determine when comparable
inputs are purchased in external markets.428 Although local telephone service has long been regarded as a natural monopoly in which
direct competition is impossible, the emergence of platform competition provides a wide range of possible external markets that can serve
as bases for determining market value. New entrants have followed
the lead of the CAPs and have constructed fiber optic networks that
offer increasing competition with the incumbent LECs’ networks.429
Because they are unlikely to be regarded as “incumbent local exchange carriers” under the 1996 Act, new fiber optic carriers are likely
to be exempt from Section 251(c)’s unbundled access, reasonable interconnection, and collocation requirements.430 As a result, their
emergence promises to provide market-based benchmarks for pricing
each of those access requirements. Actual prices charged will reflect
regulation rather than the interaction of supply and demand.431
In addition, providers of wireless telephone services have successfully emerged as direct competitors to the incumbent LECs. The FCC
chose to deploy the first generation of wireless devices, comprised of
analog cellular telephony, by issuing only two licenses per city, with
one of those licenses automatically going to the incumbent LEC.432
As a result, wireless initially offered only modest improvements to the
competitive environment. The arrival of second generation wireless
426

Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. at 428 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in

part).
427

Id. at 429 (Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
See SIDAK & SPULBER, supra note 39, at 275, 319, 321.
429
See Evan Ramstead & Kortney Stringer, Road Kill: In Race to Lay Fiber, Telecom Firms,
Wreak Havoc on City Streets, WALL ST. J., Feb. 27, 2001, at A1 (describing recent efforts to lay
fiber in Atlanta, Austin, Boston, Cincinnati, Dallas, Kansas City, San Antonio, Portland,
Richmond, and Washington, D.C.).
430
See 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(2)–(3), (6) (2000).
431
The one area in which these firms are unlikely to be able to provide a market-based
benchmark is the transport and termination of calls. To the extent that fiber optic providers offer telecommunications services to the general public, they are likely to be considered “local exchange carriers” subject to § 251(b). If so, compensation for the transport
and termination of calls by those providers will be governed by TELRIC by virtue of the
1996 Act’s reciprocal compensation provisions. See id. § 251(b)(5).
432
See Inquiry Into the Use of the Bands 825–845 MHz & 870–890 MHz for Cellular
Communications Systems, Report and Order, 86 F.C.C. 2d 469, 476–93 ¶¶ 15–47 (1981).
428
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devices, known as “Personal Communication Services” (PCS), diversified the market still further by significantly increasing the number of
licenses available for wireless telephony.433 As a result, eighty percent
of the U.S. population can choose from among five different wireless
providers.434 Once third generation wireless devices (“3G”) are fully
deployed, the wireless industry is likely to provide sufficient competition to drive market-prices towards efficient levels.
The wireless industry’s emergence is important because, unlike
fiber optic carriers, wireless telephone providers are not considered
“local exchange carriers” under the 1996 Act.435 As a result, unlike
fiber optic carriers,436 Section 251(c) does not govern the terms
under which they provide interconnection, unbundled access, or collocation access to their networks, nor does Section 251(b) govern the
terms under which they transport and terminate calls. Although Congress has given the FCC the authority to regulate the terms under
which wireless carriers interconnect with each other, the FCC has declined to do so.437 As a result, wireless carriers determine their terms
433
See Amendment of Commission’s Rules to Establish New Personal Communications
Services, Second Report and Order, 8 F.C.C.R. 7700, 7732–33 ¶¶ 73–77 (1993); Thomas
W. Hazlett, The Wireless Craze, the Unlimited Bandwidth Myth, the Spectrum Auction Faux Pas,
and the Punchline to Ronald Coase’s “Big Joke”: An Essay on Airwave Allocation Policy, 14 HARV.
J.L. & TECH. 335, 516–17 (2001).
434

Total Number of
Providers in a County
3
4
5
6
7

or
or
or
or
or

more
more
more
more
more

Pct. of U.S. Population
Contained in those Counties
94.1%
88.7%
80.4%
53.1%
21.2%

Implementation of Section 6002(b) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1993:
Annual Report and Analysis of Competitive Market Conditions with Respect to Commercial Mobile Services, Seventh Report, 17 F.C.C.R. 12985, 13095 app. C, tbl.5 (2002).
435
Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the Telecommunications
Act of 1996, First Report and Order, 11 F.C.C.R. 15499, 15994–95 ¶ 1001, 15995–96
¶¶ 1004, 1006 (1996) (“Local Competition Order”). Although wireless providers are under no
obligation to provide interconnection or access to their network elements, the FCC has
ruled that they are “telecommunications carriers” who are eligible to request interconnection and access to unbundled network elements from incumbent LECs. See id. at
15998–16000 ¶¶ 1012–13.
436
See supra note 431.
437
Interconnection & Resale Obligations Pertaining to Commercial Mobile Radio Services, Fourth Report and Order, 15 F.C.C.R. 13523, 13534 ¶ 28 (2000) (“CMRS Interconnection Order”). This order culminated protracted regulatory proceedings dating back to
1993, when the FCC issued a notice requesting comment whether it should require wireless providers to provide interconnection to other wireless providers. See Implementation
of Sections 3(n) & 332 of Communications Act, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 8
F.C.C.R. 7988, 8001–02 ¶ 71 (1993). When the FCC issued the order resulting from this
notice, however, it declined to resolve the issue. See Implementation of Sections 3(n) &
332 of Communications Act, Second Report and Order, 9 F.C.C.R. 1411, 1499–1500
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of interconnection through arms-length negotiations. These terms
can thus provide the type of external benchmark needed to determine the market value of transport and call-termination services. Admittedly, interconnection with wireless carriers is distinguishable from
interconnection with incumbent LECs. For example, significant differences in utilization rates complicate direct comparisons, as does
the emergence of wireless pricing schemes that fail to differentiate
between local and long distance service. Furthermore, wireless carriers often interconnect indirectly through the LECs.438 Nevertheless,
as wireless and other facilities-based competitors grow, the rates they
charge others for interconnection will emerge as a market-based reference point for use in resolving most pricing problems. The number
of external benchmarks will only grow as local cable operators and
other broadband providers begin to offer local telephone service.
On a more fundamental level, the existence of platform competition raises serious questions about whether compelling access to local
telephone networks represents sound economic policy. To the extent
that substitute networks are available, it is not clear that the incumbent LEC’s facilities act as a monopoly bottleneck.439 Even if compelled access were necessary, however, the emergence of alternative
facilities capable of providing the same functions dramatically affects
the manner in which such access should be priced. Simply put, com¶¶ 237–238 (1994). Instead, the FCC opted to seek further comment on the issue in a
subsequent proceeding. See Equal Access & Interconnection Obligations Pertaining to
Commercial Mobile Radio Services, Notice of Proposed Rule Making and Notice of Inquiry, 9 F.C.C.R. 5408, 5458–69 ¶¶ 121-143 (1994). In the interim, the FCC indicated that
it would “entertain any requests [for] interconnection on a case-by-case basis.” Id. at 5458
n.213. When these proceedings also matured into a formal decision, the FCC again postponed ruling on the issue on the grounds that, although requiring wireless-to-wireless interconnection would appear to promote efficiency, such regulation was premature. See
Interconnection & Resale Obligations Pertaining to Commercial Mobile Radio Services,
Second Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 10 F.C.C.R. 10666, 10681–82 ¶¶ 28–29 (1995).
An association of equipment manufacturers brought suit to compel the FCC to act. See
Telecomms. Resellers Ass’n v. FCC, 141 F.3d 1193 (D.C. Cir. 1998). Although the D.C.
Circuit expressed dismay over the fact that five years had lapsed while the FCC continued
to investigate the issue, the court nonetheless upheld the FCC’s decision to defer resolution of the issue. See id. at 1197. The FCC did not issue a final resolution until the CMRS
Interconnection Order two years later. 15 F.C.C.R. at 13534 ¶ 28. For a brief overview of the
early history of these somewhat protracted proceedings, see PETER W. HUBER ET AL., FEDERAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW 953–55 (2d ed. 1999).
438
CMRS Interconnection Order, 15 F.C.C.R. at 13533–34 ¶¶ 26–27. Historically, the
FCC further complicated such comparisons by awarding one of the two available first-generation cellular licenses to the incumbent LEC, which in turn raised questions whether
interconnection agreements between wireless carriers actually represented arms-length
transactions. The deployment of competitive wireless network on a national scale, the subsequent emergence of PCS, and the impending arrival of third-generation wireless devices
should eliminate this problem in the near future.
439
See AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 389 (1999) (holding that the FCC
must consider whether a network element is available from other sources before compelling access to that element under the 1996 Act).
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parable transactions provide external benchmarks that should enable
regulatory authorities to establish access rates that are more likely to
promote efficiency.
In the absence of external benchmarks based on actual market
transactions, a cost-based, second-best measure of market value is necessary. As noted earlier, economic theory suggests that cost-based
measures should follow ECPR, which sets rates as the sum of the direct
incremental costs of providing an input and the opportunity costs that
the incumbent incurs when the new entrant provides the services instead of the incumbent.440 TELRIC includes elements designed to reflect the first of these two components.441 The key problem with the
FCC’s analysis is its refusal to include any factor reflecting opportunity
cost.442 In setting prices without considering the value of foregone
alternatives, TELRIC essentially ignores the insights of neoclassical economics by basing value solely on cost without taking any demandside effects into consideration.
The FCC’s reasons for declining to base access rates on ECPR do
not withstand analysis. First, the FCC argued that the statutory requirement that prices be cost-based precluded consideration of opportunity cost.443 The Supreme Court, however, specifically rejected
this reasoning, finding the term cost “too protean” to support any such
plain-language argument.444 If anything, the economic truism that
opportunity costs represent the true economic cost directly undercuts
the FCC’s argument.445 Indeed, the Court recognized as much when
it cited “opportunity cost” as an example of a forward-looking “cost”
that fell within the purview of the statute.446
The FCC’s second basis for rejecting ECPR is equally unsound.
The FCC asserted that because ECPR calculates opportunity cost on
the basis of current retail prices, it locks in monopoly rents without
providing a mechanism for moving prices towards competitive
440
See supra Part I.C.3. Professor Spulber has argued elsewhere that the rates charged
for access to unbundled network elements should include an end-user charge that cannot
be bypassed in order to compensate incumbent LECs for costs incurred due to the deregulatory innovations that caused investment-backed expectations to fail. See SIDAK & SPULBER,
supra note 39, at 334–35. Extended discussion of these issues falls outside the scope of this
Article. For the time being, it suffices that the argument advanced in this Article, while
consistent with the imposition of such user charges, does not require it.
441
See SIDAK & SPULBER, supra note 39, at 316–18.
442
See supra note 413 and accompanying text.
443
See Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, First Report and Order, 11 F.C.C.R. 15499, 15859 ¶ 709 (1996) (“Local
Competition Order”).
444
Verizon Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 535 U.S. 467, 500–01 (2002) (describing
“cost” as “a chameleon” and as a “virtually meaningless term . . . [that] say[s] little about
the method employed to determine a particular rate” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
445
See SIDAK & SPULBER, supra note 39, at 322–23, 404–10.
446
Verizon, 535 U.S. at 499 n.17.
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levels.447 This argument suffers from two fundamental flaws. First, it
ignores the fact that the competition will cause retail prices to drop
and that, as this occurs, ECPR will dynamically readjust the opportunity-cost factor to reflect those price changes.448 Second, the existence of any monopoly rents in retail prices is more the result of failed
rate regulation at the state level than of any theoretical flaw in
ECPR.449 Although such a failure would justify improving state regulation of retail prices, it does not justify incurring the myriad problems
that would result from distorting access prices.450
The Supreme Court upheld the FCC’s rate-making methodology
in Verizon,451 but it did not specifically endorse TELRIC and reject
ECPR as a matter of economic policy. On the contrary, the Court
carefully eschewed expressing any opinion about the merits of any
particular economic approach.452 Instead, it applied the deferential
standard of review that gives agencies a wide range of discretion in
resolving statutory ambiguities, as long as their interpretation falls
within a wide zone of reasonableness.453 Thus, the Court’s decision
does not necessarily foreclose the FCC from applying a rate-making
approach based on market prices or ECPR.454
Indeed, because there are alternative technological platforms, it
may no longer be sound economic policy to compel access to the elements of local telephone networks. As noted above,455 any market
failures that exist are caused by the paucity of horizontal competition
at the network level. The only viable long-term solution to this problem is to promote the deployment of alternative network capacity.
UNE access requirements have the effect of destroying incentives to
447
Local Competition Order, 11 F.C.C.R. at 15859 ¶ 709; see also Expanded Interconnection with Local Telephone Co. Facilities, Report and Order and Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 7 F.C.C.R. 7369, 7426 ¶ 123, 7430 ¶ 129 (1992) (“Special Access Order”) (rejecting the use of the “net revenue” test proposed by Alfred Kahn in setting interconnection rates in the FCC’s Expanded Interconnection proceeding).
448
See SIDAK & SPULBER, supra note 39, at 352–53.
449
See id. at 353–54.
450
See id. at 351–58, 362–63.
451
See Verizon, 535 U.S. at 497–522.
452
See id. at 507 (“As a reviewing Court we are, of course, in no position to assess the
precise economic significance of [various economic aspects of the incumbent LECs’ arguments]. Instead it is enough to recognize that the incumbents’ assumption may well be
incorrect.”); id. at 523 (“We cannot say whether the passage of time will show competition
prompted by TELRIC to be an illusion, but TELRIC appears to be a reasonable policy for
now, and that is all that counts.”).
453
See id. at 501 (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S.
837, 843–45 (1984)).
454
See AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 426 (1999) (Breyer, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (noting that, in rejecting ECPR, the FCC “did not claim, nor
did its reasoning support the claim, that the use of such a system would be arbitrary or
unreasonable”).
455
See supra notes 28–29 and accompanying text.
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invest in this alternative capacity and rescuing would-be purchasers of
those services from having to make such investments. As a result,
UNE access requirements tend to harm dynamic efficiency and to entrench incumbent carriers by depriving wireless carriers, cable telephony companies, and other alternative local phone-service providers of
their natural strategic partners. Indeed, there is some evidence that
policy makers may be coming around to this point of view. Media
reports indicate that the FCC is becoming concerned that the UNE
access is forestalling the emergence of facilities-based competition in
local telephone service. As a result, it is considering whether to begin
phasing out the UNE access requirements.456
3. Constitutional Arguments in Favor of Market-Based Pricing
The FCC’s implementation of the 1996 Act was not only economically problematic; its adoption of a methodology focused solely on replacement cost raises serious constitutional problems as well. The
takings implications of the interconnection and unbundled access
provisions of the local competition provisions have largely escaped attention. Like most forms of rate regulation, TELRIC limits the prices
that incumbent LECs can charge for the use of their network elements. Therefore, the courts and the FCC have suggested that the
principles of confiscatory rate-making457 or regulatory takings458 are
likely to govern.459
The problem with this analysis is that it focuses on TELRIC as a
general matter without focusing on the constitutional implications of
the 1996 Act’s physical collocation provisions. As the FCC has itself
recognized, both interconnection and access to unbundled network
elements typically require the network owner to permit other carriers
456
See Yochi J. Dreazen & Shawn Young, FCC Plans to Erase a Key Rule Aiding Local Phone
Competition, WALL ST. J., Jan. 6, 2003, at A1. The FCC took the first steps in this direction
shortly before this Article went to press. See supra note 408.
457
See Verizon, 535 U.S. at 523–24; Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, First Report and Order (“Local Competition
Order”), 11 F.C.C.R. 15499, 15871–72 ¶¶ 737–738 (1996). In another case, a court rejected
a takings challenge because no taking would occur until a new entrant had actually purchased services under the interconnection agreement under dispute. See US W. Communications, Inc. v. WorldCom Tech., Inc., 31 F. Supp. 2d 819, (D. Or. 1998). Although the
court did not offer any hint of the type of takings analysis that would apply, an earlier
decision in the same case appeared to embrace a confiscatory rate-making analysis. See US
W. Communications, Inc. v. MFS Intelenet, Inc., 35 F. Supp. 2d 1221, 1236 (D. Or. 1998)
(indicating that the takings challenge would turn on whether the total effect of the rates
established by the interconnection agreement is confiscatory).
458
See Tex. Office of Pub. Util. Counsel v. FCC, 183 F.3d 393, 429 n.59 (5th Cir. 1999);
Local Telephone Co. Facilities, Report and Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 7
F.C.C.R. 7369, 7477–81 ¶¶ 235–237 (1992).
459
The notable exception is Qwest Corp. v. United States, 48 Fed. Cl. 672 (2001), discussed infra notes 465–72 and accompanying text.
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to place equipment in its central office on an indefinite basis.460 The
physical collocation required by interconnection and unbundled access provisions represents the type of permanent physical invasion
that Loretto deemed a per se taking.461 The D.C. Circuit reinforced
this conclusion in Bell Atlantic Telephone Cos. v. FCC,462 holding that the
physical collocation regime upon which the FCC modeled its implementation of the 1996 Act constituted a physical taking. Similarly,
GTE Service Corp. v. FCC,463 which overruled the FCC’s Collocation Order, emphasized that the Commission’s interpretation of the physical
collocation provisions may result in “unnecessary takings” of LEC
property.464
Most instructive is the decision in Qwest Corp. v. United States,465
one of the few cases to address the merits of a takings challenge to the
1996 Act. In that case, a requesting carrier obtained access to fourteen loops that served one customer, and connected them to its own
switching equipment, located in a collocation cage in the incumbent
LEC’s central office.466 The incumbent LEC brought a takings challenge, arguing that it received constitutionally insufficient compensation.467 The incumbent circumscribed its argument by conceding
that it was already receiving adequate compensation for the space occupied by the collocation cage. As a result, it restricted its takings
claim to the loops leased by the new entrant.468
The court resolved the case by relying on the distinction between
physical and nonpossessory takings. In particular, the court accepted
the theory that “government-mandated co-location of one party’s
equipment on another party’s premises constitutes a physical taking
of the occupied space.”469 As a result, the court acknowledged that
the collocation cage “is analogous to the rooftop equipment in Loretto”
and that it might have held that the restriction constituted a per se
taking had the incumbent LEC focused on the collocation cage it460

See supra note 396–99 and accompanying text.
See supra Part II.A.2. Even scholars who are skeptical of broader readings of Loretto
accept that regulations that require physical collocation effect per se takings. See Leonard
M. Baynes, Swerving to Avoid the “Takings” and “Ultra Vires” Potholes on the Information Superhighway: Is the New York Collocations and Telecommunications Policy a Taking Under the New York
Public Service Law?, 18 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 51, 73–74 (1995); Chen, supra note 62,
at 1551; Susan Rose-Ackerman & Jim Rossi, Disentangling Deregulatory Takings, 86 VA. L. REV.
1435, 1466–67 & n.115 (2000).
462
24 F.3d 1441, 1445 (D.C. Cir. 1994); see supra notes 381–82 and accompanying text.
463
205 F.3d 416 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
464
Id. at 416, 421, 426
465
48 Fed. Cl. 672 (2001).
466
See id. at 679–80.
467
See id. at 680.
468
See id. at 689–93.
469
Id. at 694.
461
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self.470 When the new entrant leased loops, on the other hand, it did
not require the incumbent LEC to submit to a permanent physical
occupation, even if the LEC’s use of its property was restricted.
Therefore, the court concluded that the claim based on the loops did
not constitute a physical taking.471 The court once again emphasized
that its holding that compelled access to the loops was not a physical
taking is consistent with its prior conclusion that “the implementation
of mandatory access provisions requiring a telecommunications provider or utility to make space available on its premises for a competitor to affix its own equipment . . . constitut[ed] a physical taking
under Loretto.”472
The FCC has attempted to reconcile these holdings by asserting
that takings claims involving public utility property are governed by
the more permissive principles embodied in the Supreme Court’s
confiscatory rate-making473 and regulatory takings474 precedents. The
fundamental problem with this analysis is that it ignores the distinction between physical and nonpossessory takings made in Loretto and
Florida Power and reaffirmed in Tahoe-Sierra.475 Because the 1996 Act’s
physical-collocation mandate unambiguously requires incumbent
LECs to permit competing carriers to place equipment on their property, the Act constitutes a classic physical taking under Loretto. Therefore, unlike with confiscatory rate-making or regulatory takings
jurisprudence, the regulation’s economic impact and its public purpose are of no consequence.
It follows that the owners of local telephone networks are entitled
to just compensation for the physical invasion that the 1996 Act mandates. As discussed above, to the extent that there are external markets for a particular input, the principles of just compensation require
that the incumbent LECs receive the market value of the inputs that
are physically taken.476 Although the past absence of direct competition in local telephony deprived regulators of any market-based
benchmarks,477 cellular telephony and other forms of wireless communications have created an external basis for determining the value
470

Id. at 691.
Id. at 691, 693.
472
Id. at 693.
473
See Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, First Report and Order, 11 F.C.C.R. 15499, 15871–72 ¶¶ 737–738 (1996)
(“Local Competition Order”).
474
See Local Telephone Co. Facilities, Report and Order and Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 7 F.C.C.R. 7369, 7479–81¶¶ 235–237 (1992).
475
See supra notes 233–35, 244, 276 and accompanying text.
476
See Part II.B.2.a.
477
See Leonard M. Baynes, How Much Is the Toll to Access the Information Superhighway?
An Analysis of the Appropriate Measure of Compensation for the Partial Taking of Public Utility
Property, 62 TENN. L. REV. 141, 149–50, 163–64 (1994).
471
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of the local loop’s services.478 Therefore, basing access prices on replacement cost conflicts with the Court’s established takings jurisprudence. Perhaps sensing the weakness of its position, the FCC offered
the alternative argument that, assuming that a taking had occurred,
fair market value should not include monopoly rents.479 The legal
support for this claim, however, is suspect.480 Even if the FCC’s legal
conclusion were sound, there is reason to doubt the factual premises
underlying the argument. The emergence of direct facilities-based
competition and the regulation of local telephone service rates suggest that the open market prices did not include monopoly rents.
Although we find it unavoidable to conclude that the 1996 Act’s
physical collocation requirements effect a physical taking, we recognize that virtual collocation poses a much closer question. The Supreme Court recognized this distinction in Loretto, observing that
regulations requiring property owners to install certain types of network-related equipment might present a different question.481 In
such a case, the property owner would own the equipment and have
full authority over its “placement, manner, use, and possibly [its] disposition.”482 In addition, the property owner would be able to decide
how to comply with the applicable regulations and therefore “could
minimize the physical, esthetic, and other effects of the installa478

See supra notes 437–38 and accompanying text.
Local Competition Order, 11 F.C.C.R. at 15872 ¶ 740; see also Baynes, supra note 477, at
173–76 (arguing that excluding monopoly rates would foster competition, meet the expectation of public utility investors, and provide constitutionally just compensation).
480
The FCC cites a single lower court decision as authority for the proposition that
just compensation does not permit recovery of monopoly rents. See Local Competition Order,
11 F.C.C.R. at 15872 ¶ 740 (citing Lord Mfg. Co. v. United States, 84 F. Supp. 748 (Ct. Cl.
1949)). Furthermore, Lord Mfg. does not stand for the proposition for which the FCC cites
it. In that case, a manufacturer of patented rubber and metal mountings critical for aircraft flight in adverse weather conditions had developed a dominant market position that
allowed it to earn profits ranging from fifty-nine to one hundred forty-seven percent. See
84 F. Supp. at 748–49, 751. During World War II, the federal government ordered the
manufacturer to sell its products to the government at prices the government deemed “fair
and reasonable,” allowing the manufacturer a profit of only ten and one-half percent. See
id. at 749–50. The manufacturer challenged the action under the Takings Clause. See id.
at 751–54. The court conceded that “[i]f these were ordinary times,” the manufacturer
would have been able to earn supercompetitive profits. Id. at 755. “[T]hese were not
ordinary times,” however, because the war had interfered with the free and untrammeled
market necessary for a fair-market value determination. See id. at 755. Thus, the true holding of Lord Mfg. is that circumstances may exist in which current market price is no longer
an appropriate indicator of fair market value. See also BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511
U.S. 531, 537–38 (1994) (discussing how forced sales can drive prices above or below fairmarket value). Lord Mfg. does not stand for the proposition that monopoly profits are not
properly considered part of fair-market value. On the contrary, the Court of Claims explicitly recognized that the opposite would hold true in the absence of wartime price controls.
See also City of Tucson v. El Rio Water Co., 415 P.2d 872, 875 (Ariz. 1966) (recognizing that
monopoly profits are properly regarded as part of fair-market value).
481
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 440 n.19 (1982).
482
Id.
479
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tion.”483 The FCC followed this reasoning in its Expanded Interconnection proceeding, where it held that offering the LECs the option of
virtual collocation eliminated any remaining constitutional
infirmities.484
Unfortunately, the courts have never had the opportunity to address whether virtual collocation effects a physical taking. During the
Expanded Interconnection proceeding, the 1996 Act’s physical collocation provisions rendered the virtual collocation provisions moot.485
The Act further obviated the need to resolve whether a bare virtual
collocation requirement constitutes a physical taking, because in most
circumstances section 251(c)(6) clearly gives requesting carriers the
right to physically collocate their equipment.486 As a result, the Act is
directly analogous to the type of regime that Loretto, Qwest, and Bell
Atlantic found to constitute a physical taking.
That said, language in Bell Atlantic suggests that virtual collocation poses the same takings concerns as physical collocation in that
both allow CAPs to physically connect their networks to the LECs’ networks.487 This interconnection requirement is enough to constitute a
physical taking, regardless of who owns the property on which the interconnection occurs.488 Indeed, a subsequent court drew largely the
same conclusion in holding that it constituted a physical taking to require that an incumbent LEC accommodate a competitor by reconfiguring the wires with which it provided telephone service to a multibuilding complex.489 The court did not consider it important that the
apartment complex owner—and not the LEC—owned the land on
which the regulation obligated the LEC to extend its wires.490
B. Access to Networks of Utility Poles
The analysis we have developed helps illuminate the economic
and constitutional considerations underlying a second emerging policy problem: compelled access to networks of utility poles. This subpart describes the FCC regulations requiring such access and applies
483
Id.; see also GTE Serv. Corp. v. FCC, 205 F.3d 416, 419 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (“Virtual
collocation therefore minimizes the takings problem, because competitors do not have
physical access to a LEC’s property.”).
484
See supra note 384 and accompanying text; see also Baynes, supra note 461, at 74–75
(“[P]hysical ‘invasions’ of utility equipment through pipes, wires, or cables deal with the
manner in which the landowner can use property; this invasion is considerably less burdensome than a traditional physical invasion.”).
485
See supra note 386 and accompanying text.
486
See supra note 399 and accompanying text.
487
See Bell Atl. Tel. Co. v. FCC, 24 F.3d 1441, 1446 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
488
Id.
489
See GTE Southwest Inc. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 10 S.W.3d 7, 10–11 (Tex. Ct. App.
2000).
490
See id.
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the analytical framework that we have developed to evaluate the regulations from an economic and constitutional standpoint. As was the
case in the first policy problem we addressed,491 we conclude that the
manner in which the government has compelled access to networks of
utility poles conflicts with basic economic theory as well as with the
Supreme Court’s takings jurisprudence. Thus, we argue that the current pricing regime should be replaced by an approach that bases access rates on market prices.
1. Regulatory Framework
In much of the country, cable television systems depend upon
networks of utility poles to establish the wireline connections to individual homes and businesses. Congress, aware of this fact, became
concerned that the electric and telephone companies who owned the
poles were charging monopoly prices that tended to retard cable’s deployment.492 As a result, it enacted the Pole Attachments Act of
1978,493 which gave the FCC the power to regulate the rates that utilities could charge cable television systems for pole attachments in any
state that did not already regulate such agreements.494 As originally
enacted, the Pole Attachments Act required that the rates, terms, and
conditions for pole attachment be just and reasonable495 and established methodologies for determining the minimum and maximum
rates that could be charged.496 As implemented by the FCC, the
“Cable Formula” allowed the pole owner to recover approximately 7.4
percent of the total costs of the pole from each attaching entity.497 As
491

See supra Part III.A.
See Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Gulf Power Co., 534 U.S. 327, 330–31
(2002); supra notes 238–41 and accompanying text.
493
Pub. L. No. 95-234, 92 Stat. 33 (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. § 224 (2000)).
494
See 47 U.S.C. § 224(b)(1). Eighteen states and the District of Columbia impose
such regulation. Application by Verizon New England, Inc., for Authorization to Provide
In-Region, InterLATA Services in Vermont, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 17
F.C.C.R. 7625, 7957 ¶ 47 (2002) (citing States that Have Certified that They Regulate Pole
Attachments, Public Notice, 7 F.C.C.R. 1498 (1992)).
495
47 U.S.C. § 224(b)(1).
496
The statute required that at a minimum the rates established by the FCC allow the
utilities to recover “the additional costs of providing pole attachments.” Id. § 224(d)(1).
The maximum rate was set “by multiplying the percentage of the total usable space [occupied by the attachment] by the sum of the operating expenses and actual capital costs
[attributable to the pole].” Id. The resulting formula is:
492

Space Occupied
Net Cost of a
Carrying
Maximum
x
x
=
Bare Pole
Charge Rate
Rate
Total Usable Space

Amendments of Commission’s Rules & Policies Governing Pole Attachments, Consolidated
Partial Order on Reconsideration, 16 F.C.C.R. 12103, 12131 ¶ 53 (2001) (“Consol. Reconsideration Order”).
497
The FCC established standard presumptions that the total amount of usable space
is limited to thirteen and one-half feet and that each attaching entity occupies one foot of
usable space. See 47 C.F.R. §§ 1.1404(g)(l)(xi), 1.1402(c) (2001). As a result, the pole
owner could recover 1/13.5 of the total cost of the pole from each attaching entity, an
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discussed above, the Supreme Court held in Florida Power that the statute as originally enacted did not constitute a per se taking under
Loretto.498 Because the Act did not require that any utility enter into a
pole attachment agreement, it represented nothing more than a form
of rate regulation, which violated the Takings Clause only if
confiscatory.499
The Telecommunications Act of 1996, however, modified the
Pole Attachments Act. As the Court noted in National Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Gulf Power Co.,500 one of the key changes was to
broaden the scope of the regulatory scheme, which now covered telecommunications carriers as well as cable television systems.501 In addition, two other features of the 1996 amendments merit extended
discussion. First, the amendments made access to poles compulsory
rather than voluntary.502 Second, the amendments established a new
pricing mechanism to govern attachments by telecommunications carriers that differed from that governing attachments by cable television
systems.503
a. The Shift to Compulsory Access
For the purposes of this Article, the most important feature of the
1996 amendments is the transformation of Pole Attachments Act into
a compulsory access provision. Prior to the 1996 amendments, when
deciding whether to treat the Pole Attachments Act as a per se taking
under Loretto, the Supreme Court gave substantial weight to the fact
that the Act did not compel any utility to allow any other entity access
to its network of utility poles.504 Although the Court explicitly declined to address what would follow if the statute compelled access to
utility poles, its reasoning strongly suggested that such a change would
bring the Pole Attachments Act within the ambit of its physical takings
jurisprudence.505
The Eleventh Circuit followed Florida Power to its logical conclusion when it held in Gulf Power Co. v. United States (Gulf Power I)506 that
amount approximately equal to 7.4 percent. See Consol. Reconsideration Order, 16 F.C.C.R. at
12129 ¶ 48.
498
See supra notes 242–44 and accompanying text.
499
See supra notes 245–46 and accompanying text.
500
534 U.S. 327 (2002).
501
47 U.S.C. § 224(e) (2000); see also id. § 224(a)(4) (defining “pole attachment” to
include attachments by telecommunications providers).
502
Id. § 224(f)(1). The statute created exceptions for situations in which there is insufficient capacity or when refusal to provide access is justified by safety, reliability, or other
engineering concerns. Id. § 224(f)(2).
503
Compare id. § 224(e), with id. § 224(d)(3).
504
See supra notes 242–44 and accompanying text.
505
See supra notes 247–49 and accompanying text.
506
187 F.3d 1324, 1328–29 (11th Cir. 1999).
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the 1996 amendments turned the Pole Attachments Act into a per se
taking under Loretto. Reaffirming the distinction between physical
and nonpossessory takings, the Eleventh Circuit held that the Court’s
confiscatory rate-making jurisprudence did not apply to cases involving the permanent physical occupation of property.507 Although the
Gulf Power I court found that a taking had occurred, it held that the
logically subsequent question—whether the statute provided for just
compensation—was not yet ripe for judicial resolution.508 The following year, in Gulf Power Co. v. FCC (Gulf Power II)509 and Alabama Power
Co. v. FCC,510 the Eleventh Circuit reaffirmed these conclusions. Although the Supreme Court later vacated Gulf Power II,511 its action did
not weaken the precedential effect of Alabama Power or Gulf Power I.
In addition, the Court did not question the propriety of the Eleventh
Circuit’s resolution of the takings issues.
b. The Compensation Regime
The 1996 amendments also supplied a different basis for compensating telecommunications carriers than the one for cable television systems.512 This new basis is commonly known as the “Telecom
Formula.”513 Although the details of the various formulas are complicated,514 for our purposes it suffices to point out a few key differences.
In contrast to the Cable Formula, which established uniform rates of
507

Id.
Id. at 1338. In so holding, however, the court did express some skepticism about
whether it would ultimately be persuaded by the utility’s takings argument. See id. This
dictum should carry little weight, because it attempted to employ the Court’s confiscatory
rate-making precedent to dispose of a case involving a physical taking.
509
Gulf Power Co. v. FCC, 208 F.3d 1263, 1272–73 (11th Cir. 2000), rev’d on other
grounds sub nom. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Gulf Power Co., 534 U.S. 327 (2002).
510
311 F.3d 1357, 1367–68 (11th Cir. 2002).
511
See Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n, 534 U.S. at 327.
512
See 47 U.S.C. § 224(e) (2000). The separate scheme governing telecommunications carriers became effective after February 8, 2001, after which point the Telecom
Formula began to be phased in over a period of five years.
513
See Amendment of Rules and Policies Governing Pole Attachments, Report and
Order, 15 F.C.C.R. 6453, 6457–58 ¶ 5 (2000) (“Fee Order”). Prior to the adoption of the
new formula, the Cable Formula governed pole attachments by telecommunications
carriers.
514
Although rates associated with usable portions of the pole follow the approach of
the Cable Formula and allocate costs in accordance with the percentage of usable space
occupied, see 47 U.S.C. § 224(e)(3), recovery rates associated with the unusable portion of
the pole are allocated in accordance with the number of attaching entities, see id.
§ 224(e)(2). Specifically, one-third of the cost of the unusable space is borne by the pole
owner, with the remaining two-thirds divided among all attaching entities (including the
pole owner). See id. § 224(e)(3); Implementation of Section 703(e) of Telecommunications Act of 1996, Report and Order, 13 F.C.C.R. 6777, 6799–6800 ¶ 43 (1998) (“Telecom
Order”). The FCC originally established two different formulas to calculate each part separately. For simplicity, they eventually combined the calculation into a single formula. The
combined formula is written as follows:
508
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compensation for all portions of the pole, the Telecom Formula allowed for different rates of recovery for the “usable” and “unusable”
portions of the pole. As a result, the Cable Formula and the Telecom
Formula can lead to significant differences in compensation.515
FIGURE 2: COMPARISON OF RECOVERY RATES
THE POLE ATTACHMENTS ACT

Number of
Attaching Entities

UNDER

Percentage of Pole Costs Recoverable
Cable Formula
Telecom Formula
7.4%
24.0%
14.8%
33.8%
40.0%
22.2%
44.8%
29.6%
48.9%
37.0%
52.6%
44.4%
56.0%
51.9%
59.3%
59.3%

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8

It is also noteworthy that both the Cable and the Telecom Formulas are based on historical cost rather than forward-looking cost.516

Maximum
=
Rate

Space
Occupied

x

2

Unusable Space

3

No. of Attaching Entities

x

x

Net Cost of a Bare Pole

Pole Height

Carrying
Charge
Rate

Amendments of Commission’s Rules and Policies Governing Pole Attachments, Consolidated Partial Order on Reconsideration, 16 F.C.C.R. 12103, 12131–32 ¶ 55 (2001) (“Consol. Reconsideration Order”). If the standard presumptions are applied, the formula is further
simplified as follows:
Maximum
=
Rate

Space
Occupied

x

2

Unusable Space

3

No. of Attaching Entities

Pole Height

x

Net Cost of a Bare Pole

x

Carrying
Charge
Rate

Id. at 12132 ¶ 56. The FCC subsequently established a rebuttable presumption that the
average number of attaching entities in non-urbanized areas was three, and that the average number of attachers in an urbanized area was five. Id. at 12139–40 ¶¶ 71–72.
515
Because the Telecom Formula allows for more generous rates for unusable space, it
in effect allows for greater recovery than the Cable Formula for any reasonable number of
attaching entities. For example, Alabama Power has asserted in litigation that, although
application of the Cable Formula leads to an annual compensation rate of $6.30 per pole,
application of the Telecom Formula would result in an annual compensation rate of
$20.41 per pole. Brief of Alabama Power Company and Gulf Power Company at 23, Ala.
Power Co. v. FCC, 311 F.3d 1357 (11th Cir. 2002).
516
Consol. Reconsideration Order, 16 F.C.C.R. at 1249 ¶ 17, 12116–17 ¶¶ 21–22; Fee Order,
15 F.C.C.R. at 6460–61 ¶¶ 9–10.
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The FCC orders implementing the 1996 amendments reasoned that
that the Supreme Court upheld the use of such an approach in Florida
Power.517 The FCC further argued that the policies underlying the
Pole Attachments Act, the static nature of the technology underlying
utility poles, and the impossibility of duplicating utility pole networks
justified adopting a methodology that was less focused on stimulating
competitive entry.518 In addition, the FCC emphasized the administrative convenience of maintaining the previous regime.519
The FCC’s cost-based orientation is further reflected by the position it adopted with respect to “overlashing,” which refers to the practice by which an additional telecommunications or cable provider
attaches a wire to one already attached to the pole. The FCC reversed
its initial decision520 and instead ruled that an overlasher should not
be counted as a separate attaching entity when determining the compensation paid to pole owners.521 It based these decisions largely on
cost-oriented considerations, reasoning that because “overlashing
shares [space] with the host attachment,” “no additional usable space
[would be] occupied.”522 Consequently, the regulations require
overlashers to pay compensation to pole owners only if their overlashing requires the owners to incur direct costs to increase the height or
strength of their poles.523 The D.C. Circuit subsequently sustained
the overlashing rules.524
The FCC declined to decide whether basing its methodology on
historical costs violated the Takings Clause, stating that such as-applied takings challenges were not ripe until the methodology was embodied in a specific rate order. Until then, the only challenge that
could be raised was a facial challenge. The FCC rejected the facial
challenge, however, because it could not conclude that the historical
rate methodology would deny just compensation in all cases.525

517

Consol. Reconsideration Order, 16 F.C.C.R. at 12117 ¶ 22; Fee Order, 15 F.C.C.R. at 6460

¶ 9.
518

Consol. Reconsideration Order, 16 F.C.C.R. at 12116–17 ¶¶ 20–21, 12118 ¶ 24.
Id. at 12116–17 ¶¶ 20–22, 12119 ¶ 25; Fee Order, 15 F.C.C.R. at 6460–61 ¶ 9.
520
Implementation of Section 703(e) of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Report
and Order, 13 F.C.C.R. 6777, 6809–10 ¶ 69 (1998) (“Telecom Order”).
521
Consol. Reconsideration Order, 16 F.C.C.R. at 12145 ¶ 83.
522
Id. at 12142 ¶ 76; see also id. at 12143 ¶ 78 (justifying the failure to require additional compensation on the ground that “[o]verlashing does not increase the amount of
space actually occupied by the attachment.”).
523
Id. at 12142–43 ¶¶ 77–78.
524
Southern Co. Servs. v. FCC, 313 F.3d 574, 582 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
525
See Consol. Reconsideration Order, 16 F.C.C.R. at 12115–16 ¶ 18; Implementation of
the Local Competition Provisions in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, First Report and
Order, 11 F.C.C.R. 15499, 16087–88 ¶ 1192 (1996) (“Local Competition Order”).
519
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The FCC reiterated these principles when deciding Alabama Cable
Telecommunications Ass’n v. Alabama Power Co..526 Because this case
arose out of an actual rate order, the FCC addressed the takings issue
directly. Citing Florida Power, the FCC ruled that the constitutionality
of its actions turned solely on whether the established rates were confiscatory. Even assuming that the 1996 amendments constituted a taking for which just compensation must be paid, the FCC found it
impossible to apply any of the three conventional methodologies for
determining fair market value.527 The FCC invoked the same rationale in rejecting similar arguments raised in its Georgia Power
proceedings.528
The Eleventh Circuit subsequently upheld Alabama Power Co., but
on substantially different grounds. As it did in Gulf Power I and II, the
court rejected the FCC’s attempt to invoke the Supreme Court’s confiscatory rate-making jurisprudence, holding that such precedent does
not apply to cases involving compelled access.529 Instead, the court
ruled that the case was governed by the Supreme Court’s physical takings decisions, which require that pole owners who are forced to submit to permanent physical invasions receive fair market value, which
in turn includes compensation for their opportunity costs.530 The
court nonetheless sustained the FCC’s decision not to include opportunity-cost compensation on the ground that one party’s use of the
poles generally did not preclude use by another party.531 So long as
there is excess pole capacity, the grant of a right of access to that pole
does not foreclose the opportunity to sell the space to another bidding firm. In other words, access rates need not include compensation for opportunity costs unless the network is at full capacity and the
pole owner can demonstrate that it had a higher-valued use for that
capacity. Accordingly, the court in Alabama Power concluded that the
526
See Ala. Cable Telecomms. Ass’n v. Ala. Power Co., Order, 16 F.C.C.R. 12209 (2001)
(“[T]he Commission’s rules implementing the Pole Attachment Act, including the Commission’s formula for calculating just and reasonable pole attachment rates, satisfy the constitutional requirement of just compensation for the taking of property under the Fifth
Amendment.”), aff’d sub nom. Ala. Power Co. v. FCC, 311 F.3d 1357 (11th Cir. 2002).
527
Ala. Cable, 16 F.C.C.R. at 12229–35 ¶¶ 46–57.
528
See Teleport Communications Atlanta, Inc. v. Ga. Power Co., Order, 16 F.C.C.R.
20238, 20240–41 ¶ 7 (2001) (following the rule of Alabama Cable) . The FCC subsequently
ordered that a series of complaints against Georgia Power be held in abeyance pending
attempts to negotiate a mutually acceptable rate using the information provided by the
FCC’s opinion in Teleport Communications. See City of Dublin v. Ga. Power Co., Order Granting Temporary Stay, 16 F.C.C.R. 20421 (2001); City of Sanderville v. Ga. Power Co., Order
Granting Temporary Stay, 16 F.C.C.R. 20417 (2001); Knology, Inc. v. Ga. Power Co., Order
Granting Temporary Stay, 16 F.C.C.R. 20413 (2001).
529
Ala. Power, 311 F.3d at 1367–68. For an earlier discussion of the Eleventh Circuit’s
decision in Alabama Power, see supra notes 82–89 and accompanying text.
530
311 F.3d at 1368–69.
531
Id. at 1369–70.
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opportunity costs of allowing another party to access the plaintiff’s
network were zero.532 A similar appeal filed in Georgia Power is still
pending before the Eleventh Circuit.533
2. Economic Arguments in Favor of Market-Based Pricing
Basic economic theory indicates that the most efficient way to implement the Pole Attachments Act would be to base access rates on
market prices. This promotes allocative efficiency by providing those
who obtain access with the signals they need in order to purchase the
optimal quantity and overall mix of inputs. Market-based pricing also
helps inputs find their way to those buyers who obtain the greatest
benefit from them. Finally, market-based pricing promotes dynamic
efficiency by providing the appropriate incentives for investment and
innovation.
Basing access rates on the price that would be paid for access on
the open market thus typically represents the best way to promote economic efficiency. Although arguably such external benchmarks once
did not exist,534 the emergence of platform competition and the shift
from rate regulation to access regulation have made it possible for
regulatory authorities to infer market prices from two different types
of transactions. First, regulators can consider the revenue earned
from other attaching entities. Second, they can infer market value
from the price of any substitute technologies available to attaching
entities.
a. Unregulated Pole Attachments
The years since the enactment of the Pole Attachments Act have
witnessed periods in which the rates for certain types of pole attachments were determined through arms-length transactions. For example, the Pole Attachments Act as originally enacted only extended to
cable television systems. It was not until 1996 that it was extended to
cover telecommunications carriers as well.535 As a result, there was no
federal regulation of pole attachment agreements negotiated by local
telephone companies seeking access to electrical companies’ utility
poles prior to 1996. Such agreements were necessarily quite common
because electric companies owned the vast majority of utility poles.536
Thus, regulatory authorities can use the terms of market-based transactions—pole attachment agreements between telephone companies
532

Id. at 1370–71.
Ga. Power Co. v. FCC, No. 02-10222-B (11th Cir. filed Jan. 11, 2002).
534
See Baynes, supra note 461, at 177.
535
See supra notes 238–41, 394–95 and accompanying text.
536
See James R. Dukart, The Fight for Power Poles, UTIL. BUS., Feb. 1, 2002, tbl. (reporting
that local telephone companies own only 3% of all utility poles), available at http://
www.utilitybusiness.com/ar/power_fight_power_poles/index.htm.
533
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and utilities—to establish efficient pricing. FCC proceedings suggest
that these rates were substantially higher than those authorized under
the Pole Attachments Act.537
In addition, it is possible that some arms-length transactions were
negotiated during the regulatory gaps that followed judicial challenges to the Pole Attachments Act. For example, in the aftermath of
Gulf Power I, the FCC’s uncertainty as to the constitutionality of the
Cable and Telecom Formulas led the Commission to issue statements
that seemed to indicate that it would not require that pole attachment
rates comply with the formulas until after the courts had determined
what constituted just compensation.538 Until the FCC explicitly disavowed this position,539 the parties negotiating pole attachment agreements may well have believed that such agreements were temporarily
unregulated and, therefore, may have negotiated arms-length transactions during this time.540
b. Alternative Network Technologies
Regulatory authorities may also infer market prices from the rates
charged for access to alternative technologies that provide the same
functions as utility pole networks. According to basic economic theory, the prices for substitutes for a particular good represent useful
proxies for determining the market value of that good.
i. Wireless Carriers
Of all the types of attachments likely to be attached to utility
poles, attachments by wireless carriers are likely to face the most com537
Compare Ala. Cable Telecomms. Ass’n v. Ala. Power Co., Order, 16 F.C.C.R. 12209,
12224 ¶ 35 (2001) (reporting that joint-use agreements between local telephone companies and electric companies reveal rates ranging between $26.29–$30.30 per pole), aff’d sub
nom. Ala. Power Co. v. FCC, 311 F.3d 1357 (11th Cir. 2002), with supra note 515 (indicating
that the Cable Formula and the Telecom Formula allowed for rates of $6.30 and $20.41,
respectively).
538
See Ala. Cable, 16 F.C.C.R. at 12219 ¶ 23.
539
See id. at 12221–23 ¶¶ 29–31.
540
The Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Gulf Power II, holding that the Pole Attachments
Act did not cover Internet services, could also have created a window during which broadband providers and pole owners negotiated arms-length transactions. Apparently, the
Eleventh Circuit immediately stayed the mandate of Gulf Power II pending Supreme Court
review. See Teleport Communications Atlanta, Inc. v. Ga. Power Co., Order, 16 F.C.C.R.
20238, 20241–42 ¶ 9 (2001); Ala. Cable, 16 F.C.C.R. at 12214–15 ¶¶ 11-12. Interestingly,
the fact that such market benchmarks are no longer available underscores the extent to
which the absence of a well-established market is the direct result of state and federal
regulation. For a discussion of the problems associated with allowing other features of a
regulatory regime to render a particular restriction constitutional, see Yoo, Rise and Demise,
supra note 37, at 29–52. The absence of a market, however, does not imply that a product
or service lacks market value. Rather, it means only that because of regulatory intervention, the value must be determined through some method other than by reference to
market prices.
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petition, because wireless carriers have the option of attaching their
equipment to a wide variety of alternative facilities. Skyscrapers, communications towers, and any other sufficiently tall location can serve
as a direct substitute for a utility pole. As a result, the Supreme Court
has questioned whether attachments by wireless carriers truly fall
within the economic rationale of the Pole Attachments Act, which is
directed towards preventing monopoly pricing in bottleneck facilities.541 Furthermore, the rates charged by these alternative attachment sites can provide an external benchmark for rate setting in the
event that policy makers decide to impose such access requirements.
The rental rates property owners charge wireless companies for space
on their communications towers appear to exceed the rates allowed by
the Pole Attachments Act by several hundred percent.542 Therefore,
there is reason to question whether the cost-based rates currently in
place effectively promote allocative and dynamic efficiency.
ii. Multichannel Video Programming Distributors (MVPDs)
Providers of multichannel television service (dubbed “multichannel video programming distributors” (MVPDs) under federal law)
have begun to utilize an ever broadening array of alternatives to conventional utility pole networks when delivering television programming to individual homes. In many cases, cable operators find it
economically attractive to bypass utility poles altogether and instead
install below-ground fiber networks of their own.543
In addition, the emergence of digital broadcast satellite (DBS)
systems as a viable competitor to cable television provides another basis for estimating the value of cable television access to utility pole
networks.544 DBS penetration is approaching levels that, under cur541
See Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Gulf Power Co., 534 U.S. 327, 341 (2002).
The Court nonetheless held that the plain language of the statute included wireless carriers within its scope. Even if the text contained some ambiguity, the Court would defer to
the FCC’s construction of the statute. Id.
542
Compare Fryer’s TowerSource, The TowerSource/Tower Summit Survey, at http://
www.towersource.com/survey.html (last visited May 16, 2002) (reporting that communications towers receive an average annual rent of over $12,000 from each attaching entity);
and Reply Brief of Ala. Power Co. & Gulf Power Co. at 14, Ala. Power Co. v. FCC, 311 F.2d
1357 (11th Cir. 2002) (reporting that Comcast charges between $18,000 and $21,600, annually, for wireless attachments to cellular communications towers), with supra note 515
(noting that the Telecom Formula allowed Alabama Power to charge wireless companies
$20.41 per year to attach to its poles)
543
See, e.g., Michael Grebb, Cable’s Big Worry: Getting Poleaxed, MULTICHANNEL NEWS,
June 4, 2001, at 100 (noting that Time Warner Cable “just decided to go underground”
when confronted with higher pole attachment rates sought by an unregulated rural cooperative); see also Kathy Brister, Cable Firms Battling Pole Fees, ATLANTA J.-CONST., Feb. 28,
2001, at D9 (indicating that the cable industry would consider digging trenches “if the FCC
does not keep rate control” on utility pole fees).
544
DBS is the most recent of a series of spectrum-based MVPD technologies. Other
technologies include multipoint distribution services (MDS), which employ microwave
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rent law, represent competition sufficient to justify eliminating rate
regulation of basic cable services.545 Recent empirical studies have
confirmed that consumers are beginning to regard DBS as a substitute
for cable.546
Rates for DBS transmission service can thus provide an external
benchmark for use in determining the market value of access to networks of public utility poles. There are, however, a number of factors
that complicate a direct comparison. First, the geographic structure
of the two media is, of course, quite different. By its nature, DBS is
necessarily national in scope, while cable television service is necessarily limited to specific localities. In addition, the services differ in
terms of quality. For example, DBS is more susceptible to weatherrelated interference than is cable. Finally, because there are presently
only two national DBS providers547 thus giving most consumers only
three MVPD options—MVPD competition may prove too thin to justify using market-based indicia to approximate efficient pricing. For
the most part, though, this substitute technology provides useful guidance as to the value of the services being provided under a compelled access regime.
iii. Broadband Providers
Broadband providers are similarly benefiting from an increasingly wide array of alternative technologies that allow them to reach
transmission facilities to provide multichannel programming; satellite master antenna television systems (SMATV), which establish private cable systems that service individual apartment buildings; home satellite dishes (HSD), comprised of C-band satellite dishes; and
various forms of Internet video. To date, none of these other technologies has proved
particularly successful. See Annual Assessment of Status of Competition in Market for Delivery of Video Programming, Ninth Annual Report, FCC 02-338, at 36–40 ¶¶ 71–78, 43–52
¶¶ 88–111 (2002), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/FCC02-338A1.pdf [hereinafter Ninth Annual Report on Video Programming Delivery].
545
See Yoo, supra note 11, at 228–30.
546
See Implementation of Section 3 of the Cable Television Consumer Protection and
Competition Act of 1992, Report on Cable Industry Prices, 16 F.C.C.R. 4346, 4363 ¶ 48,
4364–65 ¶ 53 (2001).
547
There are currently three DBS companies providing service: DirecTV, EchoStar
(marketed as the DISH Network), and Dominion Video Satellite, Inc. (marketed as Sky
Angel). Of these, only DirecTV and EchoStar have established positions in the national
market for television programming of general interest. Dominion’s Sky Angel operates
through transponders located on an EchoStar satellite and is a self-described Christian and
family-oriented DBS service. Its subscribership lags significantly behind that of DirecTV
and EchoStar. See Ninth Annual Report on Video Programming Delivery, supra note 544, at
27–28 ¶ 53, 30 ¶ 59. Ironically, the relative paucity of DBS providers may itself be the
direct result of the regulatory requirements requiring DBS providers who wish to carry
programming provided by the major broadcast networks to carry all local television stations. Because the footprint of every DBS channel is national in scope, this requirement in
effect forces DBS to devote precious channel capacity to redundant programming that can
be transmitted to only a small portion of the country. See Yoo, Rethinking Free, Local Television, supra note 37, at 37–39.
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consumers without using pole attachments.548 Although cable
modem and digital subscriber line (DSL) providers have taken the
early lead in the broadband race, there are a number of alternative
broadband technologies in various stages of deployment.549 As noted
earlier, a number of wireline telecommunications carriers have been
aggressively building extensive subterranean fiber-optic networks that
effectively bypass utility pole networks.550 In addition, DBS providers
already offer satellite-based broadband technologies that are beginning to compete directly with wireline broadband services.551 Although the differences between DBS and cable operators make direct
comparisons difficult, these substitute technologies are still useful in
determining the value of the services being provided through utility
pole networks.
Other providers are deploying spectrum-based technologies
whose geographic footprints are similar to those of cable operators.
For example, PCS providers deliver mobile wireless broadband services, and other companies are preparing to use multipoint distribution service (MDS) to provide fixed wireless broadband services.552
Digital television broadcasters are considering proposals to use part of
the increased efficiency provided by digital transmission to expand
into broadband services.553 Finally, the promise of third generation
wireless devices (3G) hangs over the entire competitive arena.554
Each of these technologies provides network transmission services on
a geographic scale that is much more comparable to utility poles than
is DBS.
548
See generally Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to Internet over Wireline Facilities, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 17 F.C.C.R. 3019, 3037–38 ¶¶ 36–37
(2002) (describing broadband technology and its effect on data processing); Yoo, supra
note 11, at 253–58 (same).
549
Inquiry Concerning Deployment of Advanced Telecommunications Capability to
All Americans in a Reasonable and Timely Fashion and Possible Steps to Accelerate Such
Deployment Pursuant to Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Third Report, 17 F.C.C.R. 2844, 2864 ¶ 44, 2865 ¶ 48 (2002) (“Third § 706 Report”).
550
See supra note 429 and accompanying text.
551
Third § 706 Report, 17 F.C.C.R. at 2869 ¶ 60, 2879–80 ¶ 85, app. B at 2926–27
¶¶ 45–49.
552
See id. at 2867–69 ¶¶ 55–59, 2901 ¶ 146, app. B at 2921–26 ¶¶ 31–44; Inquiry
Concerning Deployment of Advanced Telecommunications Capability to All Americans in
a Reasonable and Timely Fashion and Possible Steps to Accelerate Such Deployment Pursuant to Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Second Report, 15 F.C.C.R.
20913, 20932–37 ¶¶ 42–55 (2000) (“Second § 706 Report”); Ninth Annual Report on Video
Programming Delivery, supra note 544, at 37 ¶ 73.
553
See Annual Assessment of Status of Competition in Market for Delivery of Video
Programming, Seventh Annual Report, 16 F.C.C.R. 6005, 6052 ¶ 102 (2001); Advanced
Television System and Their Impact upon Existing Television Broadcast Service, Fifth Report and Order, 12 F.C.C.R. 12809, 12820–21 ¶ 29 (1997) (authorizing digital television
stations to provide “ancillary and supplementary services,” including data transmission).
554
Third § 706 Report, 17 F.C.C.R. at 2878 ¶ 80, 2900 ¶¶ 141–143, 2901–02 ¶ 147.
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The growth of direct, facilities-based competition to utility poles
raises serious questions about whether compelled access represents
sound economic policy. Compelled access harms dynamic efficiency
in two ways. First, it forces the pole owner to share any benefits that
result from investments in its own facilities. And second, compelled
access rescues those who need access to such facilities from having to
invest in alternative networks capable of providing similar services.
Thus, access both lowers the pole owner’s incentives to invest in its
own facilities as well as deprives the sponsors of substitute network
facilities of their natural strategic partners. In so doing, access requirements can forestall the emergence of alternative facilities-based
competition to utility poles, which represents the most effective longterm solution to the bottleneck problem.
If regulators are to compel access, however, the best way to mitigate the negative effects is to establish access rates based on market
prices. Doing so not only encourages existing participants to employ
appropriate levels of network inputs; it also provides appropriate signals to those deciding whether to enter particular markets and to
those deciding whether to invest in network facilities. Moreover, the
competitive environment is also likely to be sufficiently robust to allow
market prices to serve as a reliable benchmark for setting relatively
efficient rates. Compelling access to utility poles at submarket rates,
in contrast, threatens to make alternative transmission technologies
appear artificially unattractive. Therefore, regulation threatens to
cause investment in those technologies to fall below efficient levels.
Although the use of a network of utility poles does not consume
the poles, this does not justify the conclusion (advanced by the Eleventh Circuit in Alabama Power555) that it is harmless to compensate the
network only for the direct incremental costs of providing access. Economic analysis indicates that the price the pole owner charges is determined by demand-side considerations as well as supply-side
considerations. Thus, the market value of an object depends not only
on the costs that compelled access forces the network owner to incur,
but also on how much the would-be purchaser is willing to pay. The
opportunity costs associated with foregoing the arms-length transaction with any single buyer are real economic costs for which the network owner should be compensated.
Finally, with respect to broadband, it is possible that the rates allowed under the Telecom Formula can serve as a reference point for
market-based pricing for cable television systems. Admittedly, the
prices determined by the Telecom formula are not established in
open markets. Nonetheless, application of the Cable Formula typi555

See supra note 530 and accompanying text.
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cally leads to significantly lower rates than does application of the
Telecom Formula,556 thus suggesting that rates established under the
Cable Formula are not properly regarded as fair market value. Indeed, the system impairs allocative efficiency by establishing significantly different cost structures for cable modem service and DSL and
impedes dynamic efficiency by distorting the investment and entry decisions of these two types of providers. Allowing such a significant differential to persist gives the government too great a role in
determining which of these platforms will eventually emerge as the
technological winner.
c. ECPR as a Second-Best Valuation Method
The growing availability of alternative telecommunications networks is making it increasingly possible for regulatory authorities to
base access pricing on actual transactions for comparable services. We
acknowledge, however, that many of these technologies are not yet
fully deployed and that differences in utilization levels and geographic
scope may further limit the usefulness of these transactions as external
benchmarks. If this is the case, the appropriate step is for regulators
to base rates on ECPR, which requires that rates be set equal to the
sum of the direct incremental costs and the opportunity costs associated with providing access.557
The current rate-setting methodologies for pole attachments deviate from ECPR in two significant ways. First, the current approaches
calculate direct incremental costs on the basis of historical cost rather
than forward-looking cost. The FCC has acknowledged that reliance
on forward-looking costs would better promote allocative efficiency,
observing that, “a firm compares forward-looking costs with existing
market prices, in making decisions about entry, expansion, and
price.”558 As a result, rate-making methodologies based on forwardlooking cost help “to ensure the efficient use of existing telecommunications network facilities, and to encourage new entrants to make economically rational decisions about whether or how to enter a local
telecommunications market.”559 In addition, forward-looking cost
pricing reflects efficient replacement of an asset’s functions using the
most advanced technology available.560 Use of forward-looking costs
would also promote dynamic efficiency, because setting prices on the
556

See supra note 530 and accompanying text.
See supra Part I.C.2.
558
Amendments of Commission’s Rules and Policies Governing Pole Attachments,
Consolidated Partial Order on Reconsideration, 16 F.C.C.R. 12103, 12116 ¶ 20 (2001)
(“Consol. Reconsideration Order”).
559
Id.
560
See id. at 12118–19 ¶ 24.
557
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basis of forward-looking economic costs would “giv[e] the appropriate
signal for new entrants to invest in network facilities.”561
Despite acknowledging the benefits of using a methodology
based on forward-looking cost, the FCC nonetheless persisted in relying on historical cost in setting pole attachment rates, offering several
justifications. First, the FCC reasoned that the Pole Attachments Act
was designed to stem anticompetitive pricing, not to stimulate competitive entry.562 The FCC also suggested that its continued application of a historical cost methodology was justified in part because the
technology underlying utility poles was relatively static.563 Finally, the
FCC pointed out that investment incentives are less important in the
pole attachment context because local zoning and other right-of-way
restrictions prevent the construction of duplicative pole networks.564
The FCC’s reasoning fails to accord sufficient weight to the arrival of alternative technologies that compete directly with utility pole
networks. In terms of static efficiency, the FCC focuses on controlling
monopoly pricing even though the emergence of substitute facilities
generally causes monopoly rents to dissipate. In focusing too narrowly on the network of utility poles as a universe unto itself, the FCC
ignores the fact that substitute facilities, such as DBS and wireless systems, can support transmission of multichannel video program distribution.565 In addition, wireless telephony has emerged as a viable
alternative to wireline communications. Over time, the growing importance of these substitute media will erode any monopoly power
possessed by utility pole owners, if it has not done so already. The
most dramatic illustration of this point exists with respect to wireless
providers, which the FCC and Supreme Court have concluded fall
within the ambit of the Pole Attachments Act.566 Wireless providers
have an extensive array of alternative locations for their equipment,
including communications towers and rooftop placements, eliminating any supposed monopoly power possessed by utility pole owners.567
By forcing pole owners to provide wireless carriers with access at rates
561
Id. at 12119 ¶ 25 (citing Amendment of Rules & Policies Governing Pole Attachments, Report and Order, 15 F.C.C.R. 6453, 6460–61 ¶ 9 (2000) (“Fee Order”)); see id. at
12118–19 ¶ 24 (noting that methodologies based on forward-looking costs give new entrants “the proper cost signals to decide whether to construct their own networks or to use
the incumbent’s”).
562
Id. at 12116–17 ¶¶ 20–21; see also Baynes, supra note 461, at 177 (arguing that a cost
based pricing scheme is better suited to avoid monopoly rents than a market based pricing
scheme).
563
See Consol. Reconsideration Order, 16 F.C.C.R. at 12118–19 ¶ 24.
564
Id.
565
See supra Part III.B.2.b.ii.
566
See supra note 541 and accompanying text.
567
See supra Part III.B.2.b.i.
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below what they would reach through arms-length negotiations, current regulatory policy interferes with allocative efficiency.
More importantly, by disregarding the impact of below-market
rates on investment in alternative technologies, the FCC ignores access rates’ impact on dynamic efficiency. For example, the price of
access to poles directly affects investment in communication towers
and other utility pole substitutes, even though these same access
prices may not spur any additional investment in duplicate networks
of poles. Furthermore, the dramatic changes in substitute technologies will influence the economics of distributing telecommunications
services even if the technology underlying utility poles does not
change. It is only by taking an artificially truncated view of the scope
of the relevant technologies that the FCC is able to view these considerations as unimportant.
This adverse effect on dynamic efficiency will be particularly dramatic with respect to broadband technologies. As noted earlier, companies are in the process of deploying a wide range of broadband
technologies, including PCS, fixed wireless systems, 3G wireless devices, and ancillary and supplementary services provided via spectrum
assigned to digital television broadcasting.568 The manner in which
access to poles is priced will directly and dramatically impact the timing and level of investment in deploying these new technologies.
The second way in which the current rate setting methodology
for pole attachments deviates from ECPR is the absence of an element
reflecting opportunity cost. The FCC fails to understand that the
price of access to networks—a capital asset that is not consumed—
should be based on the value of the services sold through the network,
not on the costs of constructing it. In addition, the historical cost
methodology fails to consider that market value is determined
through the interaction between demand and supply and not just supply-side considerations. The FCC’s overlashing rules569 fall into the
same trap. The fact that overlashers may not require pole owners to
incur any additional direct costs does not justify allowing overlashers
to use networks of utility poles without paying any compensation. If
markets are to serve their usual role in promoting the efficient allocation of resources, any such access should reflect not only cost considerations, but also the value of the services made possible by access to
the network. Finally, an opportunity cost scheme would be relatively
568
See supra notes 548–54 and accompanying text. One of the parties in Alabama Power
also offered expert testimony asserting that railroad and highway rights of way have
emerged as yet another way in which broadband providers can bypass the network of utility
poles. See Ala. Cable Telecomms. Ass’n v. Ala. Power Co., Order, 16 F.C.C.R. 12209, 12224
¶ 34 (2001), aff’d sub nom. Ala. Power Co. v. FCC, 311 F.3d 1357 (11th Cir. 2002).
569
See supra notes 520–24 and accompanying text.
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easy to implement in this context because the relevant markets—wireless telephony, MVPDs, and broadband—are or are becoming extremely competitive.570
These arguments underscore the extent to which access regulations represent an anomaly in competition policy.571 Rather than
breaking up monopolies, compelled access simply forces monopolists
to share a bottleneck, thereby saving other firms from having to develop alternative sources of that input. In effect, compelled access
cuts off emerging alternative network technologies from their natural
strategic partners. As a consequence, it actually entrenches monopoly
power by preempting the development of viable alternatives to the
bottleneck facility, which represent the only viable long-term solution
to the monopoly problem.572 This is particularly problematic in technologically dynamic industries such as wireless telephony, video distribution, and the Internet, in which the prospects of developing new
ways either to circumvent or to compete directly with the bottleneck
are the greatest.
Indeed, applying access requirements to industries characterized
by high fixed costs can represent a form of regulatory opportunism.
Firms deciding whether to enter such industries ex ante will do so only
if they can expect to recover their fixed cost investments. Economists
have long recognized that once fixed costs are sunk, firms remain vulnerable to ex post opportunistic behavior that can beat prices down
towards marginal cost because sunk costs should no longer be taken
into account.573 The law of contracts, the desire to maintain business
relationships, and market reputation effects can mitigate such opportunism in competitive markets.574 Regulators’ access requirements remain problematic to the extent that they push prices below the levels
needed to guarantee full investment.
The FCC’s attempts to evade this logic are unpersuasive. In arguing that the relatively static nature of utility pole technology and the
practical impossibility of replacing the network render investment incentives less important, the FCC focuses too narrowly on utility poles
as a distinct technological universe and fails to give appropriate consideration to substitute technologies. The relevant incentives stimulate investment in alternative networks as much as they stimulate
investment in alternative sets of poles. For example, below-market
pricing of access to pole networks threatens to dampen television net570

See Yoo, supra note 11, at 227–30, 253–58; supra notes 548–54 and accompanying

text.
571

See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
See Yoo, supra note 11, at 246.
573
See id. at 235.
574
But see id. (arguing that “such contracts may be costly to negotiate and, in any
event, will not be able to anticipate every possible contingency”).
572
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works’ incentives to invest in DBS and other alternatives to cable television. Similarly, allowing broadband providers to obtain transmission
via utility poles may deprive non-wireline broadband technologies of
the support needed to finance their deployment.
In the end, the only justification for the FCC’s position is administrative convenience. The FCC argued that for over two decades the
historical-cost approach had “provided a stable and certain regulatory
framework, that may be applied ‘simply and expeditiously’ requiring
‘a minimum of staff, paperwork and procedures consistent with fair
and efficient regulation.’”575 The FCC also emphasized that Congress
never indicated that it wanted the FCC to deviate from this approach.
The FCC “acknowledge[d] that setting prices on the basis of forwardlooking economic costs has significant advantages, including that it
gives the appropriate signal for new entrants to invest in facilities,” but
concluded that switching to a methodology based on forward-looking
cost would cause excessive disruption and force the Commission to
undertake extensive proceedings.576
Administrative simplicity ultimately proves too insubstantial to
justify the economic losses that result from basing access prices on
historical cost. As Justice Breyer observed, although continued reliance on historical costs may provide some administrative advantages,
“[w]here the economic problems created by the use of historical cost
valuation become serious, special modifications must be made in the
process.”577 The FCC should consider whether the administrative advantages of retaining the existing regime outweigh the long-term benefits of efficient pricing, both in current transactions and in fostering
the emergence of direct facilities-based competition to utility poles—
the only viable long-term solution to the problems of bottleneck control. Thus, the FCC should not let short-term inconvenience prevent
it from amending regulatory policies and procedures in ways that promote substantial long-term benefits.578 Indeed, adhering to outmoded methodologies in the name of administrative convenience could
preempt many of the benefits expected from the shift from rate regulation to access regulation. By maintaining the status quo the FCC

575
Amendment of Rules and Policies Governing Pole Attachments, Report & Order,
15 F.C.C.R. 6453, 6460–61 ¶ 9 (2000) (“Fee Order”) (quoting S. REP. NO. 95-580, at 21
(1977)); accord Amendments of Commission’s Rules and Political Governing Pole Attachments, Consolidated Partial Order on Reconsideration, 16 F.C.C.R. 12103, 12117 ¶ 22,
12119 ¶ 25 (2001) (“Consol. Reconsideration Order”).
576
Fee Order, 15 F.C.C.R. at 6460–61 ¶ 9.
577
BREYER, supra note 29, at 40.
578
For other instances in which the FCC has inhibited the emergence of competition
by permitting itself to be unduly swayed by one-time costs associated with regulatory
change, see Yoo, Rise and Demise, supra note 37, at 41–44.
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risks quashing the benefits this supposed revolution in regulatory
policy.
3. Constitutional Arguments in Favor of Market-Based Pricing
The Supreme Court’s takings jurisprudence also cuts against the
FCC’s decision to base pole attachment rates on historical cost. As the
FCC concedes, the 1996 amendments are “not reasonably susceptible
of a reading that gives the pole owner the choice of whether to grant
telecommunications carriers or cable television systems access.”579
Furthermore, the Eleventh Circuit recognized in Gulf Power I and confirmed in Gulf Power II and Alabama Power that the 1996 amendments
transformed the Pole Attachments Act from a rate regulation scheme
into a compulsory access requirement, thus bringing the entire
scheme within Loretto’s ambit.580 The court did not decide the case
based on whether the pole owners purchased their property knowing
that they would have to put it to a public use.581 Nor did the utilities’
knowledge that their property would be subject to extensive regulation justify forcing the utilities to subject themselves to physical invasions without just compensation.582 On the contrary, the court
concluded that such an argument had things “backwards,” in that “[a]
property owner is entitled to expect that the property it acquired via
eminent domain . . . came with the right all property has—not to be
subject to government-coerced, permanent, physical occupation without just compensation.”583
The FCC contended that Florida Power foreclosed this argument
by holding that the compensation provided by the existing approach
to setting pole attachment rates is constitutional.584 The FCC main579
See Implementation of Local Competition Provision in Telecommunications Act of
1996, First Report and Order, 11 F.C.C.R. 15499, 16087 ¶ 1191 (1996) (“Local Competition
Order”).
580
See supra notes 506–10 and accompanying text.
581
See Gulf Power Co. v. FCC, 187 F.3d 1324, 1329–30 (11th Cir. 1999) (citing W.
Union Tel. Co. v. Pa. R.R. Co., 195 U.S. 540, 573 (1904) (noting that even though a railroad’s right of way is devoted to public use, “it has always been recognized . . . that a
railroad right of way is so far private property as to be entitled to that provision of the
Constitution which forbids its taking, except under the power of eminent domain and
upon payment of [just] compensation”); United Rys. & Elec. Co. v. West, 280 U.S. 234, 249
(1930) (noting that “the property of a public utility, although devoted to the public service
and impressed with a public interest, is still private property; and neither the corpus of that
property nor the use thereof constitutionally can be taken for a compulsory price which
falls below the measure of just compensation”)), overruled on other grounds by Fed. Power
Comm’n v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591 (1944)).
582
See id. at 1329.
583
Id. at 1330.
584
See Ala. Cable Telecomms. Ass’n v. Ala. Power Co., Order, 16 F.C.C.R. . 12209,
12229–30 ¶¶ 45-46 (2001); see also Amendments of Commission’s Rules and Policies Governing Pole Attachments, Consolidated Partial Order on Reconsideration, 16 F.C.C.R.
12103, 12115 ¶ 18 (2001) (“Consol. Reconsideration Order”) (citing Duquesne Light and Hope
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tained that Florida Power definitively established that the proper standard for resolving all pole attachment takings challenges was the
confiscatory rate-making standard as elaborated in Duquesne Light and
Hope Natural Gas.585 The FCC’s position ignores the sharp distinction
between physical and nonpossessory takings drawn by the Supreme
Court.586 In the words of the Eleventh Circuit:
Characterizing the mandatory access provision as a regulatory condition, even one allegedly designed to foster competition, cannot
change the fact that it effects a taking by requiring a utility to submit to a permanent, physical occupation of its property. However
laudatory its motive, Congress’ power to regulate utilities does not
extend to taking without just compensation the right of a utility to
exclude unwanted occupiers of its property.587

The Supreme Court underscored this point when it explicitly recognized that “‘[a] permanent physical occupation authorized by government is a taking without regard to the public interests that it may serve.’”588
More specifically, the FCC’s conclusion was inconsistent with precedent, which held that confiscatory rate-making principles have no
application in determining whether a physical taking has occurred.
As the Eleventh Circuit reasoned, “Duquesne’s discussion of utilities
was not in the context of a takings case dealing with the permanent
occupation of property. Nothing in Duquesne suggests a utility’s property is less subject to protection against permanent, physical occupation than anyone else’s property. It is not.”589 Nor could the 1996
amendments be upheld under a regulatory taking analysis:
“[A]lthough property is subject to broad regulatory power, a regulation becomes a taking when the government authorizes permanent,
physical occupation by a third party.”590 Because the 1996 Act effects
a per se taking, the government must ensure that the pole owners
receive compensation that reflects the earning potential of the property taken. Fair market value is the accepted basis for determining
that earning potential.591
In apparent recognition of the weakness of its position, the FCC
considered the possibility that the Takings Clause required the govNatural Gas in its analysis of just compensation); Amendments of Rules and Policies Governing Pole Attachments, Report and Order, 15 F.C.C.R. 6453, 6459–60 ¶ 8 (2000) (“Fee
Order”) (citing Duquesne Light).
585
See Consol. Reconsideration Order, 16 F.C.C.R. at 12230–31 ¶¶ 47-48 (citing Duquesne
Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299 (1989).
586
See supra notes 235–36, 276 and accompanying text.
587
Gulf Power Co., 187 F.3d at 1331.
588
Id. (quoting Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426
(1982)).
589
Id. at 1330.
590
Id. at 1328 (citing Loretto, 458 U.S. at 439–40).
591
See supra notes 286–94 and accompanying text.
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ernment to give pole owners market-value compensation for access to
their poles. Even so, the Commission concluded that “the unusual
nature of pole attachments, and the nature of the property interest
conveyed,” made it impossible to apply the standard techniques for
determining market value.592 Specifically, the absence of viable alternatives to the networks of utility poles made it impossible to base market value on comparable sales because all existing market transactions
either included monopoly rents or involved property rights “too different to draw any meaningful conclusions.”593 In addition, the FCC
found the income capitalization approach too speculative.594 Because
access to utility poles represented only one of many inputs needed to
provide cable television and telecommunications services, it was impossible to determine the income attributable to any one input.595
The FCC rejected the replacement-cost approach in part because access did not destroy the pole owner’s property interests, but instead
simply imposed an occupation that was “restricted in duration, primacy, exclusivity, and physical manner of use.”596 Finally, the FCC
reasoned that the replacement cost approach should not be used because it would be infeasible to replace the existing network of utility
poles.597
The FCC’s arguments are unconvincing. As discussed above, substitute network technologies have made it possible to establish access
rates that reflect actual market transactions. Indeed, regulators can
analyze wireless carriers’ attachment rates, which are nearly identical
transactions. The FCC’s objection to the income capitalization approach ignores the fact that the Supreme Court has sanctioned its use
when an asset was simply one of many inputs in a productive process.598 Furthermore, the FCC’s grounds for rejecting the replacement cost approach are factually incorrect in one important respect:
the access requirement authorizes occupations that are indefinite, not
temporary, and that effectively deprive the pole owner of the right to
possess, use, and dispose of the occupied property. Indeed, the Supreme Court has recognized that access requirements destroy all of
the property owner’s interests with respect to that particular portion
of the occupied property.599 The infeasibility of replicating a network
of utility poles might be relevant if no technological alternatives exis592
Ala. Cable Telecomms. Ass’n v. Ala. Power Co., Order, 16 F.C.C.R. 12209, 12233 ¶
53 (2001), aff’d sub nom. Ala. Power Co. v. FCC, 311 F.3d 1357 (11th Cir. 2002).
593
Id. at 12234 ¶ 55.
594
See id. at 12233–34 ¶ 56.
595
See id.
596
Id. at 12234–35 ¶ 57.
597
Id.
598
See supra note 352 and accompanying text.
599
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 435–36 (1982).
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ted. In this case, however, numerous alternative technologies exist
that can perform the same functions as utility poles. Thus, the FCC
should not disrupt investment signals by basing access rates on historical cost.
In short, the FCC could justify its position only by making two
analytical errors. First, it ignored the fundamental change in the takings analysis required by the shift to access regulation, as recognized
in Gulf Power I and II. Second, it ignored the fundamental change in
the just compensation analysis required by the emergence of facilitiesbased competition to networks of utility poles.
As discussed earlier,600 the Eleventh Circuit sustained the FCC’s
action against a takings challenge in Alabama Power Co. v. FCC.601 The
court avoided the pitfalls that ensnared the FCC by recognizing that
the Takings Clause mandated that pole owners receive market value
for granting access and that market value necessarily includes some
measure of opportunity costs.602 It nonetheless upheld the FCC’s
rate-setting regime on the assumption that, in the absence of some
showing that the poles’ capacity was exhausted, the opportunity cost
associated with granting access was zero, because granting access did
not foreclose the pole owner from selling pole capacity to other firms
or using it itself.603
We have previously analyzed the problems associated with these
arguments in detail604 and need only sketch them again here. Simply
put, certain features, including the lumpiness of network capacity, the
need to anticipate user requirements, and the importance of ensuring
network reliability, make excess capacity a quality that is endemic to
telecommunications networks. The conclusion that opportunity costs
are zero also conflicts with the fundamental economic principle that
market value is determined by demand as well as supply considerations. It simply does not follow that a person who is not currently
using a particular piece of property will give it away for free. Instead,
the property owner will attempt to use its bargaining position (largely
determined by the value of the property to the would-be purchaser) to
capture the highest possible price. Therefore, because the Pole Attachments Act effects a physical taking, pole owners are entitled to
market value for granting access to their poles, and such value properly includes opportunity cost—the value of the services made possible by that access.
600
601
602
603
604

See supra notes 82–85 and accompanying text.
311 F.3d 1357 (11th Cir. 2002).
See id. at 1368–69.
See id. at 1369–71.
See supra notes 86–90 and accompanying text. .
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C. Access to Broadband Networks
The internet represents perhaps the most significant and farreaching communications technology to emerge in the last several
years, competing variously as a substitute for telephones, faxes, television, radio, postal services, and private data transmission networks.
Initially, most U.S. households received internet service through “narrowband” technologies employing an analog modem attached to a
conventional telephone line. Although conventional telephone-based
connections permit connection speeds of 56.6 thousand bits per second (kbps), typical connection speeds fall in the neighborhood of
thirty kbps.605
Increasingly, however, U.S. consumers have been turning to
“broadband” technologies that allow subscribers to achieve actual
speeds in excess of one million bits per second (1 Mbps).606 Broadband transmission facilities provide many advantages for customers
seeking telecommunications and Internet access services, including
speeds up to 100 times faster than standard dial-up services. Moreover, broadband services permit bandwidth-intensive multimedia content with enriched entertainment features, such as video and
interactive computer games.607 High-bandwidth systems further allow
“always-on” service without the inconvenience of repeatedly logging
on to connect to the internet. In 2000, the FCC estimated that over
one-third of all U.S. online households would subscribe to some form
of broadband service within a few years.608 Econometric studies also
indicate that broadband is not a substitute for dial-up service, but instead constitutes a separate market.609 The FCC has declared that
“[t]he widespread deployment of broadband infrastructure [was a]
central communications policy objective.”610
One key difference between narrowband and broadband connections to the internet has emerged as the flash point for policy makers.
Narrowband customers can use their telephone lines to connect to
any one of a large number of internet service providers (ISPs). Broadband providers, however, typically require that their customers em605

See Speta, supra note 142, at 43.
Most DSL and cable modem users can expect speed somewhere in the neighborhood of 1.5 Mbps, although theoretical speeds are much higher. Id. at 52, 56.
607
See id.
608
Inquiry Concerning Deployment of Advanced Telecommunications Capability to
All Americans in a Reasonable and Timely Fashion, and Possible Steps to Accelerate Such
Deployment Pursuant to Section 706 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Second Report, 15 F.C.C.R. 20913, 20983 ¶ 186 (2000) (“Second § 706 Report”).
609
See Hausman et al., supra note 126, at 303–04.
610
Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to Internet over Wireline Facilities,
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 17 F.C.C.R. 3019, 3020–21 ¶ 1 (2002).
606
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ploy a proprietary ISP.611 Policy makers and commentators have
begun to explore whether they should compel broadband providers
to allow unaffiliated ISPs to employ their transmission networks.
Thus, of all the issues surrounding broadband deployment, the controversy over this question has made access to broadband networks
“among the most compelling issues in the communications
industry.”612
This subpart explores the manner in which any such access requirement should be implemented. It begins by reviewing the existing regulatory regimes governing the two principal broadband
technologies: digital subscriber lines (DSL) and cable modem systems.
It then explores the proper manner in which access to such systems
should be priced. We conclude that economic and constitutional considerations both indicate that such access should be priced at market
value.
1. Regulatory Framework
a. Digital Subscriber Lines (DSL)
As noted earlier, DSL represents one of the two principal current
technologies for delivering broadband services to residential customers. DSL takes advantage of the fact that conventional voice communications only occupy the lower transmission frequencies (typically
those ranging from 300 to 3400 hertz). It is thus possible to use the
higher frequencies (those above 20,000 hertz) to convey data communications through the same telephone line without interfering with
voice communications. Although there are numerous types of DSL
technology,613 we shall use the term “DSL” as the generic reference to
all forms of the technology.
611
For example, before its collapse, Excite@Home, which was the largest ISP serving
cable modem subscribers, was owned by such major cable modem providers as AT&T,
Comcast, Cox Communications, Cablevision Systems, and Shaw Cablesystems, and was the
exclusive ISP for those systems. Time Warner, the second largest high-speed broadband
provider, previously required all of its subscribers to use a proprietary ISP called “RoadRunner.” See Applications for Consent to Transfer of Control of Licenses and Section 214
Authorizations from MediaOne Group, Inc., Transferor, to AT&T Corp., Transferee, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 15 F.C.C.R. 9816, 9863 ¶ 107 (2000) (“AT&T-MediaOne
Merger”).
612
DEBORAH A. LATHEN, BROADBAND TODAY: A STAFF REPORT TO WILLIAM E. KENNARD,
CHAIRMAN, FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION 10 (Oct. 1999), available at http://
www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Cable/Reports/broadbandtoday.pdf.
613
The most popular form of DSL is Asymmetric DSL (ADSL), in which download
transmission rates are higher than upload rates. Other forms include High-bit-rate DSL
(HDSL), which has the same data transmission capacity in each direction and provides the
same capacity as a T1 line; Very-high-data-rate DSL (VDSL), which is the fastest DSL technology, but is expensive to deploy and cannot function over sustained distances; and RateAdaptive DSL (RADSL), which allows software to adjust the rate of data transmission. The
FCC refers to these various technologies as “xDSL,” with the “x” serving as a generic
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Several technical changes must be made to a local telephone network before it can be used for DSL. First, the loops used for DSL
must be “conditioned” because incumbent LECs often add devices to
their loops, such as bridge taps, low-pass filters, and range extenders,
which improve their networks’ performance and functionality for
transmitting voice calls. Unfortunately, these devices also cause the
quality and the speed of DSL service to suffer. Thus, before loops can
be used for DSL, all devices that have accumulated on the loop must
be removed. In addition, if a single telephone line is used for both
voice and data traffic, the carrier must install equipment that can separate voice traffic from data traffic. Typically the carrier will install a
device known as a digital subscriber line access multiplexer (DSLAM)
in the incumbent LEC’s central office. The relevant loops are connected to the DSLAM, which routes voice communications into a conventional circuit-switched network and data communications into a
packet-switched network.
FIGURE 3: TYPICAL CONFIGURATION OF LOCAL TELEPHONE NETWORK
PROVIDING DSL SERVICE
Central Office
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DSLAM
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Circuit
Switch

Voice
Network

Packet

Data
Network

Copper Loop
Voice & Data
Data

Switch

This scenario changes when incumbent LECs have deployed fiber
optics to increase the efficiency of their networks through a technology known as “digital loop carriers” (DLCs), as depicted in Figure
4.614 Instead of using an all-copper loop to transmit analog signals
between the central office and the customer’s premises, DLC systems
placeholder for the designation of the particular type of DSL involved. See id. at 20–21 &
tbl.2. The newest form is G.SHDSL, a new standard recently announced by the International Telecommunications Union, which allows for a symmetric, multi-rate service capable
of reaching speeds up to 2.3 Mbps in both directions as well as deployment nearly twice as
far from the central office as other forms of DSL. See Inquiry Concerning Deployment of
Advanced Telecommunications Capability to All Americans in Reasonable and Timely
Fashion, and Possible Steps to Accelerate Such Deployment Pursuant to Section 706 of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, Third Report, 17 F.C.C.R. 2844, 2879 ¶ 83 (2002)
(“Third § 706 Report”).
614
See William P. Rogerson, The Regulation of Broadband Telecommunications, the Principle
of Regulating Narrowly Defined Input Bottlenecks, and Incentives for Investment and Innovation,
2000 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 119, 125, 141–42.
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use fiber optics to establish a digital connection between the central
office and a satellite facility known as a remote terminal. From the
remote terminal, the transmission is converted into an analog format
and distributed to the customer’s premises through a copper subloop.615 The fiber optic connection provides improved efficiency and
range that greatly enhance the quality of voice transmissions. DLCs,
however, can impede the deployment of DSL because DSL depends
on the ability to send and receive signals in an analog format through
an all-copper connection. The digital fiber-optic connection between
the central office and the remote terminal forces carriers who wish to
provide DSL services on a DLC network either to deploy DSLAMs in
remote terminals or to find an alternative copper loop running between the customer and the central office.
FIGURE 4: CONFIGURATION OF DSL SERVICE PROVIDED THROUGH
DIGITAL LOUP CARRIERS
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Policy makers have created two sets of regulations providing for
some degree of access to elements of a LEC’s DSL network. The first
set of regulations originated in a series of FCC proceedings known as
the Computer Inquiries.616 The second set was created by the section
of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 that required incumbent
LECs to provide unbundled access to certain network elements.617
i. The Computer Inquiries
The first regulatory regime the FCC implemented to govern local
telephone companies’ broadband services was created during the
FCC’s Computer Inquiries. Telecommunications companies began to
do more than provide customers with a pure transmission path, a
615
For simplicity, Figure 4 omits the fact that remote terminals are actually deployed
in a ring configuration.
616
See Robert Cannon, Where Internet Service Providers and Telephone Companies Compete: A
Guide to the Computer Inquiries, Enhanced Service Providers and Information Service Providers, 9
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 49, 53–56 (2001).
617
47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(6) (2000).

\\server05\productn\C\CRN\88-4\CRN401.txt

1006

unknown

Seq: 122

CORNELL LAW REVIEW

6-MAY-03

11:13

[Vol. 88:885

function that came to be known as “basic services.”618 Instead, companies began to offer what became known as “enhanced services,” which
used computer processing to modify the information provided by the
customer before routing it to its final destination.619 Although the
LECs could offer the additional functionality provided by combining
computer processing and the transmission of those services to end
users as a single, integrated product, the lack of transmission capability prevented other enhanced service providers (ESPs) from doing the
same. These “pure ESPs” instead depended on the incumbent LEC to
provide such transmission services.
Policy makers soon became concerned that the LECs that were
formerly part of the Bell network, known as the “Bell Operating Companies” (BOCs), would use their monopoly control over basic services
to favor their own, proprietary enhanced services over those offered
by unaffiliated ESPs in much the same manner that AT&T had favored its own long distance offerings prior to its breakup.620 The FCC
618

The regulations defined basic telecommunications services as “the offering of a
pure transmission capability over a communications path that is virtually transparent in
terms of its interaction with customer supplied information.” Amendment of Section
64.702 of Commission’s Rules and Regulations (Second Computer Inquiry), Final Decision, 77 F.C.C.2d 384, 419–20 ¶¶ 95-96 (1980) (“Computer II Final Decision”), aff’d sub nom.
Computer & Communications Indus. Ass’n v. FCC, 693 F.2d 198, 205 n.18 (D.C. Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 938 (1983).
619
The regulations define “enhanced services” as “services, offered over common carrier transmission facilities used in interstate communications, which employ computer
processing applications that act on the format, content, code, protocol or similar aspects of
the subscriber’s transmitted information; provide the subscriber additional, different, or
restructured information; or involve subscriber interaction with stored information.” 47
C.F.R. § 64.702(a) (2001). Common contemporary examples include voice mail, electronic mail, electronic store-and-forward, fax store-and-forward, and gateways to online
databases such as Westlaw, Lexis, and the Internet. See Cannon, supra note 616, at 54.
620
The regulatory regime established by the Third Computer Inquiry (“Computer III”)
applied only to those LECs that were originally part of the Bell system. The FCC initially
applied the Computer III rules to both AT&T and the BOCs. See Amendment of Sections
64.702 of Commission’s Rules and Regulations (Third Computer Inquiry), Report and Order, 104 F.C.C.2d 958 (1986) (“Computer III Phase I Order”). The FCC eventually relieved
AT&T of most Computer III requirements. See, e.g., Competition in Interstate Interexchange
Marketplace, Memorandum Opinion and Order on Reconsideration, 10 F.C.C.R. 4562
(1995); Competition in Interstate Interexchange Marketplace, Report and Order, 6
F.C.C.R. 5880 (1991); Amendment of Sections 64.702 of Commission’s Rules and Regulations (Third Computer Inquiry), Memorandum Opinion and Order on Reconsideration, 2
F.C.C.R. 3035, 3039–40 ¶ 32, 3042–43, ¶¶ 45–53 (1987) (“Computer III Phase I Reconsideration Order”). But see Filing and Review of Open Network Architecture Plans, Memorandum
Opinion and Order, 4 F.C.C.R. 2449 (1988) (“AT&T ONA Order”) (ruling that AT&T remains subject to a modified ONA plan the FCC approved in 1988). The FCC later extended some ONA requirements to GTE. See Application of Open Network Architecture
and Nondiscrimination Safeguards to GTE Corp., Report and Order, 9 F.C.C.R. 4922
(1994) (“GTE ONA Order”). The FCC never imposed CEI requirements on GTE. See Computer III Further Remand Proceedings: Bell Operating Co. Provision of Enhanced Services,
Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 13 F.C.C.R. 6040, 6049 n.30 (1998) (“Computer III
Further Remand Notice”).
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responded in its First and Second Computer Inquiries (“Computer I
and II”) by requiring that BOCs wishing to provide enhanced services
to do so through a separate corporate subsidiary.621 The order that
memorialized the breakup of AT&T similarly prohibited the BOCs
from providing “information services,”622 a category determined by
the courts and the FCC to be coterminous with “enhanced services,”623 and ordered the BOCs to provide nondiscriminatory access
to all information service providers.624
In its Third Computer Inquiry (“Computer III”), the FCC eventually concluded that the costs of the separate subsidiary requirement
outweighed the benefits and that nonstructural safeguards would protect against anticompetitive activity just as effectively.625 Consequently, the Commission created a two-phase system of nonstructural
restrictions that would allow the BOCs to avoid the separate subsidiary
requirement and thereby provide enhanced services on an integrated
basis. The first phase, known as comparably efficient interconnection
(CEI), required LECs that wished to provide enhanced services without establishing a separate corporate entity to provide unaffiliated
ESPs with access to the same basic services the LECs employed to provide their own enhanced service offerings.626 The second phase,
known as open network architecture (ONA), required the LECs to
621
In its First Computer Inquiry, the FCC drew a distinction between “communications services” and “data processing services.” Regulatory and Policy Problems Presented
by the Interdependence of Computer and Communication Services and Facilities, Tentative Decision of the Commission, 28 F.C.C.2d 291, 295 ¶ 15(a) (1970). The FCC also
required common carriers other than AT&T who wished to furnish data processing services to do so through a separate corporate subsidiary. See Regulatory and Policy Problems
Presented by Interdependence of Computer and Communication Services and Facilities,
Final Decision and Order, 28 F.C.C.2d 267, 270–74 ¶¶ 11–22 (1971), aff’d sub nom. GTE
Serv. Corp. v. FCC, 474 F.2d 724 (2d Cir. 1973). AT&T was precluded from offering data
processing services altogether by the 1956 consent decree that terminated antitrust litigation against it. See id. at 282 ¶ 39 & n.13.
622
United States v. AT&T Co., 552 F. Supp. 131, 189–90 (D.D.C. 1982), aff’d mem. sub
nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983). The AT&T decision defined information services as “the offering of a capability for generating, acquiring, storing, transforming, processing, retrieving, utilizing or making available information which may be
conveyed via telecommunications.” Id. at 179, 229. Although the court prohibited the
BOCs from offering information services, it did allow AT&T to offer most information
services after the divestiture of local telephone companies. The only exception was electronic publishing, from which AT&T was to be barred for seven years. See id. at 178–86.
623
Id. at 178 n.198; Implementation of the Non-Accounting Safeguards of Sections
271 and 272 of the Communications Act of 1934, as amended, First Report and Order and
Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 11 F.C.C.R. 21905, 21955–56 ¶ 102 (1996). As a
result, the FCC has used the terms interchangeably. See, e.g., Computer III Further Remand
Proceedings: Bell Operating Co. Provision of Enhanced Services, Report and Order, 14
F.C.C.R. 4289, 4290–91 n.3 (1999) (“Computer III Further Remand Report & Order”); Computer
III Further Remand Notice, 13 F.C.C.R. at 6042 n.4, 6066 ¶ 40.
624
AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 141 n.40, 195–97.
625
104 F.C.C.2d at 1002–12 ¶¶ 79–98.
626
See Computer III Phase I Order, 104 F.C.C.2d at 1035–43 ¶¶ 147–166.
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allow unbundled access to all of their network elements. ONA is substantially broader than CEI because it is not limited to LECs that offer
advanced services.627 Moreover, ONA requires that LECs provide access to all of their network elements, not simply those that the LECs
were using to provide their own enhanced services.628
In requiring LECs to provide unbundled access to elements of
their networks, the FCC refused to require physical collocation under
either CEI or ONA.629 Instead, the FCC simply mandated that the
LECs minimize transmission costs. Although the FCC recognized that
collocation would often represent the most efficient form of equal access available, it also acknowledged that other means might prove
more cost effective when space is extremely limited.630
During 1992 and 1993, the FCC lifted the structural separation
requirement as soon as individual BOCs had shown that their plans
met the ONA requirements.631 A series of judicial challenges has
failed to resolve the legality of the FCC’s Computer III regime.632 In
627
See Ameritech’s Comparably Efficient Interconnection Plan for Electronic Vaulting
Service, Order, 13 F.C.C.R. 80, 84 n.18 (1997); Bell Operating Cos. Joint Petition for
Waiver of Computer II Rules, Order, 10 F.C.C.R. 13758, 13762–63 ¶ 26 (1995).
628
Computer III Phase I Order, 104 F.C.C.2d at 1064–66 ¶¶ 214–217. As originally conceived, ONA appeared to offer LECs’ networks to unaffiliated ESPs on an element-by-element basis. The FCC eventually stopped short of such “fundamental unbundling,” instead
approving a “common ONA model” that did not require the LECs to disaggregate their
networks into individual facilities but instead allowed them to provide access of somewhat
larger aggregations of network elements. See Filing and Review of Open Network Architecture Plans, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 4 F.C.C.R. 1, 13–14 ¶¶ 5–8, 41–42 ¶ 69
(1988) (“BOC ONA Order”) .
629
See Computer III Phase I Order, 104 F.C.C.2d at 1037–38 ¶¶ 151–153, 1042 ¶ 164
(ruling that CEI did not require mandatory collocation); id. at 1066 ¶ 218 (extending the
same principles to ONA); accord BOC ONA Order, 4 F.C.C.R. at 41–42 ¶ 69 (recognizing that
the Computer III Phase I Order did not order “mandated interconnection on carriers’ premises of facilities owned by others”).
630
See Computer III Phase I Order, 104 F.C.C.2d at 1037–38 ¶¶ 151–153, 1042 ¶ 164; id.
at 1066 ¶ 218. The FCC has reaffirmed this decision on numerous occasions. See, e.g.,
Application of Open Network Architecture and Nondiscrimination Safeguards to GTE
Corp., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 11 F.C.C.R. 1388, 1414 ¶ 57 (1995); Computer III
Remand Proceedings: Bell Operating Co. Safeguards and Tier 1 Local Exchange Co. Safeguards, Report and Order, 6 F.C.C.R. 7571, 7600–01 ¶ 64 (1991) (“Computer III Remand
Proceedings”), vacated and remanded in part sub nom. California v. FCC, 39 F.3d 919 (9th Cir.
1994), cert. denied, 514 U.S. 1050 (1995); BOC ONA Order, 4 F.C.C.R. at 94 ¶¶ 181–183
(1988).
631
See Computer III: Bell Operating Co. Provision of Enhanced Services, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 10 F.C.C.R. 8360, 8366–67 n.22 (1995).
632
The Ninth Circuit initially overturned the Computer III regime as arbitrary and capricious on the ground that the FCC had not adequately justified its decision to rely on
nonstructural safeguards. See California v. FCC, 905 F.2d 1217, 1230–39 (9th Cir. 1990).
In response, the FCC strengthened ONA by imposing mandatory price cap regulation on
the BOCs and by establishing new cost accounting rules to make anticompetitive activity
easier to detect. The FCC also reaffirmed its conclusion that nonstructural safeguards
should govern BOC participation in the information services industry. See Computer III Remand Proceedings, 6 F.C.C.R. at 7578–88 ¶¶ 14–41, 7617–25 ¶¶ 98–109. As noted earlier,
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the meantime, the FCC has continued to require that BOCs and GTE
that comply with the ONA plans already filed with and approved by
the FCC.633 Furthermore, courts rejected the FCC’s attempt to preclude states from imposing more stringent access requirements on the
LECs.634 States were free to impose more stringent requirements over
intrastate enhanced services. As will be discussed in greater detail
later, certain states, such as Oregon, enacted their own ONA regimes
mandating physical collocation.635
ii. The Telecommunications Act of 1996
As noted earlier, the 1996 Act requires incumbent LECs to interconnect with other telecommunications carriers on just and reasonable terms and to provide other telecommunications carriers with
access to all of their network elements on an unbundled basis.636 In a
series of orders, the FCC determined that these statutory obligations
apply to many of the elements needed to provide DSL service. Specifically, the FCC ruled that the 1996 Act’s interconnection obligations
applied to facilities and equipment used to provide data services as
well as voice services637 and declined to exempt advanced services
from those requirements.638 In addition, the FCC concluded that the
high frequency portion of the loop used to carry DSL was subject to
the FCC simultaneously weakened ONA by shifting from a “fundamental unbundling” approach, in which ISPs could obtain access to the BOCs’ networks on an element-by-element basis, to a less granular approach, in which unbundling was defined in terms of
network services rather than facilities. See supra note 628. In California v. FCC, the Ninth
Circuit again partially vacated the FCC’s ONA regime on the ground that the FCC failed to
explain the shift away from fundamental unbundling. 39 F.3d at 925–30. The FCC has
issued a series of notices attempting to address the concerns raised by the Ninth Circuit.
See Computer III: Bell Operating Co. Provision of Enhanced Servvices, Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 13 F.C.C.R. 6040, 6050–55 (1998); Computer III Further Remand Proceedings:
Bell Operating Co. Provision of Enhanced Servs., Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 10
F.C.C.R. 8360, 8370–87 (1995) (“Computer III Further Remand Proceedings”). These proceedings, however, are yet to be completed. See Computer III Further Remand Proceedings: Bell
Operating Co. Provision of Enhanced Services, Report and Order, 14 F.C.C.R. 4289, 4292
n.6 (1999).
633
Bell Operating Cos.’ Joint Petition for Waiver of Computer II Rules, Memorandum
Opinion and Order, 10 F.C.C.R. 1724, 1730 (Common Carrier Bur. 1995) (“Interim Waiver
Order”); accord Computer III Further Remand Proceedings, 10 F.C.C.R. at 8369 ¶ 11.
634
California v. FCC, 905 F.2d at 1239–45.
635
See, e.g., OR. ADMIN. R. 860-035-0110 (2002); infra text accompanying note 718.
636
See supra notes 13, 47, 395–99 and accompanying text. Initially, the 1996 Act also
prohibited BOCs from offering in-region alarm monitoring services, 47 U.S.C. § 275(a)(1)
(2000), and temporarily required that BOCs offer information services and electronic publishing through a separate subsidiary, id. §§ 272(a)(2)(C), 274(a). These restrictions have
since expired. See id. §§ 272(f)(2), 274(g)(2), 275(a)(1).
637
Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced Telecommunications Capability, Memorandum Opinion and Order, and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 13 F.C.C.R.
24012, 24034–35 ¶¶ 46–47 (1998) (“Advanced Servs. Order”), remanded sub nom. US W. Communications, Inc. v. FCC, No. 98-1410, 1999 WL 72855 (D.C. Cir. Aug. 25, 1999).
638
See id. at 24018 ¶ 12, 24044–48 ¶¶ 69–79.
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unbundled access,639 as were most attached electronics.640 The FCC
also ruled that the forward-looking incremental-cost approach embodied in TELRIC would determine the rates charged for access to DSL
components.641
The FCC stopped short of mandating unbundled access to incumbent LECs’ packet-switching technology, including DSLAMs. Although unbundled access to routing and switching capability was
appropriate in the circuit-switched market, in which higher utilization
rates allowed incumbent LECs to achieve significant economies of
scale, incumbent LECs did not maintain a monopoly in the packetswitched market. The FCC recognized that investments in facilities
used to provide service to nascent markets, such as broadband, carried
significantly greater risks than those in established markets. Therefore, although the failure to mandate unbundled access required entrants to incur the costs associated with collocating their own
equipment, the potential adverse effect on investment incentives led
the FCC to refuse to mandate unbundled access to DSLAMs and other
packet-switching technology.642
The FCC did allow for one exception to this refusal by ruling that
incumbent LECs employing DLCs must provide unbundled access to
packet-switching equipment when the incumbent LEC has placed a
DSLAM in a remote terminal, but has not allowed other carriers to do
the same through physical collocation.643 In addition, although incumbent LECs need not provide unbundled access to their own
DSLAMs, they must allow requesting carriers to collocate DSLAMs
639
Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced Telecommunications Capability, Third Report and Order in CC Docket No. 98-147 and Fourth Report and Order in CC
Docket No. 96-98, 14 F.C.C.R. 20912, 20921–22 ¶¶ 13–14, 20922–23 ¶¶ 16–19, 20926 ¶ 25
(1999) (“Line Sharing Order”); 47 C.F.R. § 51.319(h) (2001); Advanced Servs. Order, 13
F.C.C.R. at 24036–38 ¶¶ 52–54. The FCC later clarified that incumbent LECs also must
condition (i.e., remove equipment from) loops upon request. See Implementation of Local
Competition Provisions of Telecommunications Act of 1996, Third Report and Order and
Fourth Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 15 F.C.C.R. 3696, 3775 ¶ 172, 3783–84
¶¶ 190–194 (1999) (“UNE Remand Order”); 47 C.F.R. § 51.319(a)(3), (h)(5). The D.C.
Circuit affirmed that incumbent LECs’ DSL-based advanced services are subject to 47
U.S.C. § 251(c). WorldCom, Inc. v. FCC, 246 F.3d 690, 693–95 (D.C. Cir. 2001). The
court did, however, vacate and remand the order for the FCC to determine whether DSLbased advanced services constituted “exchange access” or “telephone exchange service.”
Id. at 695–96.
640
UNE Remand Order, 15 F.C.C.R. at 3776–77 ¶ 175.
641
Line Sharing Order, 14 F.C.C.R. at 20973 ¶ 132, 20974–81 ¶¶ 135–157.
642
See UNE Remand Order, 15 F.C.C.R. at 3835–37 ¶¶ 306–309, 3839–40 ¶¶ 314–317; see
also Implementation of Local Competition Provisions of Telecommunications Act of 1996,
First Report and Order, 11 F.C.C.R. 15499, 15713 ¶ 427 (1996) (“Local Competition Order”)
(declining to “adopt a national rule for the unbundling of packet switches”).
643
UNE Remand Order, 15 F.C.C.R. at 3838–39 ¶ 313; 47 C.F.R. § 51.319(c)(5). The
regulations also require that no spare copper loops capable of providing DSL service be
available. See id.
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and other equipment needed to route data communications into the
requesting carrier’s packet-switched network.644
The FCC’s conclusions with respect to collocation largely paralleled its conclusions with respect to interconnection and unbundled
access. Carriers could collocate transmission and termination equipment, including multiplexers on LEC premises. New entrants were
not permitted, however, to collocate packet switches and other equipment used solely to provide enhanced services, because such equipment was unrelated to the transmission and termination of telephone
exchange service and exchange access.645 The FCC later clarified the
manner in which these rules applied to multifunction equipment by
explaining that incumbent LECs must permit collocation of any
equipment that was “used or useful for interconnection or access to
unbundled network elements, regardless of any other functionalities
that may be offered by that equipment.”646 As a result, competitors
had the right to collocate equipment such as DSLAMs, routers, ATM
multiplexers, and remote switching modules, which are designed both
to terminate and switch broadband traffic.647
The D.C. Circuit struck down the FCC’s decision permitting the
collocation of multifunction equipment.648 The court reasoned that
the FCC’s decision to mandate collocation of any equipment used or
useful for interconnection or access to unbundled network elements
conflicted with the statutory requirement that collocation be limited
to equipment that was “necessary to achieve reasonable physical
collocation.”649
A subsequent D.C. Circuit decision also struck down the FCC’s
decision requiring unbundled access to the high frequency portion of
local loops.650 The court based this decision on the FCC’s own findings that DSL providers faced “robust competition” from cable
modem providers and, to a lesser extent, satellite broadband provid644
See Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced Telecommunications Capability, Fourth Report and Order, 16 F.C.C.R. 15435, 15460–63 ¶¶ 45–51 (2001) (“Collocation Remand Order”), aff’d sub nom. Verizon Tel. Cos. v. FCC, 292 F.3d 903 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
645
See Local Competition Order, 11 F.C.C.R. at 15794–96 ¶¶ 580–581.
646
Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced Telecommunications Capability, First Report and Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 14 F.C.C.R. 4761, 4776–79
¶¶ 28–31 (1999) (“Collocation Order”).
647
See id. at 4776–77 ¶¶ 27–28.
648
GTE Serv. Corp. v. FCC, 205 F.3d 416, 418–19 (D.C. Cir. 2000). For an earlier
discussion of this case, see supra notes 408, 463, 483 and accompanying text.
649
GTE Serv. Corp., 205 F.3d at 426 (internal quotations omitted). In so holding, the
D.C. Circuit invoked the Supreme Court’s admonition that the term “necessary” must be
construed according to its ordinary meaning, which is limited to what is “required to achieve
a desired goal” and is not so broad as to apply to anything that simply increases the requesting carrier’s costs. Id. at 423–24 (emphasis added) (citing AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd.,
525 U.S. 366, 389–90 (1999)).
650
United States Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 290 F.3d 415, 428–29 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
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ers.651 In fact, cable modems established the early lead, capturing
fifty-four percent of the market for high-speed lines, while DSL captured only twenty-eight percent.652 At this point in the race, however,
“no competitor has a large embedded base of paying residential consumers,” and as a result the “record does not indicate that the consumer market is inherently a natural monopoly.”653 Drawing
guidance from Justice Breyer’s observation that mandatory unbundling creates innovation and investment disincentives and embroils network owners in the “tangled management inherent in
shared use of a common resource,”654 the D.C. Circuit concluded that
compelling access to the high frequency portions of loops exceeded
the “necessary” and “impair” requirements of the 1996 Act.655
In response, the FCC ruled that the high frequency portion of
the loop and fiber and hybrid fiber-copper loops are no longer unbundled network elements.656 In addition, the FCC revised its rules to
limit collocation of multifunction equipment to equipment that provides the requesting carrier either with interconnection that is “equal
in quality” to that provided by the incumbent LEC for its own services
or with “nondiscriminatory access to one or more unbundled network
elements.”657 The FCC asserted that even if the collocation effected a
per se taking, any issues relating to just compensation can be addressed after the implementation of an actual rate order.658 The parties did not press any constitutional issues in their unsuccessful
judicial challenge to the revised rules.659
651

See id. at 428.
Id. at 429 (citing Inquiry Concerning Deployment of Advanced Telecommunications Capability to All Americans in Reasonable and Timely Fashion, and Possible Steps to
Accelerate Such Deployment Pursuant to Section 706 of Telecommunications Act of 1996,
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 17 F.C.C.R. 2844, 2864 ¶ 44, 2865 ¶ 48 (2002)).
653
Id. at 428–29 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Inquiry Concerning Deployment of Advanced Telecommunications Capability to All Americans in Reasonable
and Timely Fashion, and Possible Steps to Accelerate Such Deployment Pursuant to Section 706 of Telecommunications Act of 1996, Report, 14 F.C.C.R. 2398, 2423 ¶ 48 (1999)).
654
See id. at 429 (citing AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 428–29 (1999)
(Berger, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part)).
655
See id. (holding that the FCC’s Line Sharing Order was tainted by the same error as
the provisions discussed in the earlier portions of the opinion, which focused on the “necessary” and “impair” standards). For a more complete description of these standards, see
supra note 408 and accompanying text.
656
Attachment to Triennial Review Press Release 2 (F.C.C. Feb. 20, 2003), available at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov./edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-231344A2.pdf.
657
Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced Telecommunications Capability, Fourth Report and Order, 16 F.C.C.R. 15435, 15454 ¶¶ 32–44 (2001) (“Collocation Remand Order”).
658
See Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced Telecommunications Capability, Order on Reconsideration and Second Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in
CC Docket No. 8-147 and Fifth Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in CC Docket No.
96-98, 15 F.C.C.R. 17806, 17839 ¶ 69 (2000) (“Collocation Reconsideration Order”).
659
See Verizon Tel. Cos. v. FCC, 292 F.3d 903, 905 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
652
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iii. Reconciling the Two Regimes
Although some commentators have suggested that the Telecommunications Act of 1996 superseded the Computer III regime,660 both
regimes continue to govern in slightly different spheres. For example,
the range of entities that must provide access under the 1996 Act is
broader than the range of entities that must do so under Computer III,
because the relevant provisions of the 1996 Act cover all incumbent
LECs, whereas ONA applies only to BOCs and, in some cases, GTE.661
In addition, a narrower range of entities may request access under the
1996 Act than may request access under Computer III. Because the interconnection and unbundled access provisions of the 1996 Act extend only to “telecommunications carriers”662—those who offer
transport services to the public without changing the form or content
of the information663—it does not cover pure ESPs, which use computer processing to modify user-supplied information without providing transmission services to end users.664 Finally, the two regimes have
different geographic scopes.665
The FCC launched a series of proposals reconsidering various
features of the current regulatory regime. For example, the FCC
reevaluated whether the high-frequency portion of the loop should
continue to be a network element subject to unbundled access.666 At
660

See, e.g., Cannon, supra note 616, at 68.
See supra note 620. GTE merged with Bell Atlantic to form Verizon. See Peter J.
Howe, Regulators OK Bell Atlantic-GTE Merger, BOSTON GLOBE, June 17, 2000, at C1.
662
47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(2)–(3) (2000).
663
See id. § 153(43), (44), (46). The FCC determined that telecommunications carriers remain within the scope of the interconnection and unbundled access provisions of the
1996 Act even if they offer information services through the same arrangement. Implementation of Local Competition Provisions of Telecommunications Act of 1996, First Report & Order, 11 F.C.C.R. 15499, 15990 ¶¶ 992–995 (1996) (“Local Competition Order”).
664
Computer III Further Remand Proceedings: Bell Operating Co. Provision of Enhanced Services, Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 13 F.C.C.R. 6040, 6061 ¶ 32,
6090 ¶ 92 (1998) (“Computer III Further Remand Notice”). Pure ISPs provide only information services. See 47 U.S.C. § 153(20).
665
The separate affiliate requirements for BOC provision of information services
under the 1996 Act are limited to interLATA information services, 47 U.S.C. § 271(a),
except with regard to electronic publishing services, which must be provided through a
separate affiliate regardless of whether it is offered on an interLATA or on an intraLATA
basis, 47 U.S.C. § 274(a). The separate subsidiary requirements enacted by Computer II and
the nonstructural safeguards enacted by Computer III do not distinguish between interLATA and intraLATA information services. Implementation of the Non-Accounting
Safeguards of Section 271 and 272 of the Communications Act of 1934, as Amended, First
Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 11 F.C.C.R. 21905,
21969–70 ¶¶ 132–134 (1996) (“Non-Accounting Safeguards Order”). As a result, interLATA
information services are subject to both section 271 of the 1996 Act and ONA/CEI. IntraLATA services (except electronic publishing) are subject only to CEI and ONA. Id.
666
See Review of Section 251 Unbundling Obligations of Incumbent Local Exchange
Carriers, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 16 F.C.C.R. 22781, 22805–06 ¶ 53 (2001) (“Triennial UNE Review Notice”).
661
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the same proceeding, the FCC solicited comments on the rules governing unbundling.667 The FCC also sought comments on the physical collocation rules of DSLAMs and other equipment at remote
terminals.668 Finally, the FCC opened a sweeping inquiry attempting
to rationalize these two regulatory regimes. In particular, this proceeding explored whether technological changes or the enactment of
the 1996 Act justify or require the modification or elimination of part
or all of the CEI and ONA regime created by Computer III.669
For the purposes of this Article, the key fact is that unlike the
federal ONA regime, the 1996 Act and certain state ONA regimes give
requesting carriers the right to collocate DSLAMs and switching and
routing equipment on the incumbent LEC’s property, whether in central offices or remote terminals.670 Like all unbundled network elements governed by the 1996 Act, the rates that incumbent LECs may
charge for conditioned loops and physical collocation are governed
by TELRIC.671
b. Cable Modem Systems
Cable modems represent the other principal technology for providing broadband services to residential customers.672 Cable modem
systems provide data communications through the network of coaxial
cables originally designed to provide a uniform stream of video programming in one direction running from the network to all subscribers. Before a cable network can be used to provide cable modem
service, it must be transformed from the typical tree-and-branch infrastructure associated with transmitting television programming into a
ring or star-type infrastructure. This is usually accomplished through
a hybrid fiber-coaxial (HFC) architecture similar to the DLC architecture discussed above.673 In an HFC architecture, fiber optic cables are
used to connect the cable headend to a satellite facility known as a
neighborhood node. The final connection between the neighbor667
Id. at 22809 ¶ 61 (requesting comments on the rule requiring unbundled access to
DSLAMs in remote terminals where collocation is impossible and alternative copper loops
are unavailable); Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced Telecommunications Capability, Order on Reconsideration & Second Further Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking in CC Docket No. 8–147 and Fifth Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in
CC Docket No. 96–98, 15 F.C.C.R. 17806, 17851–54 ¶¶ 103–112 (2000) (“Collocation Reconsideration Order”) (opening general inquiry into unbundled access at remote terminals).
668
See Collocation Reconsideration Order, 15 F.C.C.R. at 17851–54 ¶¶ 104–112 (2000).
669
Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to Internet over Wireline Facilities,
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 17 F.C.C.R. 3019, 3040–43 ¶¶ 43-53 (2002).
670
See supra notes 375, 384, 634 and accompanying text.
671
See supra notes 408–15 and accompanying text.
672
The ensuing regulatory history draws on the discussion in Yoo, supra note 11, at
175–76, 250–51.
673
See supra note 614 and accompanying text. For simplicity, Figure 5 omits the fact
that fiber rods are actually deployed in a ring configuration.
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hood node and the subscribers is made through copper-based coaxial
cables. Cable modem service also requires special equipment at the
headend known as frequency up-conventer to segregate the video at
data streams onto different channels. A device known as a cable
modem termination system (CMTS) in turn separates and connects
the flow of data to the various broadband services, such as e-mail, IP
telephony, content cached locally, and content residing on the World
Wide Web.
FIGURE 5: TYPICAL CONFIGURATION
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CABLE MODEM SYSTEM
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The principal access-related policy question regarding cable
modem systems is the extent to which the government should ensure
that cable modem customers have some degree of choice among ISPs.
Litigants and commentators have described this issue as either “open
access” or “forced access,” depending on the particular biases of the
party using the term.674 In an attempt to sidestep the political overtones associated with either designation, the FCC opted to refer to the
issue as “multiple ISP access.”675
Questions about multiple ISP access first arose during the FCC’s
review of AT&T’s proposed acquisitions of TCI and MediaOne. A
number of parties argued that allowing AT&T to bring both physical
transmission and ISP services under the same corporate umbrella
would allow AT&T to use its control over cable to harm competition
in the market for ISPs. Consequently, these parties asked the FCC to
force AT&T to allow independent ISPs to interconnect with AT&T’s
cable modem service network on nondiscriminatory terms.676 Consistent with its longstanding policy of nonregulation of computer-based
674
See Applications for Consent to Transfer of Control of Licenses and Section 214
Authorizations from MediaOne Group, Inc., Transferor, to AT&T Corp., Transferee, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 15 F.C.C.R. 9816, 9866 ¶ 114 (2000) (“AT&T-MediaOne
Merger”).
675
Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to the Internet Over Cable and Other Facilities, Declaratory Ruling and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 17 F.C.C.R. 4798, 4839 ¶ 72
(2002) (internal quotation marks omitted).
676
See AT&T-MediaOne Merger, 15 F.C.C.R. at 9866 ¶¶ 114–115; Applications for Consent to Transfer of Control of Licenses and Section 214 Authorizations from Tele-Communications, Inc., Transferor, to AT&T Corp., Transferee, Memorandum Opinion and Order,
14 F.C.C.R. 3160, 3197–98 ¶ 75 (1999) (“AT&T-TCI Merger”).
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services,677 the FCC refused to impose multiple ISP access as a merger
condition in either case.678
Because cable operators are subject to municipal as well as federal regulation, advocates of multiple ISP access pressed their arguments before municipal regulators. Some of these municipal
authorities turned out to be more accommodating than the FCC, either mandating open access by municipal ordinance679 or requiring it
as a condition for the license transfer needed to complete AT&T’s
acquisitions of TCI and MediaOne.680 A series of judicial decisions
holding that municipal franchising authorities lacked the jurisdiction
to compel multiple ISP access soon cut short these municipal
regulations.681
Multiple ISP access advocates were unable to garner sustainable
victories until the merger between America Online and Time Warner.
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) order approving the merger
required that AOL Time Warner allow cable modem subscribers the
option of choosing from among at least three unaffiliated ISPs in addition to its proprietary ISPs, America Online and RoadRunner.682
677
See, e.g., Amendment of Section 64.702 of Commission’s Rules and Regulations
(Second Computer Inquiry), Order, 77 F.C.C.2d 384, 433 ¶¶ 124–127 (1980) (“Computer II
Final Decision”), aff’d sub nom. Computer & Communications Indus. Ass’n v. FCC, 693 F.2d
198 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 938 (1983); Regulatory and Policy Problems
Presented by Interdependence of Computer and Communication Services and Facilities,
Final Decision and Order, 28 F.C.C.2d 267, 270 ¶ 11 (1970), aff’d sub nom. GTE Serv. Corp.
v. FCC, 474 F.2d 724 (2d Cir. 1973).
678
AT&T-MediaOne Merger, 15 F.C.C.R. at 9872–73 ¶ 127; AT&T-TCI Merger, 14
F.C.C.R. at 3205–08 ¶¶ 92–96.
679
See Comcast Cablevision of Broward County, Inc. v. Broward County, 124 F. Supp.
2d 685, 686–87 (S.D. Fla. 2000).
680
See MediaOne Group, Inc. v. County of Henrico, Va., 257 F.3d 356, 360 (4th Cir.
2001); AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland, 216 F.3d 871, 875 (9th Cir. 2000). See generally
LATHEN, supra note 612, at 14–15 (describing mandated access proposals in Portland,
Broward County, Florida, San Francisco, and Fairfax, Virginia, as well as initiatives in other
localities).
681
The Ninth Circuit’s decision followed from its conclusion that cable modem service
constituted a “telecommunications service[ ].” AT&T, 216 F.3d at 878–79. The Fourth
Circuit was more circumspect about the proper regulatory classification of cable modem
service, holding instead that requiring open access violated 47 U.S.C. § 541(b)(3)(D)
(2000), which prohibits franchising authorities from requiring cable operators to provide
telecommunications facilities. MediaOne, 257 F.3d at 362–65.
682
The FTC order allowed AOL Time Warner to begin providing cable service in
twenty specifically identified geographic areas, provided that cable modem subscribers had
the option of subscribing to Earthlink and that AOL Time Warner made at least two additional unaffiliated ISP options available within ninety days. See America Online, Inc., No.
C-3989, slip op. at 6-7 (F.T.C. Dec. 18, 2000) (Decision and Order), available at http://
www.ftc.gov/os/2000/12/aoldando.pdf. The order did not condition the initial offering
of services on the availability of Earthlink as an option in any other geographic area. Instead, it simply required AOL Time Warner to provide at least three unaffiliated ISPs
within ninety days of making its own ISP services available. See id. at 8. The FTC also
authorized the appointment of a trustee to monitor compliance with its order. See id. at
12–14.
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The order also required AOL Time Warner to provide all of these
unaffiliated ISPs with “Access,”683 which the order defined as the right
to interconnect at the same connection points that AOL Time Warner
provided to its own affiliated ISPs.684 In addition, the order required
that AOL Time Warner not discriminate against the unaffiliated ISPs’
content,685 and that all ISP service agreements include a “most favored nation clause,” allowing unaffiliated ISPs to avail themselves of
the most attractive terms obtained by AOL from other unaffiliated
cable systems.686
Although it had rejected similar arguments in relation to AT&T’s
acquisitions of TCI and MediaOne,687 the FCC abruptly reversed
course, endorsing the FTC’s requirement that Time Warner and
America Online negotiate open access with at least three unaffiliated
ISPs as a condition of their merger.688 Although the FCC claimed that
its decision did not “portend” how it would resolve multiple ISP access
as a matter of general regulatory policy,689 the breadth of its reasoning
suggested that it might approve even more sweeping action in the future.690 In fact, AT&T and Comcast voluntarily agreed to undertake a
limited form of multiple ISP access, apparently to boost their chances
of regulatory approval for Comcast’s acquisition of AT&T’s cable
properties.691
Since then, however, the FCC’s initial reticence to impose multiple ISP access seems to have reasserted itself. For example, the FCC
concluded that cable modem service is an interstate “information service.”692 This decision has twofold significance. First, by rejecting the
Ninth Circuit’s conclusion that cable modem services constituted
“telecommunications services,”693 the FCC removed cable modem service from the interconnection, unbundled access, and physical collo683

Id. at 11.
Id. at 2.
685
Id. at 11.
686
Id. at 9.
687
See supra note 678 and accompanying text.
688
See Applications for Consent to the Transfer of Control of Licenses and Section 214
Authorizations by Time Warner Inc. and America Online, Inc., Transferors, to AOL Time
Warner Inc., Transferee, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 16 F.C.C.R. 6547, 6568–69
¶ 57 (2001) (“AOL-Time Warner Merger”).
689
Id. at 6569 ¶ 58.
690
See id. at 6581–6600 ¶¶ 80–125.
691
See Julia Angwin, AT&T to Offer EarthLink Inc. on Cable Lines, WALL ST. J., Mar. 13,
2002, at B7; Julia Angwin, Comcast, United Online Set Deal for Internet Service on Cable Lines,
WALL ST. J., Feb. 27, 2002, at B4.
692
Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to Internet Over Cable and Other Facilities, Declaratory Ruling and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 17 F.C.C.R. 4798, 4820–32,
¶¶ 34–59 (2002) (“Cable Modem NPRM”).
693
Id. at 4831–32 ¶¶ 56–58.
684
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cation requirements contained in the 1996 Act.694 Second, the FCC’s
decision placed cable modems in a regulatory category traditionally
associated with nonregulation. Therefore, the classification of cable
modem service as an information service was generally regarded as a
signal that the FCC was unlikely to mandate multiple ISP access.695
The FCC acknowledged that this remained an open issue and requested comments on the relative merits of imposing multiple ISP access,696 as well as on the free speech and takings implications of
compelling such access.697
The order approving Comcast’s acquisition of AT&T’s cable businesses cast further doubts on the Commission’s willingness to impose
multiple ISP access.698 Notably, the FCC downplayed its role in the
multiple ISP access mandate imposed during the AOL-Time Warner
merger. The Commission argued that the unaffiliated ISP condition
was imposed by the FTC and that the FCC’s only contribution to the
process was to require that any such access, provided voluntarily or
otherwise, be offered on a nondiscriminatory basis. In addition, the
FCC argued that multiple ISP access was justified in that case because
the merger brought the nation’s largest ISP, second largest cable operator, and some of the largest libraries of multimedia content available under the same corporate umbrella. The AT&T-Comcast merger
posed no similar risks. Indeed, Comcast had already made a commitment to support ISP choice and was already bound by contract to allow a number of unaffiliated ISPs access to its system. As a result, the
FCC concluded that any further multiple ISP requirements were
unnecessary.699
2. Economic Arguments in Favor of Market-Based Pricing
If the government mandates access to broadband inputs, economic analysis indicates that access rates should be based on market
prices. As we have repeatedly emphasized, this would promote allocative efficiency by giving both purchasers and providers the appropriate signals for calibrating consumption and production levels. In
addition, basing access rates on market prices would enhance dynamic efficiency by providing the incentives necessary to attract the
694
Interestingly, classifying cable modem service as an information service possibly
subjected it to municipal regulation, as demonstrated by the FCC’s active solicitation of
comments on this specific point. See id. at 4849 ¶ 100.
695
See Yochi J. Dreazen, FCC Ruling Frees Cable-TV Firms from Sharing Wires, WALL ST. J.,
Mar. 15, 2002, at B2.
696
Cable Modem NPRM, 17 F.C.C.R. at 4839–41 ¶ 74, 4843–47 ¶¶ 83–93.
697
Id. at 4843 ¶¶ 80–81.
698
Applications for Consent to the Transfer of Control of Licenses from Comcast
Corp. & AT&T Corp., Transferors, to AT&T Comcast Corp., Transferee, Memorandum
Opinion and Order, 17 F.C.C.R. 23246, 23299–300 ¶ 135 (2002).
699
Id. at 22300–01 ¶¶ 135–137.
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investments needed to finance the deployment of the various broadband technologies. As the FCC has repeatedly recognized, issues surrounding investment and innovation are of the utmost importance
when the market involved “is a nascent one.”700
Although at one time market prices might have been difficult to
determine, the emergence of new technologies capable of providing
high-speed broadband services make this task increasingly easy. As
noted earlier, DSL and cable modem systems are currently competing
vigorously for early dominance of the broadband industry. Although
both technologies are generally assumed to constitute natural monopolies, formal models calibrated on engineering data suggest that as
many as seventy percent of U.S. households may eventually be able to
choose from up to three wireline broadband providers.701 In addition, communications companies provide broadband services through
a wide variety of wireless technologies, including PCS, MDS, ancillary
and supplemental service provided via digital television, and 3G mobile wireless devices.702 These services are similar in geographic scope
to those provided by cable modem and local telephone systems. Although these services are still in their nascent stages, when fully operational they should provide a ready basis for determining the value of
the transmission of services.
In addition, DBS companies provide satellite broadband services
that are beginning to compete directly with cable modem systems and
ADSL.703 These too can provide a market-based benchmark for the
value of network services. Because DBS is necessarily national in
scope and because the quality of the broadband services may differ,
any direct comparison between DBS and other more regional wireline
broadband services can be complicated. Nevertheless, these substitutes can provide useful guidance as to the value of services under a
regime of compelled access.
If these alternative technologies are insufficiently developed to
allow direct determination of market prices, economic theory indicates that regulatory authorities should base rates on ECPR, which sets
rates as the sum of the forward-looking incremental cost and the opportunity cost associated with providing access.704 The opportunity
cost of providing network access is determined by subtracting direct
incremental costs from the retail price in the final goods market. The
700
See, e.g., Cable Modem NPRM, 17 F.C.C.R. at 4802 ¶ 5; Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Advanced Telecommunications Capability, First Report and Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 14 F.C.C.R. 4761, 4763 ¶ 2 (1999) (“Collocation Order”).
701
See Gerald R. Faulhaber & Christian Hogendorn, The Market Structure of Broadband
Telecommunications, 48 J. INDUS. ECON. 305, 321 (2000).
702
See supra notes 549, 552–53, 652–53 and accompanying text.
703
See supra note 551 and accompanying text.
704
See supra Part I.C.3.
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FCC has been reluctant to allow this method, primarily because the
retail prices supposedly reflected monopoly returns.705 Although this
position is at least arguable in the case of local telephony,706 it is unsupportable in the case of broadband. The FCC and the courts have
recognized that vibrant competition exists, and the impending arrival
of additional competitors should only cause it to intensify.707
Indeed, the presence of this competition raises serious questions
whether compelling access to high-speed broadband facilities represents sensible economic policy. Access requirements only make sense
if a true bottleneck facility provides a company with a natural monopoly. When competition exists, compelled access at best accomplishes
nothing, because parties who negotiate agreements on other terms
will simply negotiate around access rates that are set too high.708 Access rates that are set too low, however, can harm allocative efficiency
by creating the shortages and distortions inevitably associated with
prices that are not calibrated to balance supply and demand.709
Worse yet, compelled access can harm dynamic efficiency by eliminating the need for firms to invest in substitute facilities. By rescuing
those who need alternative means of transmission from having to invest in alternative capacity, access requirements can forestall the emergence of competition by depriving other facilities-based competitors
of their natural strategic partners.710 Access requirements can thus
have the perverse effect of cementing the existing technologies into
place. The FCC’s notice of proposed rulemaking acknowledges this
by underscoring the importance of taking a more functional approach711 and recognizing the emergence of multiple options in providing broadband service, including cable, telephony, wireless, and
satellite.712 Indeed, it was the emergence of this competition that led
the FCC to seek comment on whether access requirements should be
eliminated.713
Thus, there is good reason to question whether the FCC should
compel access to broadband networks. If it does, it should base the
rates for such access on market prices. Any attempt to base prices
solely on direct cost, as under the current TELRIC regime, fails to
705

See supra notes 418, 447 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 418, 479 and accompanying text.
707
See supra notes 548–54, 653 and accompanying text.
708
This presumes that access rates will follow the model established by the 1996 Act
and, rather than requiring carriers to provide services on a tariffed basis, allow parties to
negotiate their own arrangements.
709
See supra Part I.B.1.
710
See, e.g., supra notes 25, 455–56 and accompanying text.
711
See Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over Wireline
Facilities, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 17 F.C.C.R. 3019, 3023 ¶ 7 (2002).
712
See id. at 3037–38 ¶¶ 36–37.
713
See id. at 3040–42 ¶¶ 44–48.
706
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acknowledge that market value of network access is determined by the
value of the services sold through the network, not the cost of the
network itself.714 Not only is this appropriate in light of the fact that
networks are capital assets that are not consumed, but it also reflects
the demand-side considerations that underlie economic analysis. The
presence of substitute facilities should permit market value to be determined through a comparison to actual market transactions or
through the opportunity cost component mandated by ECPR. The
presence of direct competition makes it unlikely that prices set in this
manner will allow network owners to recover supracompetitive
returns.
3. Constitutional Arguments in Favor of Market-Based Pricing
The Supreme Court’s takings jurisprudence provides another
reason for requiring that any FCC-imposed access be priced at market
value. The issues are the clearest with respect to DSL. Although the
D.C. Circuit vacated the regulations providing that the high frequency
portion of the loop constituted a network element subject to unbundled access under the 1996 Act, it left intact the regulations giving
telecommunications carriers the right to physically collocate DSLAMs
and other routing equipment on the incumbent LEC’s property.715 It
seems clear that such a requirement constitutes the type of permanent
physical occupation held to constitute a per se taking in Loretto.716
Lower court precedent supports this conclusion as well. In GTE
Northwest, Inc. v. Public Utility Commission,717 GTE challenged a state
regulatory provision similar to the ONA regime created by the FCC in
Computer III. The key difference, however, was that Oregon’s regime
required local telephone companies to permit ESPs to physically collocate on their property.718 After reviewing the relevant takings analysis contained in Loretto, FCC v. Florida Power Corp.,719 and Yee v. City of
Escondido,720 the court concluded that the physical collocation requirement was properly characterized as the type of permanent physical invasion held to be a per se taking in Loretto.721 In so holding, the
714

See supra notes 27, 322–35 and accompanying text.
See United States Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 290 F.3d 415, 428–29 (D.C. Cir. 2002);
supra notes 650–55 and accompanying text.
716
See supra Part II.A.2.
717
900 P.2d 495 (Or. 1995). The litigants in GTE Northwest framed their challenge in
terms of both the Takings Clause and the corresponding provision of the Oregon Constitution. The court assumed without deciding that the analysis would be the same under either provision. See id. at 501 n.6; see also supra notes 627–28 and accompanying text
(describing ONA).
718
See OR. ADMIN. R. 860-035-0110 (2002); see also supra text accompanying note 635.
719
480 U.S. 245 (1987); see supra Part II.A.3.
720
503 U.S. 519 (1992).
721
See GTE Northwest, 900 P.2d at 502–04.
715
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court rejected the argument that the prior restrictions on the telephone company’s ability to use its property deprived the company of
any “historically rooted expectation of compensation.”722 As the court
reasoned, “the facts that an industry is heavily regulated, and that a
property owner acquired the property knowing that it is heavily regulated, do not diminish a physical invasion to something less than a
taking.”723 The court also rejected the argument that physical collocation represented nothing more than a restriction on the use of property that was more properly analyzed as a regulatory taking.724
Furthermore, according to the court, the PUC lacked the statutory
authority to exercise the power of eminent domain. As a result, the
Oregon Supreme Court invalidated the PUC’s collocation regulations
as beyond the PUC’s statutory authority.725
The analysis with respect to cable modem systems is slightly more
ambiguous. Unless it mandates multiple ISP access as a general matter, the FCC need not address precisely how and where the interconnection needed for multiple ISP access should occur or how such
access should be priced.726 None of the municipal ordinances requiring multiple ISP access sets forth parameters for interconnection or
pricing guidelines, and no consensus has emerged among industry
participants as to where the interconnection needed for multiple ISP
access should occur.727 Accordingly, the only operative multiple ISP
722

Id. at 504.
Id.
724
See id. at 505–06.
725
Id. at 499–501. Note that provisions of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 explicitly give state public utility commissions the right to enforce physical collocation provisions.
47 U.S.C. §§ 251(c)(6), 252 (2000). See generally Philip J. Weiser, Towards a Constitutional
Architecture for Cooperative Federalism, 79 N.C. L. REV. 663, 676–77 (2001) (“Under the
Telecom Act, state agencies like the Oregon PUC have mandated physical collocation and
other measures that the agencies would not be otherwise authorized to do under state
law.”). Although this effectively overturned the Oregon Supreme Court’s holding with
respect to the PUC’s authority to enforce physical collocation, it did not in any way undercut the court’s conclusion that the physical collocation provisions of the Oregon regulatory
scheme constituted a per se taking under Loretto.
726
See LATHEN, supra note 612, at 36.
727
Id. at 38–39. Most of these ordinances simply required that cable modem systems
provide nondiscriminatory access by allowing unaffiliated ISPs to obtain carriage on the
same terms as affiliated ISPs. Although the ordinances in question failed to address the
point, such schemes generally require elaborate accounting and nonaccounting rules to
ensure that the terms of the access agreements with affiliated ISPs does not include any
cross subsidies. See id. at 38 (citing Implementation of Non-Accounting Safeguards of Sections 271 and 272 of Communications Act of 1934, as Amended, First Report and Order
and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 11 F.C.C.R. 21905 (1996); Implementation
of Telecommunications Act of 1996: Accounting Safeguards Under Telecommunications
Act of 1996, Report and Order, 11 F.C.C.R. 17539 (1996)). Thus, contrary to the suggestion of some advocates of multiple ISP access, see, e.g., Jim Chen, The Authority to Regulate
Broadband Internet Access over Cable, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 677, 716 (2001), it is likely that
any such scheme would require a significant degree of public utility regulation.
723
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access requirements are those imposed as part of the regulatory approval of the AOL-Time Warner merger, which gives certain unaffiliated ISPs the right to interconnect at the same points as AOL Time
Warner’s proprietary ISPs.728 As a result, contrary to the suggestion of
some scholars,729 multiple ISP access to cable modem systems will
likely require the type of permanent physical invasion held to constitute a per se taking. Consequently, cable modem system operators
who are subjected to multiple ISP access requirements would be entitled to fair-market value as compensation. As noted in the discussion
regarding access to DSL networks, the proliferation of technological
alternatives is in the process of greatly simplifying such a
determination.730
CONCLUSION
There can be little question that compelling access to networks
has tremendous intuitive appeal as a potential regulatory response to
the growing influence of network technologies. Such compulsion
would seem to increase the number of options presented to consumers and would appear to offer the prospect of lowering the prices at
which network services are available. It goes without saying, however,
that there is no free lunch—every regulatory effort that seeks to promote the availability of any particular good necessarily carries costs.
Specifically, direct government intervention in establishing access
rates all too often fosters allocative inefficiency by interfering with the
mechanism through which consumers of network access calibrate
their overall level of purchases. Interference with market pricing simultaneously causes secondary distortions in the markets for substitute inputs by making the regulated input seem artificially attractive.
These effects create further inefficiencies in the production decisions
of entrants and incumbent firms by distorting their mix of productive
inputs.
What is less obvious, but no less important, is how government
regulation of access pricing can impede dynamic efficiency. Market
728
See supra notes 682–85 and accompanying text. The multiple ISP access scheme
mandated by the FTC originally anticipated that the unaffiliated ISPs would place their
own routing and backbone access facilities within the cable headend in a manner that
closely resembled physical collocation. As actually implemented, however, multiple ISP
access bears a greater resemblance to virtual collocation, with all of the traffic exiting the
headend via AOL’s backbone and interconnecting with the unaffiliated ISP’s network at
some location outside the headend. As we have argued earlier in this Article, this shift
does not take the access regime outside the realm of physical takings, because multiple ISP
access would still require every cable modem system operator to permit unaffiliated ISPs to
establish a physical connection to its network. See supra notes 481–90 and accompanying
text.
729
See, e.g., Chen, supra note 727, at 716.
730
See supra note 707 and accompanying text.
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prices play a critical role in encouraging firms who need access to
telecommunications networks to make the financial commitments
necessary to deploy alternative network technologies. Compelling access at below-market rates only serves to dampen the price signal that
normally would stimulate investment in additional network capacity.
In addition, by precluding these firms from having to make such investments, compelled access starves firms seeking to deploy substitute
technologies of the financial resources they need to support the
buildout of their networks. The arguments that networks are unique
economic phenomena, to which ordinary economic analysis does not
apply, simply do not withstand scrutiny.
Given the economic support for basing access rates on market
pricing, it should come as little surprise that the Supreme Court’s takings jurisprudence supports the same conclusion. Policy makers and
the courts have sanctioned the use of cost-based rather than marketbased rates only because the initial lack of competition among different network facilities rendered market-based pricing of network access
impossible. The emergence of technological alternatives capable of
serving as substitutes and the overarching shift in regulatory policy
from rate regulation to access regulation have called into question the
justifications for failing to base access rates on market prices. Indeed,
our discussion of the current status of local telephone networks, utility
pole networks, and wireline broadband networks identifies the ways in
which technology now provides the external benchmarks needed to
support market-based access pricing. Of course, sufficient competition in the provision of network services eventually would suggest regulatory forbearance in setting access rates and compelling access, with
reliance instead on markets both for pricing of network services and
for assuring the provision of access.
Of course numerous technical obstacles to implementing such a
solution remain. Many of the technologies to which we refer are only
now in the process of being deployed, and if previous policy making
in other technologies is any guide, numerous technical and accounting-related difficulties doubtless still exist. Nonetheless, the economic
and constitutional validity of market-based pricing of access to networks should be sufficient to overcome these administrative costs.
Market-based rates correctly identify both the economic costs and the
just compensation for takings in the “age of access.”

